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This dissertation traces the biomedical networks through which human
chimeras are clinically constituted.  Chimeras are organisms in which two
or more genetically distinct cell populations co-exist.  Unlike their
experimentally produced counterparts (often interspecies mixtures),
human chimeras arise spontaneously when fraternal twin embryos fuse in
the womb.  While undoubtedly a rare occurrence, the true incidence is
unknown because many chimeras have no visible signs of their composite
being.  Hence, chimeras are produced in an inadvertent encounter with the
laboratory, during blood donation or tissue typing, for example.  A
subtype of chimerism, called microchimerism, occurs when the second
cell population is tiny.  The main context in which microchimerism is
discussed in biomedical research is cell exchange between women and
their fetuses, now thought to be a normal event during pregnancy.  Human
chimerism has existed since the 1950’s, and microchimerism has become
a research theme only in the last decade.
Like multiple personality disorder, conjoined twinning and organ
transplantation, human chimerism troubles the connection between the
individual and the body.  Bodies, in these cases, are not neatly contained,
which calls into question the inevitability and naturalness of singularembodiment.  Chimerism, in particular, offers an analytical vantage point
for the examination of genetics and identity in contemporary biomedicine.
Using historical and ethnographic methods, and analytical tools from
science & technology studies, this dissertation explores human chimerism
and microchimerism.  Interviews with scientists and careful analyses of
published and unpublished literature reveals that biomedical researchers
speak and write as though cells and people are interchangeable; not only
do people contain cells, cells contain people.  This tendency is an
instantiation of genetic reductionism (we are our genomes), but it also
refers to much older Western traditions wherein the material of the body
is one and the same as the person.  In chimerism, though, ascribing
personal identity to cells leads to a confusion of the boundaries by which
individuals are normally separated.  While the location of personhood in
cells is no doubt a reductionist tendency, the result – the fragmentation
and interspersion of selves – leads to a provocative anti-reductionist
conclusion: we all contain multitudes.iii
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INTRODUCTION
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes)
---Walt Whitman, Song of Myself
1
The category of the person
The “category of the person” has many guises: self, soul, name, psyche,
consciousness, personality, biography, citizen, body.
2 Most of these terms
are presumed, in contemporary Western societies, to be unitary, one, to
have identity with each other, in the mathematical and sociological
meanings of the word.  However, under careful historical and cross-
cultural scrutiny, all of these concepts prove to be contingent on time and
place, rather than essential to human being.  Moreover, their alignment
may be peculiar to Western modernity.  Marcel Mauss showed that among
the Kwakiutl Indians of the Northwest US and Canada, names do not
attach to persons in the ways in which we are familiar, but rather change
according to the season and to the age of the individual.  Moreover, a clan
has a fixed number of names, and ancestors “live again in the bodies of
                                                   
1  Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass, Bantam classic edition ed. (New York:
Bantam Books, 1983 [1892]), 72.
2 This is in reference to Marcel Mauss, "A Category of the Human Mind:
The Notion of Person; the Notion of Self," in The Category of the Person:
Anthropology, Philosophy, History, eds. Michael Carrithers, Steven
Collins and Steven Lukes, trans. W. D. Halls (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1985 [1938]), 1-25.2
those who bear their names.”
3  Long before the decentered self came into
vogue in the academy, William James wrote: “Properly speaking, a man
has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and
carry an image of him in their mind.”
4
Ian Hacking’s history of multiple personality shows how, in the late
1800’s, psychologists used cases of dédoublement to refute the existence
of a transcendental self, soul or ego: “For in those individuals, there was
not one single self.  Those individuals had two personalities, each
connected by a continuous or normal chain of memories, aside from
amnesic gaps…. Hence (it seemed) there were two persons, two souls in
one body.”
5  Studies of multiple personality disorder, including
Hacking’s, explore the existential confusion encountered by multiples in a
world where social and political institutions, such as courts, require
individuality to be singular.
6  Similarly, in her work on conjoined twins,
Alice Dreger foregrounds the social imperative to contain only one body
per person.
7  While almost all twins who have remained conjoined report
that they prefer it that way, singleton doctors, judges and parents presume
                                                   
3  Ibid., 8.
4  William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: H. Holt and
company, 1890), 294.
5  Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences
of Memory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 208.
6 Hacking, Rewriting the Soul; Elyn R. Saks and Stephen H. Behnke,
Jekyll on Trial: Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Law (New
York: New York University Press, 1997).
7  Alice Domurat Dreger, One of Us: Conjoined Twins and the Future of
Normal (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).3
that a life that so radically impinges on normal individuality would be
unlivable.
These studies speak not just to a multiplication of selfhood in some rare
tribes or disordered people, but also to a dissolution, or at least an
historical and cultural fluidity, of the very thing called “the person.”
Exceptions to the alignment of body and person could be interpreted as
proof that this alignment is not, in fact, prescribed by nature.  Instead,
biomedical discourses most often police the “naturalness” of singular
identity by portraying any exceptions as pathological or monstrous and
therefore not disruptive to the fundamental norm of discrete individuality.
In this dissertation, I introduce another biological phenomenon that
appears to trouble the inevitable alignment of the body and the person:
human genetic chimerism.
The case: Human chimerism
Human genetic chimeras are individuals who contain more than one
genetically distinct population of cells.  What biologists know about
chimeras is not now, and has never been, stable and well defined.  Indeed,
the slipperiness of categories and classifications of chimerism is a subject
of my research, and so it is difficult to use those categories as a resource.
Nonetheless, I appreciate that the reader needs some kind of guide
through the forthcoming material.  Therefore, I will delineate what
“kinds” of chimerism are relevant to my study, and what kinds are not.
My inclusions and exclusions have emerged during the course of my
research for both methodological and analytical reasons, which I will
describe below.4
1) Chimeric twins and singletons
The first kind of human chimera I will consider results from a dizygotic
(commonly called “fraternal”) twinning event, and it has two subtypes,
fraternal twins who share blood cells, and singletons who are the result of
early embryo fusion.
8  In the first subtype, fraternal twins share blood in
utero, and blood cells genetically traceable to each twin can be found in
the other.  The first twin chimera was ascertained in Britain in 1953 when
a woman who donated blood was found to contain both A and O blood
types; one was labeled “hers,” and the other was “borrowed” from her
twin during gestation.  Early cases were described with fascination, but
this is now thought to be fairly common: current estimates suggest that
12% of dizygotic twins contain blood from their twin.
9  In the second
subtype of dizygotic chimerism, only one baby is born, and that person is
found to contain two populations of genetically distinct cells.  At some
point in development, dizygotic twins existed, and the second one fused
with the first.  If the embryos had not fused, they would have developed
into fraternal twins, either of the same sex or different sexes.  The
resulting person has a mixture of two genetically distinct cell types
distributed throughout the tissues of his or her body in an unpredictable
combination.  Any organ may contain one or both of the cell types.
                                                   
8 Twinning specialist Charles Boklage has recently called this distinction
into question, by suggesting that both types of twin chimeras arise by the
same developmental mechanisms, whether one or two are born.  See C. E.
Boklage, "Embryogenesis of Chimeras, Twins and Anterior Midline
Asymmetries," Human Reproduction  21, no. 3 (Mar, 2006), 579-591.
Historically, the mechanisms have been understood separately and I will
retain this distinction to ameliorate confusion.
9 Ibid.5
The question of just how rarely embryo fusion occurs is fundamentally
unanswerable, for a number of reasons.  First, the ascertainment of
chimerism is most often accidental: human chimeras have been
“discovered” when donating blood and when being tissue typed as
potential organ donors or recipients.  Approximately forty of these cases
have been reported, some of which were identified because a patient
presented with some degree of intersex development (the fused embryos
were XX and XY).  However, not all clinicians who discover a case will
publish it; I have found reference to several unpublished cases in archives.
Furthermore, authors may not have used the word chimera, as they may
instead have described patients as mosaics (see below) or hermaphrodites.
Many experts believe that there is a large gap between ascertainment and
true existence of the phenomenon.  Twinning specialist Charles Boklage
recently wrote:
We do not expect to find chimeras because most of us are ignorant
of their existence and the informed few just know they are too rare
and bizarre to require consideration.  We don’t look for them
because we don’t expect to find them and we don’t find them until
we trip over evidence we cannot ignore.
10
While we do not know just how rare the phenomenon is, it is certainly
true that reports of it are very rare.
                                                   
10 Ibid., 581.6
2) Fetal microchimerism
The second type of human chimerism considered in this study is much
more common.  Mothers and their children exchange cells during
gestation, and these cells, it seems, can persist in both bodies long after
the birth of a child (and, in the mother, long after the termination of a
pregnancy).  This phenomenon became the subject of biomedical research
beginning in the mid-nineties, and it is commonly called
“microchimerism.” The category microchimerism usually implies a very
small (less than 1%) subpopulation of persistently dividing cells (known
as a “cell line”) within a dominant population of cells.
Not the case
The term chimera and its strict definition (more than one genetically
distinct cell population) can apply to several other biological phenomena
as well.  These are on the periphery of this project, and while meanings
move around among cases, the following kinds of chimerism are in the
background rather than the foreground of my study.  In science and
medicine, the term chimera is applied to these cases in some contexts and
not in others.  In general, it is used when the speaker wishes to emphasize
the dissimilar genetic composition of the person, organism or compound.
1) Transplants
Some of human chimerism is artificially produced in the course of
medical treatment.  Recipients of organs, bone marrow and cell
transplants become chimeric by virtue of the introduction of donor cell
populations, although they are seldom labeled chimeras.  To be
considered chimeric, the population needs to establish a long-term7
presence, which it does in most of these cases, provided that the transplant
is not rejected.  Blood transfusion, however, does not usually create
chimeras as the introduced cell population is transient.
2) Mosaics
A second human biological situation that is distinct from chimerism,
though historically and clinically intertwined, is genetic mosaicism.
Mosaics arise when a single fertilized egg undergoes a mutation in early
cell division and establishes a second cell line.  For example, an embryo
that starts out containing three copies of chromosome 21 in all of its cells
(the cause of Down Syndrome) might lose the third copy of chromosome
21 in one cell because of an “error” in cell division.  The resultant cell,
now with two copies of 21, divides and establishes a cell population and
the fetus continues to develop with cells of each composition throughout
the body.  The person may (if enough tissues are sampled to find both cell
types) be diagnosed as having “Mosaic Down Syndrome.”  This can
happen to any chromosome in the body, however some cells are more
likely to survive than others with extra or missing chromosomes.  While
mosaics and chimeras are differentiated by their causal mechanism, the
clinical situation is easily confused because both are detected by the
presence of two distinct cell types.
3) Plants and animals
Plant chimeras and animal chimeras have long been produced artificially,
and in many cases materials from different species have been combined.  I
will give an overview of these experimental organisms in chapter 1, but
for the most part, I have excluded them from my analysis.  Finally,8
xenotransplantation can create animal/human chimerism.
Xenotransplantation has generated intense debates about ethics and
safety.
11  These cases, too, I set aside.
While my inclusions and exclusions may seem arbitrary at first, I have a
very clear sense of the stakes involved in my choices.  First, I am focused
on human social and political identity.  Second, I am interested in the
clinical domain: where the doctor’s office, the hospital and the laboratory
meet.  I began the project with a desire to include mosaicism and
transplantation as human clinical events which exist somewhere on a
continuum with chimerism.  However, as the project took shape, I
excluded mosaics and transplant recipients mostly for reasons of scope.
Anthropologists of medicine have already studied transplantation from an
ethnographic standpoint, and I make liberal use of these studies,
particularly in chapter 4.  While mosaicism raises compelling social and
classificatory dilemmas about fragmented identity, I observed that the
concerns in this community (where does my child fit in?) are very
different from those that emerged in communities arranged around
chimerism.  As I will discuss throughout, the latter phenomenon evokes
worries about being or containing “someone else,” in ways that are not
germane to mosaicism. Finally, I decided to limit my project to those
cases that seem to arise spontaneously, however “unnatural” they are
                                                   
11  See, for example, Nik Brown and Mike Michael, "Risky Creatures:
Institutional Species Boundary Change in Biotechnology Regulation,"
Health, Risk & Society 6, no. 3 (Sept, 2004), 207-222; Nik Brown and
Mike Michael, "Switching between Science and Culture in Transpecies
Transplantation," Science, Technology & Human Values 26, no. 1
(Winter, 2001), 3-22.9
coded by biologists and biomedical researchers.  Experimentally or
therapeutically created combinations of genetic material do not trouble the
naturalness of the alignment of the body, the genome and the person in
quite the same way as do chimeras that arise in nature.
Cells and Selves
In this dissertation, I utilize chimerism, and the discourses in which it is
characterized, as an analytical window into contemporary “regimes of the
self.”
12  It is a “test case” of sorts, like phantom limbs were to Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, hermaphroditism and transsexuality were to Harold
Garfinkel, Michel Foucault and Anne Fausto-Sterling, and multiple
personality to Hacking.
13  These rarities and intermediate cases are useful
because they can be jarring and disruptive of the categories we take for
granted, and which order our social worlds.  They can reveal not just how
bodies function in the normal order of things (which is how biomedicine
has long employed physiological anomalies), but they also expose how
scientists and others think about and actively delineate how bodies
function in the normal order of things.  They are useful sites for revealing
                                                   
12 This phrase is borrowed from Nikolas S. Rose, Inventing our Selves:
Psychology, Power, and Personhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996).
13 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London; New
York: Routledge & K. Paul; 1962); Harold Garfinkel, Studies in
Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Michel
Foucault, Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a
Nineteenth-Century French Hermaphrodite  (New York: Pantheon Books,
1980); Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the
Construction of Sexuality, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000);
Hacking, Rewriting the Soul, 336.10
the ways in which normative assumptions in biomedicine shape the
materiality (genes, cells, bones and flesh) of bodies.
The painting in figure 1 was commissioned from New York artist Cynthia
Van Buhler by U.S.News to accompany a story about maternal/fetal
microchimerism.  The magazine added this text to the painting: “like the
creature of myth, medical chimeras are a mix of selves.”  Why does this
statement, “chimeras are a mix of selves,” seem to make sense? I suggest
that this discursive move follows from an extreme genetic essentialism
that equates a genome – the full genetic complement contained in the
nucleus of a cell – with a self.
14  A mother who contains her son’s cells is,
we are told, a mixture of her self and his. This slippage from cell to
person is not a tendency confined to an oversimplifying media, and in fact
                                                   
14 “Geneticization,” a worry of science critics in the 1990s seems to be on
the wane after the Human Genome Project, where epigenetics has taken
on a new relevance.  Nonetheless, genetics is insinuating itself into
policing, courts, administration of citizenship and rights, not to mention
health management. For discussion of genetic reductionism, see Lenny
Moss, What Genes can't do (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 228;
Evelyn Fox Keller, The Century of the Gene (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2000), 186;  Sahotra Sarkar, Genetics and Reductionism
(Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998),
246; Daniel J. Kevles and Leroy E. Hood, The Code of Codes: Scientific
and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1992), 397; Richard C. Lewontin, It Ain't
Necessarily so: The Dream of the Human Genome and Other Illusions
(New York: New York Review of Books, 2000), 330.  For recent
coverage of genetics, governance and identity, see for example, Jenny
Reardon, Race to the Finish: Identity and Governance in an Age of
Genomics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 237; Carlos
Novas and Nikolas Rose, "Genetic Risk and the Birth of the Somatic
Individual," Economy and Society 29, no. 4 (Nov, 2000), 485-513.11
it seems to originate with the biomedical researchers who talk to the
media.  An article in Nature tells us: “Eight years ago a boy was born
who, genetically, was two people.”
15
Figure 1: “Myths, mothers and modern medicine” (C. von Buhler)
16
Surely there is much more to selfhood than cells?  Talk of cells as selves,
the preoccupation of this entire project, is of course but one vista in a
complex landscape of the self.  It does not necessarily supersede other
                                                   
15  Helen Pearson, "Dual Identities," Nature 417, no. 6884 (May 2, 2002),
10.
16 Reprinted with permission from Cynthia von Buhler.  Originally
published in Rachel K. Sobel, "Myths, Mothers and Modern Medicine:
Do 'Chimeras' Trigger some Women's Illnesses?" US News and World
Report 130, no. 18 (May 7, 2001), 46.12
prominent discourses of the self, like psychology, biography and social
roles.  Even for those geneticists who spend more time thinking about
cells and identity than do most people, it is a way of talking that is elicited
in appropriate dialogues, but it is not necessarily the only way they look at
people.  I do not wish to over-determine the phenomenon of chimerism,
but to mark it as emblematic of a prevalent and evocative cultural
moment.
The common thread throughout the dissertation is whether and in what
contexts it makes sense to ascribe personal identity (and personality) to
cellular identity.  We will see that in many cases, cells and persons are
presumed to exist in a relationship of synecdoche.  In linguistics, a
synecdoche is a figure of speech in which parts are substituted for wholes
and vice versa.  It can also apply where one speaks of the material that
something is made of instead of the thing itself – the wood, instead of the
bat, for example.
Rather than this being simply a linguistic habit, in clinical cytogenetics,
synecdoche is the rule that justifies the enterprise.  Individual cells from
blood or other tissues are isolated on a microscope slide, and a skilled
observer examines the genetic material of a few cells in order to make a
diagnostic judgment about the whole person.  If each cell were found to
have an X and a Y chromosome and 3 copies of chromosome 21, for
example, the person would be labeled as a male with Down Syndrome.
As a rule, one cell could suffice as a stand-in for the entire body. A recent
program on the Discovery Channel describes this relationship: “Every cell
in our body holds the same completely unique DNA pattern.  It is what13
defines us, and makes us who we are.  It is this individual genetic
blueprint that a DNA test reveals.”
17  While the relative power and
accuracy of genetic discourse is disputed, it is undeniable that genetics is
often coupled to human identity in contemporary societies.
18  While not
everyone may know the details contained in their “genetic code,” there is
a widely held belief that our genes could, in theory, divulge many aspects
of our biological identity (sex, disease status, kinship, race, etc.). Thus, a
cell is not just a “part” of the body, it is widely thought to be –
particularly in an era of genetic essentialism – a part that contains the
whole.
Chimeric conditions are exceptions to this rule.  We will see that this
disruption causes people to make some peculiar and seemingly awkward
leaps when they ponder what it means for a single person to contain more
than one (person’s?) cell line. As exceptions to the one-body-one-genome
rule, chimeric conditions expose the extent of cultural penetration of the
synecdoche between cells and persons.  The extension of personhood to
cells is a derivative or variant of genetic reductionism, wherein a single
cell embodies the complete material necessary for individuality.  The cell
                                                   
17 “I am my own twin,” Cicada Films, first aired on Discovery Health
Channel, May, 2005.
18 For discussions about the cultural resonances of genetic thinking, and
its limitations, see Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee, The DNA
Mystique: The Gene as a Cultural Icon (New York: Freeman, 1995), 276.;
Evelyn Fox Keller, The Century of the Gene; Lenny Moss, What Genes
can't do. I am hesitant to suggest that genetics is a universal marker of
identity, but I also do not want to exclude countries or parts of the world
on the basis of an ethnocentric assumption that this is a “Western”
phenomenon.  The extent of “genes R us” thinking is an empirical
question I simply canʼt answer.14
is the person.  This reductionist tendency that I trace throughout the
dissertation leads, if taken literally, to a paradoxically anti-reductionist
conclusion:  The more scientists probe into the cellular material of bodies,
the more it seems that we are all chimeras.  If the cell is the person, we all
contain multitudes.
Conversations
I envision this project as a contribution to several literatures, and I
imagine myself in conversation with many authors.  Ethnographies of
medicine, biology and the body most overtly inform the project, and many
of these are feminist in orientation.  Authors such as Margaret Lock,
Emily Martin, Rayna Rapp and Annemarie Mol have carefully attended to
and skillfully presented studies of clinical nodes where patients,
physicians, biomedical researchers and instruments come together.
19  Each
author has placed a technoscientific object – organ transplantation, the
immune system, amniocentesis and atherosclerosis respectively – at the
center of a story about the cultural politics of knowledge and the lived
body, or rather bodies.  Other feminist anthropologists such as Sarah
Franklin and Marilyn Strathern, and sociologist Charis Thompson, have
interrogated kinship in relation to reproductive and genetic technologies,
                                                   
19  Margaret M. Lock, Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the
Reinvention of Death (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002);
Emily Martin, Flexible Bodies: Tracking Immunity in American Culture
from the Days of Polio to the Age of AIDS (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994);
Rayna Rapp, Testing Women, Testing the Fetus: The Social Impact of
Amniocentesis in America (New York: Routledge, 1999); Annemarie Mol,
The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2002).15
and their work also informs mine.
20  Finally, classic works by Donna
Haraway, Evelyn Fox Keller and Anne Fausto-Sterling attend to the
content of biological knowledge, and reveal the ways in which this
knowledge is often saturated with gendered assumptions.
21
My study of human chimeras begins with the premise, articulated most
clearly by Michel Foucault, that neither the individual nor the body exists
as such pre-socially.  Instead, they are constituted by power.  In his words,
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary
nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which
power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in
so doing subdues or crushes individuals.  In fact, it is already one of
the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures,
certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and
constituted as individuals.  The individual, that is, is not the vis-à-
vis of power, it is, I believe, one of its prime effects.
22
                                                   
20  Sarah Franklin and Helene Ragon_, Reproducing Reproduction:
Kinship, Power, and Technological Innovation (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1998); Sarah Franklin, Embodied Progress: A
Cultural Account of Assisted Conception (New York: Routledge, 1997);
Marilyn Strathern, After Nature: English Kinship in the Late Twentieth
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Charis
Thompson, Making Parents: The Ontological Choreography of
Reproductive Technologies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
21  Donna Jeanne Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The
Reinvention of Nature (New York, NY: Routledge, 1991); Evelyn Fox
Keller, Refiguring Life: Metaphors of Twentieth-Century Biology (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Evelyn Fox Keller, Secrets of
Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender, and Science (New
York: Routledge, 1992); Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body.
22  Michel Foucault, Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings, 1972-1977, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books,
1980).16
My work is in dialogue with the work of scholars such as Ian Hacking,
Nikolas Rose and Paul Rabinow who have, in turn, been inspired by
Foucault.
23  Rose writes: “ ‘The body’ provides no sure basis for an
analytic of subjectification, precisely because corporealities are diverse,
nonunified, and operate in relation to particular regimes of knowledge: the
configurations of the human body inscribed in the anatomical atlas did not
always define a way of delimiting the order of vital processes, or of
visualizing and acting on human being.”
24  Hacking and Rose have both
explored the history of psy disciplines (psychology, psychiatry,
psychotherapy) and have shown them to be power-laden discourses which
operate to mold certain kinds of selves.  Like Foucault, Rose urges that a
history of subjectification is not to be found in lofty ideals of
philosophers, but in the everyday, mundane enactments of power, such as
medical records or IQ tests.
In this endeavor – finding meaning in the minutiae of scientific practice
and discourse – the field of science and technology studies is my home
and my main methodological resource.  Attention to materiality is, I
believe, the major strength of this project, in terms of its potential to affect
broader discussions about identity and the body.  Feminist critical
                                                   
23 Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul; Ian Hacking, "Making Up People" in
Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in
Western Thought, eds. Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna and David E.
Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 222-236;  Nikolas
Rose, Inventing Our Selves; Paul Rabinow, Essays on the Anthropology
of Reason (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
24 Nikolas Rose, Inventing Our Selves, 10.17
theorists, such as Judith Butler and Elizabeth Grosz, have written
influential texts about the fluidity of the body and of biological sex.
25
Grosz, for example, writes: “the body is a pliable entity whose
determinate form is provided not simply by biology but through the
interaction of modes of psychical and physical inscription and the
provision of a set of limiting codes.”
26  However, these cultural theorists
lack material instantiations of their abstract positions.  Butler, for the most
part, locates her examples in psychoanalysis and comparative literature.
This study of chimerism and microchimerism from the perspective of
S&TS is a persuasive case with which to strengthen poststructuralist
feminist theory because it follows sex and identity to the places where
they are affixed to chromosomes and to bodies, where sex and identity are
materially inscribed.
It is a central tenet of S&TS that scientific facts and technical artifacts are
made (or constructed or achieved or enacted) in social contexts, and the
resultant facts and artifacts are imprinted by those contexts.
Methodologically, this means that social scientists need not be held at bay
by the authority and objectivity of scientific knowledge, but can instead
visit the places where facts are made and observe the processes by which
they are assembled.  Early and formative studies in S&TS that inform my
approach to this project include the laboratory studies of the late 1970’s
                                                   
25  Elizabeth A. Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Judith Butler, Gender
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge,
1999); Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of
"Sex" (New York: Routledge, 1993).
26 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 187.18
and early 1980’s by Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar, Michael Lynch,
Karin Knorr-Cetina and Sharon Traweek.
27  I also employ analytical
strategies formulated by the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK)
and thus my work is in conversation with sociologists Trevor Pinch,
Harry Collins, Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, and David Bloor.
28
These strategies include approaching my material symmetrically (i.e.,
assuming that beliefs, whether they are later judged to be correct or
incorrect, are caused by the same sorts of social factors) and studying
controversies in order to reveal the social contingencies that are usually
expunged when controversies are resolved.
                                                   
27  Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction
of Scientific Facts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986);
Michael Lynch, Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science: A Study of Shop
Work and Shop Talk in a Research Laboratory (Boston: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1985); Karin D. Knorr, The Manufacture of Knowledge: An
Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science (Oxford ;
New York: Pergamon Press, 1981); Sharon Traweek, Beamtimes and
Lifetimes: The World of High Energy Physicists (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1988).
28  Trevor Pinch, "Towards an Analysis of Scientific Observation: The
Externality and Evidential Significance of Observational Reports in
Physics," Social Studies of Science 15, no. 1 (Feb, 1985), 3-36; H. M.
Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice
(London: Sage Publications, 1985); G. Nigel Gilbert and M. J. Mulkay,
Opening Pandora's Box: A Sociological Analysis of Scientists' Discourse
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); David Bloor,
Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1976).19
This project also connects with some more recent texts in S&TS, most
notably Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star’s Sorting Things Out.
29
Their project, like mine, interrogates classification as a profoundly world-
making enterprise. Bowker and Star write:
People often see multiplicity and heterogeneity as accidents or
exceptions.  The marginal person, who is for example of mixed
race, is portrayed as the troubled outsider; just as the thing that does
not fit into one bin or another gets put into a “residual” category.
This habit of purity has old and complicated origins in western
scientific and political culture.
30
In this dissertation, we will see that fine distinctions between XX cells
and XY cells are made in everyday work situations, and these
classifications matter to the lived realities of the people they implicate.
Finding two genetically different cells in a single person creates a
problem of classification.
Finally, this is a story first and foremost about identity.  Where in the
body is identity located and can it be found in genetic code?  If so, what if
a person contains two codes?  My project engages with those S&TS
scholars who have grappled with questions of genetics and identity.
These include Jenny Reardon and Troy Duster.
31 Those who study patient
activism and biosociality also inform my project, although with a few
                                                   
29  Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out:
Classification and its Consequences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1999).
30 Ibid., 300.
31  Jenny Reardon, Race to the Finish; Troy Duster, Backdoor to Eugenics
(New York: Routledge, 2003).20
exceptions, the subjects in my study – chimeras, pregnant and post-
pregnant women – are not a politicized patient group, or at least they are
not politicized around chimerism.  Nonetheless, the works of Paul
Rabinow, Michel Callon and Vololona Rabeharisoa, Nikolas Rose and
Carlos Novas, and Steven Epstein have shaped my thinking about the
politics of patienthood.
32  My project contributes to this literature an
example of biosociality that is not necessarily predicated on disease or
risk.  Finally, Hannah Landecker’s historical work on cell culturing, and
in particular her piece about the HeLa cell line and its troubled relation to
the person Henrietta Lacks was particularly inspirational.
33
Methodology
My research methodology for this project could itself be described as a
mosaic.  As is common in S&TS, I combine methodologies from
qualitative sociology, such as  interviewing and observation; from
anthropology and sociology of work, such as ethnography; and from
history, such as archival research and discourse analysis.
                                                   
32  Paul Rabinow, "Artificiality and Enlightenment: From Sociobiology to
Biosociality" in Essays on the Anthropology of Reason, 91-111.; Michel
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Shaping of New Social Identities," Technology in Society 25, no. 2 (Apr,
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1) Chimerism
In my first task, constructing a thick description of cases of genetic
chimerism, I relied mostly on historical materials.  The papers of the
MRC Blood Group Unit at the Wellcome Library in London yielded a
treasure trove of archival riches, as the Unit identified the first human
chimera and became an obligatory passage point in all the early case
descriptions.  The material from this archive – including correspondence
between scientists, doctors and patients, drafts of publications and talks,
laboratory notes, notes from phone calls among physicians, and reprints –
forms much of the empirical material in chapter 1.  I also relied on
textbooks, published case reports and review articles to reconstruct
biomedical representations of chimeras.
During the course of this project, which I began in 2003, a surge of
American public interest in chimerism was spurred by the publicity of one
case, a woman called “Karen”.  When her blood was tested, Karen
appeared not to match her sons, which would exclude her as their mother.
I discuss this case in chapter 4.  I was unable to interview Karen’s
physician (due to medical leave), and I did not try to gain access to speak
to Karen herself.  This was partly because I am leery of the potential
exploitation of people who are sometimes portrayed as “freaks”, and I
wanted to study this impulse rather than to contribute to it.  However, she
has appeared in interviews both on National Public Radio and the
Discovery Health channel, and the case has been covered in many media
other accounts.  I did use these transcripts and articles, and public
responses to them posted in internet chat rooms, as research data.22
While I did not undertake a lengthy laboratory ethnography, I did spend
one week in a hospital cytogenetics lab (in which molecular methods were
also used) to familiarize myself with the technical aspects of the work.
Because I worked in a cytogenetic research laboratory during my
undergraduate training, I did not begin my tutelage in the laboratory from
scratch, but this field work served as an intensive reminder of up-to-date
technologies, and I was especially attentive to the processes of identity-
making in the lab.  The clinical laboratory I visited was not engaged in
either chimerism research (which comes up rarely and in unpredictable
places), or in the detection of fetal cells in women.  However the
researchers did use most of the technical methods for visualizing genetic
material in cells, which is the salient technical aspect of chimerism and
microchimerism research.
During my time in the clinical lab, I shadowed technicians at each
“station” in the production of a prenatal genetic diagnosis: from delivery
and administrative processing of the sample (blood or amniotic fluid); to
tissue culture; to the staining and fixing necessary to make cells and
chromosomes visible on microscope slides; to the visual work by
technicians at the microscope/computer screen; to the diagnostic work by
the cytogeneticist, which takes place on a digital printout of the
chromosomal material of two cells.  During the week, I lodged with the
director of cytogenetics who ran the lab (a former professor from my
undergraduate work).  We had many informal discussions about the
organization of labor in the laboratory, the aesthetics of microscopy, the
economic, social and political aspects of clinical genetics, etc.  In contrast23
to my genial but brief interviews with most other respondents, I learned
that this deeper engagement with a study participant was a rare and
immeasurably valuable pleasure of ethnographic research.
2) Microchimerism
Because fetal microchimerism research is recent and ongoing, and it is not
based on the accidental elucidation of rare events, this portion of my
research was methodologically more accessible.  I began by reading the
relevant scientific and biomedical literatures on fetal cell isolation for
non-invasive prenatal screening (chapter 2) and on microchimerism, the
persistence of those cells in women after the end of the pregnancy
(chapter 3).  My careful reading of the literature in the field enabled me to
become familiar with the technical problems, the debates, the language,
and the key investigators who published recurrently and seemed to have a
sustained commitment to researching the phenomena.  I contacted these
researchers, and in most cases, was successful in setting up interviews
(see Appendix).  Using a “snowball” approach, I would ask my
interviewees to recommend others in the field with whom I should speak.
Often interviewees would give me a tour of their laboratories or invite me
to join them for a meal, and these informal exchanges were important in
rounding out my understanding of the field.
Most of the fetal cell and microchimerism researchers whom I
interviewed worked in Canada, the U.S., Great Britain or Switzerland.
This is a function of the demographics of the research community, and
also of my financial constraints.  The only major laboratory outside these
areas, as far as I could tell from the English literature, was in Singapore.  I24
was able to interview the PI (principal investigator) from this lab at a
conference in London.  During the project, I attended three international
conferences: the first conference of the International Mosaic Down
Syndrome Association (IMDSA) in 2004, the American Society of
Human Genetics (ASHG) annual meeting (2004), and the Fourth
International Conference on Circulating Nucleic Acids and Proteins
(CNAPS) in 2005.  At these meetings, I attended talks and poster
sessions, spoke to researchers between sessions, and participated in
informal conversations at meal times and breaks.  These were important
research moments, as they allowed glimpses of the social interactions
among researchers, and of modalities for presenting content that varied
from interviews and the published literature.  Overall, my combination of
research methodologies was opportunistic: I followed up every lead
possible in order to gain a rich sense of the creation and negotiation of
cellular multiplicity.
Chapter preview
In the following four chapters, I follow cells to the places in which they
are given identities, and observe how those cellular identities seem to
recast or confuse personal identities.  The narrative, and the empirical
material, is loosely chronological.  In the first chapter, I trace the
genealogy of the word “chimera”, from its origin as a Greek mythological
monster to its use in botany and then in zoology, and finally to its use in
clinical medicine.  I foreground the persistent linkage between the two
meanings: the Greek “she-monster” (composed of a lion, goat and
serpent) and the genetically compound being.  When researchers talk
about genetic chimeras, they almost always invoke the mythical creature,25
as they have since the first human chimera, Mrs. McK, was named in
1953.  The commonality between the mythical beast and genetic chimeras
is that they are mixtures, hybrids and boundary transgressors, and they
therefore violate cultural rules about purity.  I will show that serologists
and geneticists characterized human chimeras in much the same way as
embryologists and teratologists characterized anatomical monsters in
Enlightenment embryology: they were both objects of fascination and
collection; they were tools in debates about embryonic development; and
they were described as “Nature’s experiment.”  While anatomical oddities
have traditionally been characterized by visible difference and even
repugnance, chimeras exemplify a new order of microscopic visibility and
social invisibility.  They are micromonsters.
34
Chapters 2 and 3 shift the empirical focus from spontaneous chimeras to
fetal cells in pregnant women, and to microchimerism.  In chapter 2, I tell
the story of a would-be prenatal screening technique that aims to
instrumentalize fetal cells in blood samples from pregnant women.  In the
course of its almost 40-year history, the technique has had numerous
iterations, each of which has relied on visualizing the Y chromosome as a
“proof of concept,” and each of which has been plagued with false
positives and false negatives.  Instrumental communities have grown and
adapted around the rule of binary sex, which relies on an absolute identity
between “male” cells and “male” bodies.  Implicitly, they rely on an
                                                   
34 Georges Canguilhem introduces this term, to refer to an “error” in the
genetic code, such as a hereditary biochemical condition.  See Georges
Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett
(New York: Zone Books, 1991), 278.26
absence of visible markers to exclude female bodies.  Exceptions – such
as chimeras, cells from previous pregnancies and intersex conditions – are
raised as possibilities by investigators only when they explain away
“false” results in an isolated experimental instance, but they never prompt
scientists to question the rule that undergirds the enterprise.  This refusal
to acknowledge categorical fluidity, I suggest, may contribute to the
failure of the technique to bridge the gap from experimental promise to
clinical certainty.
Chapter 3 traces a community of researchers and a phenomenon that were
offshoots of the effort to use fetal cells for prenatal screening.  During a
fetal cell study in the mid-1990s, one laboratory found Y-bearing cells in
many of their non-pregnant controls.  These women had previously
delivered sons; one had given birth as long ago as 27 years before.  Thus,
it seemed fairly common that fetal cells outlive pregnancy, a phenomenon
which researchers called “microchimerism,” or “fetal cell trafficking.”
These cells almost immediately became characterized by a consistent
package of metaphors having to do with international migration.  They
trafficked, migrated and repopulated organs.  These vagabond cells were
immediately suspected as a cause of autoimmune diseases in women, a
theoretical trajectory which I argue was bound up in the geopolitical
metaphors permeating the field, and the relations of self and other they
presuppose.
Each of these chapters is a story unto itself, but they fit together because
of the continuity of techniques and of researchers, and through the
attribution of greater and lesser degrees of cellular multiplicity.  In each,27
at least two kinds of cells were made visible, salient and distinct from
each other in the laboratory, and they were inscribed with an identity that
normally applies to whole persons (male, immigrant, brother, mother,
child).  This difference was then read back into and onto whole bodies.
Chapter 4 uses contemporary interview excerpts and media moments to
foreground this synecdoche through which part and whole become
interchangeable.  Both scientists and members of the public speak and
write about chimeras and microchimerism as though something of the self
is bound up in cells.  After exploring the contexts in which references to
identity surface in contemporary discussions of chimerism, I turn to
literature about organ transplantation and multiple personality disorder.
Both of these cases are analogous to chimerism in that patients’ identities
are multiplied in clinical contexts.28
CHAPTER 1:
GODS AND MICROMONSTERS: A GENEALOGY OF CHIMERAS MADE AND
FOUND
Introduction
Phyllis Moores, a blood group specialist working in South Africa,
delivered a paper at the Blood Transfusion Congress in Port Elizabeth in
1967.  By the tone of her introduction, we get the impression that she was
more animated about her findings than the average serologist at the
conference:
It is with considerable excitement that I find myself in the
privileged position today to bring you a report on the discovery of a
new blood group chimera, here in South Africa. She is an Asiatic
woman – a Tamil of good caste, and is of the Hindu religion.  Her
appearance physically, is completely normal; her age is
approximately 27 years, and she is in full health having borne three
and now four perfectly normal children.  The word “Chimera” is
borrowed from Greek mythology.  It was used to describe a
creature with the head of a lion, the body of a goat and the tail of a
serpent, which spent its days terrorizing the populace.  That such a
conglomeration of different species had any chance of living as a
single unit, we know nowadays, would be quite impossible, for the
components are of vastly different origins, and the anatomical,
genetical and immunohaematological difficulties would have been
immense.  Clearly then, the discovery of a natural chimera, would
be an event of the utmost potential interest, and very rare.  The first
report of a human chimera occurred in 1953. Dunsford and his
associates made the remarkable find of a woman with not only one,
but two blood groups…. We discovered our chimera during the
course of routine antenatal tests at the Natal Blood Transfusion
Service towards the end of 1965.
1
                                                   
1 Phyllis Moores, n.d. (approximately 1967), F20/6/3, SA/BGU, The
Wellcome Library, London [underlining in original].29
Moores’ introduction is fairly typical of the genre (although her emphasis
on race and religion may express a uniquely South African flair).  When
medical scientists speak or write about chimeras, they inevitably couple
the human subject with the mythological Chimaera.
2  Not only is the
reference to the creature purposefully embedded in the nomenclature, it is,
as we see above, a blatant feature of professional discourse in the
community of researchers.  One researcher told me: “We refer to
the mythical ‘chimera’ in almost every talk, especially those where we
either are providing an overview of the field or if we are presenting our
research to an audience that is not familiar with the field.”
3
In this chapter, I use archival and published materials, as well as
interviews with contemporary practitioners, to interrogate this association
between, on the one hand, a healthy human with multiple populations of
genetically different cells, and, on the other hand, a monster composed of
lion, goat and serpent parts.  The analysis proceeds in two parts.  The first
part of the chapter is an etymological chain tracing the word “chimera”
from its mythological roots to its first use in a botanical text in 1907 to
present-day references.  Following Michel Foucault, my method is
genealogical.
4  As Foucault writes, “[g]enealogy is gray, meticulous, and
                                                   
2 While they are often used interchangeably, for the sake of consistency, I
will use ʻchimeraʼ to refer to biological instances, and ʻChimaeraʼ for the
mythological monster.  Where I am quoting text, I will maintain the
spelling that the source uses.
3  AG email communication, November 7, 2005. The initials of
interviewees have been anonymized, however each speaker will be
consistently initialed throughout.
4 For an elaboration of this methodology, see Michel Foucault,
"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Language, Counter-Memory,30
patiently documentary.  It operates on a field of entangled and confused
parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied
many times.”
5  The purpose of such a careful reconstruction, he claims, is
to eschew the search for origins, or for teleology, and to recover “the
vicissitudes of history.”
6  Genealogical projects inherently question the
inevitability of things as we know them, and in so doing, they uncover the
political moves made to secure things (such as “liberty” or “the body”).
Behind things, the genealogist finds “not a timeless and essential secret,
but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was
fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”
7
My purpose in carefully reconstructing the chain by which human genetic
chimeras have acquired their name is to reveal the intentions, accidents,
missteps and controversies inherent in the historical practices of this
naming.  There is nothing inevitable about the outcome.  While it may
appear that human genetic chimeras are in essence like the mythological
Chimaera, this appearance is an historical achievement.  Using archival
evidence, I will establish that each time the term was appropriated by
biologists or medical scientists, they intentionally evoked the connection
between the monster and the organism (be it animal, plant or human).
This reiteration, I suggest, has epistemological significance: what we
know about chimeras and the way we know about them has always been
colored by their aura of monstrosity.
                                                                                                                                                     
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, edited by D. F. Bouchard
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
5 Ibid., 139.
6 Ibid., 144.
7 Ibid., 142.31
However “monster” is a daunting and unwieldy category, which requires
some specification.  While any strict taxonomy would be an
oversimplification, we could imagine subcategories of monsters such as
fictitious (e.g., Frankenstein, Cookie Monster), apocryphal (e.g., Loch
Ness), violent (e.g., serial murderers) and anatomical (e.g., two-headed
calf).  Overlaps and slippages abound, of course, particularly between
morphological and moral transgressors.  For example, the Greek
Chimaera could conceivably fit in all of the above categories, as could
Frankenstein.  Because my concern is primarily about the interplay of
biomedical knowledge and monstrosity, the history of anatomical
monsters, specifically, will inform my analysis of human biological
chimeras and the anxieties they inspire.
Later in the chapter, I will show how the mythological Chimaera is
invoked in contemporary clinical medicine.  Judging from where it is
invoked – and where it is not – I suggest that the analogy between the
Chimaera and the chimera works precisely because medical scientists
consistently locate human genetic chimeras within the realm of the
anatomically monstrous.  Anatomical monsters have a specific history in
Enlightenment embryology and anatomy, where they were classified,
displayed and dissected as foils for nature’s regularity. While the contours
of the objectifying display have changed in the twentieth century, many of
the basic features persist in the medical handling of these morphological
rarities.  I will conclude the chapter with the proposal that human
chimeras are an example of twentieth century anatomical monsters, which
both share and diverge from some characteristics of their predecessors.32
Why study monsters?
Scholarly analyses of the monstrous seem inevitably to agree that
monsters aren’t epistemologically neutral.  In a footnote to her article, The
Promises of Monsters, Donna Haraway urges us to “remember that
monsters have the same root as to demonstrate; monsters signify.”
8  In
science and technology studies in the early 1990’s, monsters were adopted
as signifiers of optimistic heterogeneity, hybridity and resistance to
classificatory or purifying domination.  Complementing Haraway’s
“Promises of Monsters”
9  were Bruno Latour’s “proliferation of
hybrids,”
10 and John Law’s edited volume, “A Sociology of Monsters.”
11
In Law’s account everybody is a monster, and we should embrace our
monstrosity:
We will come to appreciate that we are all monsters, outrageous
and heterogeneous collages … and how it is that we might work
towards a form of modest, multivocal organization where all could
be reborn as hopeful monsters – as places where the necessary
incompatibilities, inconsistencies and overlaps come gently and
creatively together.
12
These hopeful pronouncements identified and attempted to rescue a
prevalent (and heretofore negative) characterization of monsters: the
mixing together of unlike elements.
                                                   
8  Donna Haraway, "The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics
for Inappropriate/d  Others" in Cultural Studies, eds. Lawrence
Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula A. Treichler (New York: Routledge,
1992), 333.
9  Ibid.
10  Bruno Latour, We have Never been Modern  (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1993), 157.
11  John Law, A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology,
and Domination (London; New York: Routledge, 1991).
12 Ibid, 18-19.33
In medical discourse about human chimeras, the main characteristic that
renders them fascinating is not any kind of visible repugnance or physical
threat, but their tendency to violate clear boundaries.  It is their
embodiment of self and other, of male and female, that puts them in the
same class as the lion/goat/serpent hybrid, and which seems to inspire
some degree of cultural anxiety about the violation of natural and social
order.
In Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas draws our attention to common
cultural taboos that proscribe mixing. For example, “hybrids and other
confusions are abominated. … Holiness requires that different classes of
things shall not be confused.”
13 During this discussion, Douglas cites the
following passage from Leviticus:  “You shall not let your cattle breed
with a different kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed;
nor shall there come upon you a garment of cloth made of two kinds of
stuff.”
14  Using slightly different language than Leviticus, mixtures or
hybrids are often accused of being “unnatural”, whereas wholeness or
purity is considered more natural.  For example, Curt Stern, a geneticist,
wrote that chimeras are “seemingly created ‘against Nature.’”
15  Geoffrey
Bowker and Susan Leigh Star observe that “a monster occurs when an
object refuses to be naturalized.”
16  Bowker and Star would argue, and I
                                                   
13  Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of
Pollution and Taboo (New York: Routledge, 2002), 66-67.
14 Leviticus XVIII, from Ibid., 66.
15 Curt Stern, Genetic Mosaics and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1968), 28.
16  Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out, 304.34
concur, that monstrosity is not inherent or essential in the monster (or the
chimera) but in its inability to fit into cultural categories.  “Monsters and
freaks are also ways of speaking about the constraints of the classifying
and (often) dichotomizing imagination.”
17  Hence, monsters are made – in
the sociological sense - by community assent, by collective imagination,
by culture-bound regulation of the norms and margins of being.
PART 1: A Genealogy of Chimeras
In this part of the chapter, we will see an intriguing inversion of the usual
order of things, wherein art represents nature.  This reversal can be nicely
summed up by Oscar Wilde’s aphorism “Nature imitates Art.”
18
Chimaeras first existed in fantastical tales and artistic depictions.  The
word was then given material existence when Hans Winkler chose it to
name the mixed-species plant he created; he selected it precisely because
such a thing did not exist in nature.
19  Andrezej Tarkowski, who created
the first mouse-mouse chimeras, later wrote that the very creation of
artificial chimeras was a “bow and a tribute” to mythology:
Creating embryos and occasionally even animals composed of cells
derived from two different species is in a way a bow and a tribute
paid by experimental embryology to ancient mythology which
created monsters of dual, triple or even multiple origin, without
paying much attention to the taxonomic relationship between the
“contributing” species.
20
                                                   
17 Ibid., 304.
18  Oscar Wilde, The Decay of Lying (New York: Syrens, 1995), 64.
19  Hans Winkler, "_ber Pfropfbastarde Und Pflanzliche Chim_ren," Ber.
Dtsch. Bot. Ges. 25 (1907), 568-576.
20  A. K. Tarkowski, "Mouse Chimaeras Revisited: Recollections and
Reflections," The International Journal of Developmental Biology 42, no.
7 (1998), 904-905.35
Eventually the term was appropriated in the 1950’s for genetically mixed
organisms “found in nature,” however unnatural their constitution was
thought to be.  First fraternal twin cows, and then humans, were found to
contain blood cells from their fraternal twins.  In the 1960’s, the term was
used to describe humans found to contain two genetically different cell
populations in every tissue, not just blood.  Several researchers have
called chimeric animals and humans “Nature’s experiments,” suggesting a
purposeful creation by Nature that mimics the artifice of the human
experimenter.
21  In the latter part of the twentieth century, the term
chimera has been applied to sub-organismic entities, such as proteins and
DNA strands, where molecules from different origins are spliced together,
either experimentally or accidentally.
In the early twenty-first century, a biological chimera can refer to many
things; when the name was appropriated to name a newly created or
discovered entity, the entities from which it was borrowed continued to
exist.  These overlapping meanings are confusing, but it is their very
relationship that I wish to trace in this chapter, so I cannot begin with a
simple definition.  In an attempt to ease the reader’s potential confusion,
therefore, I have created a loose typology of what the word has been used
for in biology (table 1).
                                                   
21  I. Dunsford and others, "A Human Blood-Group Chimera," British
Medical Journal 2, no. 4827 (Jul 11, 1953), 80-81; Patricia Tippett,
"Blood Group Chimeras. A Review," Vox Sanguinis 44, no. 6 (1983),
333-359.36
Table 1: A Chimera Typology
Kind Interspecies/
same species
Found/
Made
Combinations Sample
Citations
Chimaera
of Myth
Interspecies “Found” Lion/Goat/Serpent Homer 720
B.C.
Plant Interspecies Made Tomato/Nightshade Winkler 1907
Animal Interspecies Made Newt/Fish
Mouse/Rat
Goat/Sheep “geep”
Spemann 1921
Stern 1973
Fehilly et al.,
1984
Animal Same species Found Cow twins Owen 1945
Anderson et al.,
1951
I “Blood Group
Chimeras”
Mrs. McK
W twins
(later considered
“microchimerism”)
Dunsford et al.,
1953
Booth et al.,
1957
II Human singleton
(also called “dispermy,”
“tetragametic chimera”)
Gartler et al.,
1962
Yu et al., 2002
Human Same species Found
III Human
microchimerism
Transplant
Maternal/fetal
Starzl 1992
Bianchi 1996
Animal Same species Made Mouse/mouse Tarkowski 1961
Mintz 1962
Molecular
Compound
Interspecies
Or Same
Species
Made Virus /Mouse DNA
Jellyfish/Rabbit protein
“GFP bunny”
Chu 1981
Kac 2001
Animal
Human
Plant
YAC artifacts (accidental
biproducts)
Human chimeric proteins
(spliced gene products)
Green 1991
Hansen et al.,
1998
Human Same species Made Human/human Gleicher 200437
The most salient division, in my view, is that between organisms that have
been “made” by experimental scientists, and those that have been “found”
by medical personnel, including clinicians and investigators in clinical
labs.  Another relevant distinction is that between interspecies
combinations of genetic material, and combinations from the same
species.  Giving each kind of organism the same name purposefully blurs
the distinctions between made and found, and between interspecies and
same species mixes.
The Chimaera in Myth, Literature and Art
Homer’s Iliad, the earliest known literary mention of the Chimaera,
described her as “a creature none could conquer, born of gods, not of
men: she was a lion in front, a snake behind, and a goat in the middle, and
her fearful breath was a blast of blazing fire.”
22 Hesiod, from around the
same era (9
th or 8
th Century B.C.), tells the same story, elaborating only
that the creature had three heads.
 23  In Homer, as in many subsequent
references, the Chimaera is a singular beast rather than a race (such as the
satyrs). The monster has a remarkably stable personage over the almost
                                                   
22 Homer, The Iliad, trans. Martin Hammond (New York: Penguin Books,
1987), 95.
23 In most cases, I was directed to the Chimaera references in this section
by two unlikely sources, an Italian chemist and a Greek dentist.  Ugo
Bardi, a chemistry professor in Florence, maintains an excellent website
about the Chimaera in mythology and art, at: Ugo Bardi, "The Page of the
Ancient Chimera - Or Chimaera - Myth,"
http://www.unifi.it/unifi/surfchem/solid/bardi/chimera/ (accessed 11/20,
2005).  The other source is a review by Greek dentist: E. Bazopoulou-
Kyrkanidou, "Chimeric Creatures in Greek Mythology and Reflections in
Science," American Journal of Medical Genetics 100, no. 1 (Apr 15,
2001), 66-80.38
thirty centuries passed in retelling the story: she is inevitably figured as
fire-breathing, most often female (originally owing to the ancient Greek
literal translation of  χιµαιρα as “young she-goat”), and she is always a
combination of lion, goat and serpent.   In Homeric legend, she was the
offspring of the gods Typhon (a giant) and Echidna (half-serpent, half-
woman), and was a sibling of Cerberus (the hound of Hell), Hydra (the
nine-headed water snake) and Orthrus (another multi-headed dog).  The
Chimaera terrorized Lycia, and she was much feared.
Paraphrased from The Iliad (6, §151-191), the highlights of the story are
as follows:  Bellerophon, whom the gods granted “beauty and all that is
lovely in manhood,”
24 made Anteia, the wife of the king of Ephyre, angry
by refusing to lie with her.  She told her husband, Proitos, quite the
opposite, and he, unwilling to kill the lovely Bellerophon himself, sent
him off to Lycia with a message to the king there to see that Bellerophon
meets his demise.  (Apparently Bellerophon couldn’t read, or he was too
polite to open someone else’s mail).  In response to the request, the
Lycian king told Bellerophon to kill the Chimaera, a task that would
doom him to sure death.  In what is allegedly one of the oldest hero-kills-
dragon stories, Bellerophon, riding the famed steed Pegasus, did in fact
kill the Chimaera, with some help from the gods.  After Bellerophon
avoided a few more “cunning snares” meant to kill the hero, the king of
Lycia threw up his hands and offered Bellerophon his daughter in
marriage.
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In the ancient world, the Chimaera was sustained in artistic
representations.  The monster is depicted on many plates, cups and other
pottery from antiquity.  The most popular visual representation, at least
among geneticists, is the Chimaera of Arezzo (figure 2), a bronze statue of
about 80 cm, unearthed near the city gates of Arezzo, Italy in 1553.
25  The
statue was of Etruscan origin, created by an anonymous sculptor around
the 5
th century B.C.  Once rediscovered, the statue was taken from Arezzo
by the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Cosimo I, to his palace in Florence.  It is
now a prized piece at the National Archaeological Museum in Florence,
where it sits near the entrance in a room of its own.  It has become an icon
for researchers who explore genetic chimerism and microchimerism.
Figure 2: Replica of the Chimaera of Arezzo
26
                                                   
25 These details are from Bardi, The Page of the Ancient Chimera.
26 This photograph is of a replica, courtesy of Galleria Frilli, Firenze. The
original Chimaera of Arezzo is at Museo Archeologico Nazionale di
Firenze, Etruscan, ca 5
th-4
th Century B.C.40
The Chimaera is mentioned in a number of ancient and classical texts by,
for example, Euripedes, Aristotle, Plutarch and Galen,
27 Plato, Lucretius
and Virgil.
28 In the middle ages, the Chimaera was adopted as a portent of
the evils of women.  In the Malleus Maleficarum, the enormously popular
“guidebook” for inquisition of witches, Heinrich Kramer and James
Sprenger wrote:
Hear what Valerius said to Rufinus: You do not know that woman
is the Chimaera, but it is good that you should know it; for that
monster was of three forms; its face was that of a radiant and noble
lion, it had the filthy belly of a goat, and it was armed with the
virulent tail of a viper. And he means that a woman is beautiful to
look upon, contaminating to the touch, and deadly to keep.
29
Feminization of the monster implied and adopted a misogynist tone in its
early literary history.  I am reluctant to make strong claims about the
association between women, the Chimaera, and the medical phenomena
because explicit connections in the historical record are rare.  Nonetheless
we will see that anxieties about sexuality and fertility become an
important part of the medical context of chimeras and microchimerism,
and this association may subtly reach back to the Malleus which, in
addition to being relentlessly misogynist, fixated on sexuality and
reproduction.
                                                   
27 According to Bazopoulou-Kyrkanidou, “Chimeric Creatures”.
28 According to Bardi, The Page of the Ancient Chimera.
29  Heinrich Kramer and Jakob Sprenger, "Part I, Question VI" in Malleus
Maleficarum, ed. Montague Summers, unabridged online republication,
Windhaven Network, 1928 [1486]), http://www.malleusmaleficarum.org/.41
Modern literary references to the Chimaera include popular texts such as
Bullfinch’s Mythology
30 and Nathanial Hawthorne’s A Wonder-Book for
Girls and Boys.
31  Both were published in the 1850’s, and both recounted
the tale told by Homer of the hero Bellerophon and the fire-breathing
monster.  Hawthorne’s story makes the creature sound ghastly indeed:
According to the best accounts which I have been able to obtain,
this Chimæra was nearly, if not quite, the ugliest and most
poisonous creature, and the strangest and unaccountablest, and the
hardest to fight with, and the most difficult to run away from, that
ever came out of the earth's inside. It had a tail like a boa-
constrictor; its body was like I do not care what; and it had three
separate heads, one of which was a lion's, the second a goat's, and
the third an abominably great snake's. And a hot blast of fire came
flaming out of each of its three mouths! Being an earthly monster, I
doubt whether it had any wings; but, wings or no, it ran like a goat
and a lion, and wriggled along like a serpent, and thus contrived to
make about as much speed as all the three together.
32
Hawthorne takes great license in elaborating Homer’s brief tale of
Bellerophon and the Chimaera and describes the grueling battle in detail.
The Chimaera story was picked up from Hawthorne and reprinted in
another popular children’s book, Myths Every Child Should Know: A
Selection Of The Classic Myths Of All Times For Young People, around
the turn of the 20
th Century.
33  W.H. Auden makes an allusive reference to
                                                   
30  Thomas Bulfinch, The Age of Fable, Or, Beauties of Mythology
(Boston: S.W. Tilton, 1855), 488.
31 Nathaniel Hawthorne, A Wonder-Book for Girls and Boys (Boston:
DeWolfe Fiske, 1852).
32 Ibid.
33  Hamilton Wright Mabie and Mary Hamilton Frye, Myths Every Child
should Know (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & company, 1911), 6.42
the monster in his poem “The Chimeras.”  Absence of heart, mind and
worth, he writes, “Are telltale signs that a chimera has just dined/ On
someone else; of him, poor foolish fellow/ Not a scrap is left, not even his
name.”
34
Given its persistence in popular literature and iconography, the
mythological Chimaera – along with its interspecies kin the Centaurs,
Cerberus, the Griffin and others – have maintained a life in the popular
imagination up to and including the 20
th Century.  In the next section, I
turn to a genealogy of the word and meaning of “chimera” as a technical
term in botany, zoology and clinical medicine.
Chimeras in Biology and Medicine
For the most part, the following account is ordered chronologically.
However in order to highlight some important genealogical departures, I
will divide the story into chimeras that are “made” in the laboratory and
those that are “found” in nature.  The term was first used for plants, and
then taken up by animal embryologists, to mean experimentally created
organisms of more than one species (e.g. mouse/rat; chick/quail).  The
experimental tradition of making chimeras, mostly as tools for
developmental biologists, continues to the present.  However, the
genealogy will branch off in the early 1950’s, where we see a new kind of
usage of the term.  First cows, and then humans, were “found” that
contained more than one genetically distinct cell population, the second
population being derived from a twin.  It is this departure in which I am
                                                   
34  W. H. Auden, Collected Shorter Poems, 1927-1957 (London: Faber,
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most interested, as I will argue that it fits within a pre-established tradition
of medical fascination with anatomical monsters.
Chimeras: Made
Hans Winkler, a German botanist in the early 20
th century, was the first
scientist to appropriate the term “chimaera” to emphasize dissimilar
genetic constitution, the meaning in which I am most interested.
35
Winkler experimentally produced a plant that was, on one side, a tomato
plant and on the other side, a nightshade.  The name he chose explicitly
recalled the Greek monster:
To my knowledge there is nothing in nature that is analogous to
our plant, i.e. there is no organism which consists to one half of one
species and to the other half of another species ... such that the only
remaining analogies were mythical creatures such as the Centaurs,
which were half man, half horse, or the Chimaera, which was [in
the forepart a lion, the hindpart a dragon, and in the middle a she-
                                                   
35 The first use of chimaera in biology seems to have been its
appropriation to describe a fish species, Chimaera monstrosa, the origin
of which the Oxford English Dictionary dates to 1804. See "Chimera,
Chim_ra" in Oxford English Dictionary, Online Edition ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), http://dictionary.oed.com (accessed
March 11, 2006)]. This shark-like class of fish has maintained the name,
although its common names include “ratfish”, “rabbitfish” and “catfish”.
Importantly, for my linguistic genealogy, this use seems to refer to the
strange appearance of the fish, rather than to an implication of any
fundamental dissimilarity beneath the scales of the fish.  In other words,
the name was descriptive of the exterior morphology, rather than the
interior anatomy of the fish.  In this sense, the term represents a linguistic
cul-de-sac, and is not a link in the etymological chain of human genetic
chimeras.44
goat].
36 In order to have a short unambiguous name for the category
of completely new kinds of organisms which have appeared with
our plant, I have therefore taken the liberty to call them plant
chimaeras...
37
Note that Winkler experimentally created his plant mixture, and he argues
that a new name is needed specifically because such an amalgamation
does not exist in nature.  Also, the analogy to mythical creatures is meant
to capture species difference.  Finally, one could suppose that what
brought the analogy to Winkler’s mind was the jarring difference in
appearance between the two halves of his plant.  We will see that by the
time the term is in use to refer to humans – found “in nature,” whose parts
are of the same species, and whose difference is invisible from the outside
– it has taken on quite a different meaning than Winkler intended.
Ironically, Winkler also chose the word for its lack of ambiguity.
At least one botanist, W. Neilson-Jones lamented the generalization of the
term’s usage, and complained:
Zoologists still use Chimaera in its original technical sense of the
name of a group of fishes; chimera, on the other hand, is no longer
confined by all biologists to plants having the kind of unlike, allied
tissues to which Winkler originally bestowed the name.  The term
is now often applied, unfortunately and wrongly in my opinion, to
                                                   
36 In the original German text, this portion was in ancient Greek symbols;
translated at http://www.translatum.gr/.
37  Hans Winkler, "_ber Pfropfbastarde Und Pflanzliche Chim_ren."
[italics mine]. Thanks to Anna Maerker for the translation from German.45
any kind of tissue, plant or animal, that is not genetically
homogenous.
38
While Neilson-Jones seems to wish for a narrowly restricted technical use
of the word, he also takes some liberties with its metaphorical
connotations, as he describes such plants as “having what might be called
a multiple personality,”
39 and he suggests that “a grafting operation was
responsible for the introduction of the word chimera into botanical
terminology.”
40 Neilson-Jones begins and ends his book-length treatment
of these grafted plants by airing his pet peeve about nomenclature.  In the
end, he grudgingly concedes that “it would be unrealistic to expect that
the use of a term should be restricted to its legitimate application once its
inappropriate use has gained wide publicity.  Yet I feel some expression
of regret that this is so.”
41
For better or worse, the name did escape botany, however initially it
retained the connotations of an interspecies mixture created
experimentally in the laboratory.  The first reference to an animal chimera
I have been able to locate is in a German article by Hans Spemann,
published in 1921, whose title translates as: “The production of animal
chimaera by heteroplastic embryonal transplantation between triton
                                                   
38 W. Neilson-Jones, Plant Chimeras, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen & Co.
Ltd., 1969), 1.
39 Ibid., 2.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 112.46
cristatus and taeniatus.”
42  Spemann was a renowned experimental
embryologist, and in this paper he describes the amalgamation of newt
and fish embryos.  Spemann cites Winkler, whose creation and naming of
plant chimeras is, Spemann suggests, “well-known.” Moreover, Spemann
elaborates on the comparison between Winkler’s plants and his own
animal embryos.  This comparison is taken up as well by C.H.
Waddington in his textbook, An Introduction to Modern Genetics (1939),
in which he refers to “studies on ‘germ-layer chimaera,’ which are
obtained by adding presumptive mesoderm cells of one species to the
blastula of another.”
43  Making the jump from animals to plants explicit,
Waddington writes that “these correspond among animals to periclinal
chimaeras among plants.”
44  Their similitude was, as I have pointed out, a
result of being both interspecies and man-made.
In the 1950’s, the word took on a new use, and this branch of its
genealogy will take us to the human chimeras of clinical medicine.
However, in the meantime the experimental production of chimeric
organisms has persisted.  Particularly in the 1970’s and the 1980’s, a
subgroup of developmental biologists working with mice, rats, chicks and
quail, among other creatures, created chimeric animals in order to
visualize developmental processes.  Anne McLaren, a central researcher
in this field who still heads a lab in Cambridge and still produces mouse
                                                   
42  Hans Spemann, "Die Erzeugung Tierischer Chimaren Durch
Heteroplastiche Embryonale Transplantation Zwischen Triton Cristatus
Und Taeniatus," Archiv Fur Entwicklungsmechanik 48 (1921), 533-570.
43 C. H. Waddington, An Introduction to Modern Genetics (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1939), 147.
44 Ibid.47
chimeras, describes the remarkably simple process of making chimeras:
“You take two embryos at the eight cell stages, which in mice is two days
after fertilization … you remove, with an enzyme the outer [membrane]
called zona pellucida - and you push the two egg cells together.” In 1984,
researchers  made a “geep” by amalgamating goat and sheep embryos.
45
The result – not to be confused with a goat/sheep hybrid which would
result from mating – had patches of goat tissue, and patches of sheep
tissue (figure 3).  The analogy to the mythical Chimaera appears
frequently in discourse about such interspecies mixes.
Figure 3: A geep
   (photo: Gary Anderson, UC Davis)
                                                   
45  C. B. Fehilly, S. M. Willadsen and E. M. Tucker, "Interspecific
Chimaerism between Sheep and Goat," Nature 307, no. 5952 (Feb 16-22,
1984), 634-636.48
Continuing in the vein of man-made chimeras, the word has been adopted
in recombinant genetics to mean two strands of DNA or amino acids that
have been artificially spliced together (they can either be from different
species or the same species).  This usage, which I will not trace in detail,
began in the mid-1970’s and has become by far the most common usage
in contemporary biology.  In these cases, the word chimera will usually be
preceded by a molecular descriptor such as protein or plasmid.
Interestingly, neither imagery of the mythical Chimaera, nor an explicit
reference to the etymology of the scientific term is a prominent feature in
discourse about molecular chimeras, a point to which I will return later.
Chimeras: Found
In what was to become a classic paper in immunology, and a touchstone
in the establishment of chimerism found in nature, D. Anderson, R. E.
Billingham, G.H. Lampkin and Peter Medawar slightly altered the
meaning of chimera and did some definitional work to fix its meaning.
46
Their experiments with cattle twins touched on a trajectory of research
initiated by Frank Lillie’s work, in 1916, which elaborated the
“freemartin” effect.
47 Often, when twin cows are born, one twin, the
freemartin, will have female external genitalia and some degree of
masculinization of internal gonads.  That this cow was infertile was long
known to cattle breeders.  Lillie undertook substantial explorations of
                                                   
46  D. Anderson and others, "Use of Skin Grafting to Distinguish between
Monozygotic and Dizygotic Twins in Cattle," Heredity 5 (1951), 379-397.
47  F. R. Lillie, "The Theory of the Free-Martin," Science 43 (1916), 611-
613; see also B. Capel and D. Coveney, "Frank Lillie's Freemartin:
Illuminating the Pathway to 21st Century Reproductive Endocrinology," J
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cattle embryology and hypothesized, first, that the freemartin was
genetically female and second, that the female twin is exposed to male
hormones because the twins’ blood supplies have become linked during
gestation. In 1945, Ray Owen, at the University of Wisconsin, used blood
typing to confirm that fraternal twin cows exchange cells in utero by way
of anastomoses, or interconnected blood vessels.  Without naming them
anything other than twin cows, Owen concludes:
These cells are apparently capable of becoming established in the
hematopoietic tissues of their co-twin hosts and continuing to
provide a source of blood cells distinct from those of the host,
presumably throughout his life.
48
Owen foreshadows a common theme in subsequent reports of animal and
human chimeras by describing the phenomenon as “nature’s experiment,”
differentiating it from scientists’ experiments while reinforcing the
analogy.  Indeed this theme recurs in the literature about “spontaneous”
chimeras: they are found in nature, though they are “unnatural.”
Owen’s work would become important when, five years later, Sir Peter
Medawar and colleagues made another peculiar discovery about cow
twins.  In his autobiography, Medawar explains the circumstances leading
to the experiment reported in Anderson et al’s classic article “Use of skin
grafting to distinguish between monozygotic and dizygotic twins in
cattle.”  At a meeting of the International Congress of Genetics in
Stockholm, Medawar met Hugh Donald, who was comparing identical
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(monozygotic) and fraternal (dizygotic) twin cattle to shed light on the
question of inborn versus acquired character differences.  But his entire
enterprise depended on the correct classification of cow twins into
identical or fraternal, which is apparently tricky.  Medawar reports his
response to Donald’s problem:
‘My dear fellow,’ I said in the rather spacious and expansive way
that one is tempted to adopt at international congresses, ‘in
principle the solution is easy: just exchange skin grafts between the
twins and see how long they last.  If they last indefinitely you can
be sure these are identical twins, but if they are thrown off after a
week or two you can classify them with equal certainty as fraternal
twins.’
49
Medawar “somewhat injudiciously” offered to demonstrate the technique
of skin grafting.  A few months later, when his offer was called in by
Donald, Medawar traveled north to Birmingham to undertake the
intensive task of removing patches of skin from cows and sewing them on
to other cows.  Much to the team’s surprise, all the skin grafts lasted, even
in fraternal twins, in which the grafts “should” be rejected by the host
cow’s immune system because they are no more genetically related than
siblings. Medawar and company were stumped that fraternal twins in
cattle respond differently than any other animal in which they had
exchanged skin grafts, including humans.
50
                                                   
49  P. B. Medawar, Memoir of a Thinking Radish: An Autobiography
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invasive!) skin-grafting method to prove that two little French boys had
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(London: Methuen, 1957), 146-148.51
At this point, they encountered Owen’s work, which provided an
explanation for the anomalous finding.  Dizygotic cattle twins were able
to tolerate skin grafts from their twin precisely because they had been
exposed to, and indeed contain, cells from their twin.  They were
immunologically desensitized to their twin during embryonic
development.  In their publication, Anderson et al. (Medawar’s team)
explained that “the dizygotic twin calf at birth is already, in fact, a
genetical chimæra.”
51  At the end of this sentence, they placed an asterix
which leads to the following passage at the bottom of the page:
In the current embryological (which is also the classical) sense, a
“chimaera” is an organism whose cells derive from two or more
distinct zygote lineages, and this is the sense in which the term
“genetical chimaera” is here intended to convey.  “Genetical
mosaic” is less suitable, because a mosaic is formed of the cells of a
single zygote lineage.  In a sense, the dizygotic cattle twin is what
the botanist would call a “graft hybrid.”
52
This passage is often quoted verbatim in subsequent publications, and
thus it is a crucial moment in the definitional life of the word. Of note
here is that we are meant to assume that the classical (i.e. Greek) sense of
the term refers to the “cells” and “zygote lineages” of the lion, goat and
serpent despite the impossibility of thinking in these terms before the 20
th
century.  Second, we are to accept the premise that it was the different
embryological origins of animal parts that mattered in principle, not that
they were of different species and featured visibly incongruous parts.  By
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virtue of this passage, Anderson et al.’s twin cows, which came from the
same species and indeed the same uterus were the same kind of creature
as the lion-goat-serpent, the tomato-nightshade and the fish-newt because
in each case the parts derived from different zygotes had amalgamated
into one organism.  Where experimental agency of the scientist was very
much a part of the early trajectory, the agency of the creator is irrelevant
or implicit in the new meaning of the word.  While theistic notions of a
Creator are not found in the secular story of human chimeras (with one
exception, described later), “Nature” is often credited for its experiment in
the making of chimeras.  The naming of human chimeras picks up where
the cow story left off, and it continues the linguistic slippage from made
to found.
The story of naming human chimeras has not, to my knowledge, been told
in one place before, so I will elaborate in some detail on the subtleties
here.  My main archival source is the MRC Blood Group archive, held by
the Wellcome Library for the History and Understanding of Medicine in
London.  The MRC Blood Group Unit was founded in 1946, with Robert
Race as its director.  Race was a blood group serologist who had, before
and during the war, done important work on the ABO blood groups in
humans, and he had been instrumental in the discovery of the Rh factor,
an antigen in some people’s blood and not others.  Ruth Sanger was hired
as Race’s assistant when the new Unit opened, and she later became his
collaborator, his wife and his successor as director of the Unit when he
retired in 1973. According Race’s biographer, “Rob and Ruth effected
such a symbiosis that like a chimera each had something of the other and53
in the fullness of time another biographer will have the same problem – to
try and find out who did what.”
53
It seems that the main function of the Unit was as a research facility to
work up cases that routine blood donor and transfusion clinics, for
example, did not have the time, equipment or expertise to pursue.
Moreover, following Race’s early work on ABO and Rh systems, the
MRC Unit continued to describe new antigens and groups that differ
among individuals.  The sources of samples coming to them were not
limited to clinics throughout England.  They “acted like a magnet,
attracting problems from people all over the world.”
54  And so it happened
that in March of 1953, Dr. Ivor Dunsford sent a vial of Mrs. McK’s blood
to this puzzle-solving laboratory.  He could not work out why one donor’s
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blood had both A and O types of blood, even though she claimed never to
have received a transfusion, and accidental mixing was ruled out by
repeating the blood draw.
Race, Sanger and colleagues were also able to separate the blood into O
and A, and Race recalled having heard about the mixed-blood situation in
cattle.  At Race’s suggestion, Dunsford asked his patient whether or not
she was a twin.  And, much to everyone’s surprise, she said she had been
a twin, though her brother died when they were three years old.  Race’s
next question, following the cow model, was about Mrs. McK’s fertility:
“I suppose Mrs. McK is not obviously a freemartin – has she been
pregnant I wonder?”
55  Dunsford replies: “I am told by Dr. Bowley that
Mrs. McK is a ‘femine [sic] female’ with a sufficient quota of curves and
bumps to attract and wed a spouse and bear him one child.”
56  As I
mentioned previously, sex, gender and fertility are common themes in
correspondence between the (mostly male) doctors and investigators.
Another colleague, Alan Drury, wrote in a note to Race: “I was interested
to have the letter about your extraordinary case … I did not think that you
would get on to a line that suggests that when a woman has twins she
behaves so extraordinarily like a cow!”
57  This comment exemplifies the
ways in which human chimerism was, from the start, embedded in
discourses of gender, a point to which I will return.
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In order to verify his twin hypothesis, Race sent inquiries to colleagues,
including Peter Medawar, and solicited more of Mrs. McK’s blood, and
some saliva, as well as both from her family members.  “I will be
disappointed,” he wrote to Dunsford, “if other members of the family
[have the abnormality].  The twin idea seems much more attractive.”
58
Race also considered “dispermia,” a condition which had been found in
birds, in which two fertilized eggs result in only one, genetically mixed,
individual.  To rule this out, he suggested that Dunsford check if Mrs.
McK is “more or less bilaterally symmetrical,” by checking if her eye
color, hair color, ear shape and fingerprints are the same on both sides
59 –
which apparently they were.  After a “triumphant day with… the
wonderful samples,”
60 the Blood Group Unit had re-confirmed that there
were two different types of blood.  They also determined that the second
type could not come from Mrs. McK’s mother, a possibility which Race
didn’t seem to take seriously, but he wished to rule out because critics
might.  Finally, they used Mrs. McK’s saliva to “fix her as genetically O,”
and therefore her brother’s “truly begotten blood” as type A.
61
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In a second letter to Medawar, Race wrote “Isn’t it extraordinary to be
able to group fully a person who has been dead for 30 years!”
62  Medawar
makes this re-vivification of Mrs. McK’s brother more explicit in an essay
on “the Uniqueness of the Individual” which he wrote shortly after the
investigation of Mrs. McK:
There is no telling how long Mrs McK will remain a chimera, but
she has now been so for twenty-eight years; probably, in the long
run, her twin brother’s red blood cells will slowly disappear, and so
pay back the still outstanding balance of his mortality.
63
This notion – that someone lives on in the cells that are “genetically
theirs,” though contained in another person – is a recurrent theme in
accounts of chimerism and microchimerism, but it is rarely stated so
poetically.  This theme, that cells embody persons (rather than the other
way around), is addressed more fully in chapter 4.
With regard to naming Mrs. McK a chimera, the record isn’t entirely
clear, or without controversy.  The first time Race mentions the word in
the files pertaining to Mrs. McK is on a handwritten page of laboratory
notes dated April 27, 1953, which simply says “Chimaera? Transfused,”
and the word transfused seems to have been crossed out.
64  Race would, in
1957, recall: “I thought I (Dunsford Bowley et al.) had pinched the word
chimera from the botanists, but quite recently, I saw that Medawar et al.
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had used it two years before, in the same context.”
65  However, Medawar
himself had, in a letter to Race dated April 23, 1953 (just days before
Race’s first written notation of the term), made reference to having
reproduced the cattle situation in laboratory mice, which were thus
“cattle-like genetical chimaeras.”
66  Whether Race got the idea from
Medawar’s letter, or directly from the botanical references in the
textbooks he mentions, is not necessarily important.  I am more interested
in the degree to which Race, when he named the first human chimera, was
reflective or deliberate about the link to its mythological or monstrous
meaning.
The publication reporting on Mrs. McK came out on July 11, 1953, and it
was titled “A Human Blood Group Chimera”  (hereafter, “Dunsford et
al.”).
67  No mention is made to the Greek Chimaera in the text, but Race
did mention in a letter to Bowley during the drafting of the article that
“the biggest reference to chimaera in the Ency. Britt. is to the sort of
meaning we are wanting.”
68  In the edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica
closest in date to this letter, the “biggest” reference describes plant
chimaeras, the first paragraph of which ends: “A chimaera was a
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mythological monster of composite nature, having the head of a lion, the
body of a goat and the tail of a dragon.  The plant chimaeras are truly of
composite nature and origin.”
69  As further evidence that Race was
reflective about the mythological, or at least ancient, meaning of the word,
there is a curious note on a scrap of paper in the Mrs. McK files which
says: “If one of twins survives he is named Vopiscus.”  While there is no
date or further explanation on this note, the word Vopiscus seems to come
from Plutarch’s Coriolanus (75 A.D.):
There are some, too, who even at this day take names from certain
casual incidents at their nativity: a child that is born when his father
is away from home is called Proculus; or Postumus, if after his
decease; and when twins come into the world, and one dies at the
birth, the survivor has the name of Vopiscus.
70
Vopiscus was never taken up in biological nomenclature, but it was
apparently on the minds of Race and/or the other blood groupers.
In the same issue of BMJ as the Dunsford et al. report, an anonymous
editorial reflects on the case.  The opening paragraph states that:
The chimaera of classical tradition was a creature consisting of
parts of several different vertebrate species.  In the natural world,
individuals composed of two genetically distinct parts are rare.
They are found in the plant kingdom and more rarely among
insects.  In their more obvious manifestations chimeras are
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unknown among mammals, but serology, more subtle than the
unaided eye, has shown that they do exist in cattle.  And now Mr. I.
Dunsford and his colleagues … have demonstrated the existence of
a composite human being.
71
From its first use in human biology, therefore, the “classical” Greek
monster was recalled and pointed out to readers, as it was when used by
Winkler with regard to plants, and by Anderson et al. with regard to
animals.
Around the time of the BMJ publication, Race was involved in a peculiar
exchange regarding terminology with two scientists in the United States.
While the potential dispute was easily resolved, it is a telling episode with
respect to the politics (both personal and national) and the contingencies
involved in scientific naming.  Clyde Stormont, a veterinary serologist at
the University of California, Davis, wrote to Ray Owen, the
aforementioned investigator who had identified mixed blood groups in
cattle twins.  In the letter which Stormont copied to Race  (though they
had not before met), he takes issue with the latter’s use of the word
“chimera” to describe “their remarkable discovery of erythrocyte
mosaicism (a la Owen et al. J. Hered. 37:291-297, 1946) in man”
72:
In a separate letter to you, I am discussing the inevitable problem
which often seems to follow when English researchers write on
subjects developed first by American investigators – namely, the
problem of nomenclature.  Shall admixed or compound blood types
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associated with the birth of twins or higher order multiples be
referred to as erythrocyte mosaicism (a la Owen et al. loc. cit) or by
such terms as “genetical chimera”, “blood group chimera”, etc. now
being substituted by Anderson et al Hered. 5:379-397, 1951 and
Dunsford et al in their ms?
73
Excerpts from Owen’s lengthy and jocular response, also copied to Race,
follow:
Fact is, Clyde, though I deeply appreciate your willingness to take
up the cudgel for EM, I don’t feel that the nomenclatorial issue here
is a profound one; I regard it as something of a chimaera (var. of
chimera, a monster vomiting flames; a horrible illusion; a vain or
visionary conception).  If you are right in accusing our English
colleagues of toying with our terminology, I suspect that part of the
explanation might lie in their generally more sensitive
discrimination in the use of English; for myself, I have long envied
the writing of Englishmen.  I rather wish I’d thought of chimera
first myself; it is a somewhat more specific term than mosaic and,
as far as I can see, almost entirely appropriate to the situation…. I
have an impression of incongruous juxtapositions when I see the
term chimera – perhaps, as Anderson et al would say, in the
“classical sense” – quite different from the neatly matched elements
of a mosaic.
74
From this letter we learn that a contemporary of Race’s (even a
linguistically stunted American!) was aware of the monstrous connotation
of chimera.  Owen goes on to note, tongue-in-cheek, that ambiguity of
terms can only benefit him:
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One pleasant aspect of a diffuse terminology for the phenomenon is
that as long as no single consistent term provides an unambiguous
shorthand designation for it, authors continue to specify in effect
that what they are talking about is the phenomenon described by
Owen in 1945 in his brilliant studies on bovine twins, etc. etc.  This
of course is sweet to me, and if I had a press agent I am sure that
we would advise me to foster a confusion of terms.
75
In a handwritten note to Robert Race at the bottom of the copy sent to
him, Owen wrote: “I hope you will find some fun in parts of the above, as
I did in writing it… I do find some of my old friend’s phraseology
unfortunate, but when you meet him I’m sure you’ll agree that he’s a fine
chap all the same.”
76
Race’s response to the exchange was to note, in a letter to Owen, the lack
of thought he had actually given to using the term:
I am sorry [Stormont] is getting a bit excited about the word
chimera (as the BMJ insists on spelling it).  My only thought in
using it was to get a good title for the paper.  Thank you for your
flattering remarks about our English but, to tell you the truth, I
cribbed the word from Waddington’s book and from Darlington
and Mathers.
77
The proto-controversy seems to have ended here.  Owen’s failure to insist
on “erythrocyte mosaicism” seems to have taken the wind out of
Stormont’s sails.  The exchange demonstrates that, at the time of naming
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human chimeras, participants were fully aware of the multivalence of the
term, of its historical roots, and of the desirability of signifying
“incongruous juxtapositions,” which is at the heart of the word.
After Mrs. McK, the MRC Blood Group Unit was involved in several
other investigations of twin chimeras, and the London laboratory became
somewhat of a repository to which chimera cases were inevitably reported
and discussed.  Another early case was the W twins, fraternal twins also
from England, whose status as chimeras was discovered when the 21 year
old woman, “Miss W,” donated blood.
78  She was found to have 1% of
type A blood, from her brother, while he had 14% of her blood type O.
They became the subjects of decades of research involving repeated blood
typing of the sister and brother, their parents, and eventually their spouses
and children.  In a reiteration of Anderson et al.’s skin graft swap between
cow twins, the W twins were subjected to (or volunteered for) a reciprocal
skin graft, which was not rejected.
In the same issue of the British Medical Journal in which Booth et al.
reported on the W twins, another team, Nicholas et al., described another
set of blood chimera twins.
79  Nicholas thought a clarification in
nomenclature was necessary, he writes to Race, because “most
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pathologists appear to be unfamiliar with the word.”
80  In a repetition of
the formula, the first paragraph states:
The term “chimera” (originally a fabulous fire-spouting monster,
part lion, part goat and part serpent) has been used in botany for
many years to denote an individual plant in which there are two or
more tissues differing in their genetic constitution, such as a graft
hybrid.
81
Here, too, species difference is conflated with individual genetic
difference within a species, as Nicholas emphasizes “tissues differing in
their genetic constitution,” without mentioning species difference.  This is
significant because it renders the difference between individuals
(brother/sister in this case) as the same kind of thing as the difference
between species  (lion/goat/serpent).
Another find: Genetic chimeras
By the early 1960’s, techniques in cytogenetics (meaning “cell genetics”)
were much improved and allowed visual scrutiny of nucleus-containing
cells in blood (white blood cells have nuclei, while red blood cells
generally don’t).  In 1962, Doctors at the University of Washington in
Seattle saw a two-year-old patient for “surgical correction of an enlarged
clitoris.”
82  She also, they noted, had two different colored eyes.  When
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they karyotyped
83 13 of her white blood cells, they found that “seven had
an XX chromosome pattern and six were XY.”
84  They also found mixed
XX and XY cells in her gonadal tissue (an “ovotestis”), and in skin from
her abdomen.  They concluded that they were studying the first human
instance of “generalized tissue mosaicism.”  In keeping with the
nomenclature for intersex individuals at the time, Gartler et al. called their
patient a hermaphrodite (again drawing on the residues of ancient myth).
Shortly after the paper describing the case, the same team published a
second paper which used blood grouping – done by Race and Sanger – to
confirm the “mosaicism.”
85
From a nomenclature point of view, it is interesting to note that Gartler et
al. do not call their case a chimera, although they mention “twin blood
group chimeras,” as a similar phenomenon, in their introduction.  In 1963,
a second case was discerned in the U.S., though this time in an
“apparently healthy 18 year old male of Negro-Amerindian-Caucasian
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ancestry” who started as a blood donor and became a “case” because of
abnormal blood typing.
86  Again, the subject of the article is not called a
chimera, but “a new example of generalized tissue mosaicism.” It is
possible that, because these early cases were found and published in the
U.S., the choice of nomenclature may be colored by the exchange
between Owen, Stormont and Race described above, in that the
Americans used Owen’s original term “mosaic” instead of chimera.
87
In 1965, Race and Sanger determined the blood groups in the third case of
mixed XX/XY cells, originating in Milwaukee, in which they used the
phrase “dispermy,” but not chimera.  In their 1968 chapter reviewing
chimeras, they state that “dispermy thereby falls into the chimera class but
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Disputes about nomenclature apparently fell along the same national lines
as the disagreements about naming in human chimerism.  One British
researcher told me, “Minsk insisted that they should be called allophonic
mice, not chimeras.  We had a big battle for years about what to call them.
But Iʼm one for priorities, and the term chimera had priority and I argued
nationally and internationally that they should be called chimeras, and in
the end, I think now, everybody calls them chimeras.”66
we prefer to place it in a class of its own.”
88  In a contemporaneous
review, Curt Stern, working in the U.S., demonstrated that the question of
naming these cases was not yet closed. As is customary, he
parenthetically describes that chimeras are “named after the mythical
monster that was compounded of a lion’s head, a goat’s body, and a
serpent’s tail.”
89  He goes on to say that – because of the difficulty of
discerning the difference between mosaics and chimeras with total
confidence, “it seems appropriate … to use the term ‘mosaic’ for any kind
of genetic multiplicity in an individual.”
90
The next year, Charles Ford published an essay in the British Medical
Bulletin which begins by quoting the famous passage by Anderson et al.,
and states quite clearly that “the component cell lines of mosaics will have
an underlying genetic identity, whereas in chimaeras they will be
genetically distinct.”
91 A handwritten note in the MRC Blood Group file,
dated 1971, was possibly in preparation for a talk or a publication, or
perhaps just Race’s way of working out the issue.  On it is stapled a typed
copy of Anderson et al.’s passage.  Below it, Race writes:
Twin chimeras are derived from 2 distinct zygote lineages but their
second lineage is rather superficial, scarcely more that a tissue
graft.  The cases of dispermy are indeed wholly derived from 2
distinct zygote lineages and really deserve the name of chimeras
more than the twin type.  We do need two names to distinguish
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these essentially different organisms, which at present most writers
describe as chimeras, both of them.  If the very attractive word
chimera, which by the way, in the non-mythological sense – means
a she-goat, is to persist, perhaps it should be confined to the
dispermic condition & some other name be found for the twin
type.
92
Attached to this page by a paper clip is a smaller note which reads:
Chimera, χιµαιρα, means a female goat and also, as a proper noun
the mythical monster slain by Bellerophon.  One of the modern
meanings given by the O.E.D. is ‘an unfounded conception’ which
refers to ideas but is oddly close to a description of our genetical
puzzle.
93
By the time Race and Sanger published the 6th Edition of Blood Groups
in Man, in 1975, the nomenclature seems to have stabilized.
94  While they
continued to compile cases of both types of chimeras, it seems that at
some point it became redundant for blood bankers or geneticists who
stumbled on new cases to publish them in journal articles.  The MRC
archive contains much correspondence in which Race, Sanger, and later
their successor Patricia Tippett followed up on or received notice of
chimera cases.  In one such letter, M. Ferguson Smith writes “I am truly
ashamed to say that I never got round to publishing the case of F.B. It is
somehow never quite so exciting to write up something that has been
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described before.”
95   Of the 22 cases of dispermic chimeras they describe
in 1975, 9 were unpublished.  Of 20 sets of twin chimaeras, 4 were
unpublished.  Race and Sanger end their 1975 chapter with the following
plea:
Those in the position to find these cases are all very busy people
who need not be called on to write a formal paper: all that is needed
is a brief report, perhaps in telegrammatic form, giving such facts
as time has allowed the gathering.
96
This is significant, I think, because estimates of the prevalence of
chimerism often take the paucity of published cases as evidence of their
rarity.
The use of the term chimera for found cases of genetic multiplicity
continues to the present, and sporadic cases of tetragametic chimeras are
still published and publicized.  Notable recent cases included a woman in
Massachusetts who is a same-sex chimera (XX/XX),
97 and a boy in
England who is has both populations of cells, XX and XY, and he was
born after In Vitro Fertilization (IVF).
98  Contemporary definitions of
“chimera” tend to refer to dissimilar genetic elements derived from two or
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more fertilized zygotes.  This definition does, indeed, encompass all of the
cases I have described above, although it retrospectively collapses many
of the specificities implied by the word at particular historical moments.
Linguistic labyrinths
Ludwig Wittgenstein writes that:
Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets
and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions
from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new
boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.
99
The history of the word “chimera” fits nicely into this allegory. Some of
its users (Winkler, Anderson et al., Race) modified, expanded or regulated
the meaning while others (Neilson-Jones, Stormont, Stern) tried to
without success. We have seen that two meanings of the word, the
monster and the biological organism, have remained coupled together for
a century.  It did not have to be so; at any point, one or the other could
have fallen into disuse. The type of organism could have been named
something else (we have seen “mosaic,” “dispermy,” and “allophonic” in
the running).  The monster part of the analogy could have become a dead
metaphor, the word left to mean only a genetically composite organism,
no one the wiser.  In fact, the metaphor seems to be in limbo.  It is neither
alive – or people wouldn’t have to explain it all the time, nor dead –
because people are able to explain it all the time.
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As a counter-example, the use of “chimera” in molecular biology is an
instance of a dead metaphor.  Molecular biologists and genetic engineers
do worry about the spontaneous creation of chimeric material – the
unpredictable melding of bits of DNA or RNA - as obstacles to their
experiments.  A vague sense of the combination of unlike elements
remains, but the monster itself has fallen away from discourse about the
chimeric protein, or the chimeric plasmid.  The creature is neither
depicted nor described in articles and talks about molecular
recombination, and the monster is not constitutive of the concept in the
same way that it seems to be in clinical medicine.
100  I suspect that this is
because a string of molecules is not a whole organism, and hence is not
amenable to “monstering” in quite the same way.  In the case of human
genetic chimeras, researchers have implied notions of composite being, of
a melding together of patches of fundamental difference (be it between
species or within a single species).  Despite this difference, the
creature/organism holds together as an unlikely single functioning whole,
and this similarity is made salient each time the connection between
monster and human is reiterated.
Because both the biological chimera and the mythical Chimaera belong to
relatively esoteric fields, the maintenance of the analogy has required
work by the scientists who used it, and it still does.  In early 20
th Century
America, those who use the word, or its derivatives “chimerism” and
“microchimerism,” to refer to medical phenomenon often explain its link
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to the mythological monster.  Why do these researchers bring figurative
mythology into the technical discourse of cytogenetics and medicine?
Like Robert Race and others in some of the passages I quoted above, the
scientists I speak to find the metaphor and the images very compelling.
One laboratory director told me that it implies mystery: “I feel this visual
link puts the research into a perspective that is personal, fantastic,
mystical and silly.”
101  Another uses it in a different kind of pedagogical
sense than introducing lay people or students to the field.  He uses a visual
image of the creature to cue colleagues into the fact that his work is
related to what has come before:
I use the analogy of the chimera because the people who have
previously worked on intact cells have generally used such an
analogy. The extension of this analogy to the cell-free DNA world
would make the concept more easily comprehensible to these
groups of scientists.
102
From my observations, it seems like this community-building use is
common.  The Chimaera has become an icon in the field, and, as another
researcher told me, images are easy to come by with Google.  “Always
use pictures in talks!”
103 One researcher told me that she specifically
traveled to Arezzo in Italy while on vacation in order to see the statue, and
she uses her own photograph of the monster in presentations.
104
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The point at which the monster is most likely to make its appearance is in
the introduction to a talk, an article, or a book.  Hence it is used as a tool
for clarification, or a descriptive “hook”, before the speaker or writer goes
on to say whatever else they want to say – that the “foreign” cells may be
causing an immune reaction, for example.  Let us presume that the reader
or listener does not know the word at all.
105  If they do, they most likely
know it to mean something fanciful, or made-up, which is exactly NOT
what our hypothetical scientist wants them to believe about this important
research.  In order to make the explanation quick and memorable, the
speaker describes, or shows an image of, a creature that has three quite
different parts.  And then they imply that like the monster, the human has
different parts (usually only two).  Hence the crux of the metaphor, which
is obvious by now, is the composite nature, the amalgamation, the mixing
involved in both cases.
I am often told by chimerism researchers that they don’t think the word
has any bad connotations, or that they deliberately avoid the word
“monster.”  When I noted, in discussion with one pediatrician, that the
Greek myth is often invoked in scientists’ communications, she went on at
some length about the playfulness of it:
Oh, just to be cute.  We all like to be based in being philosophical.
Yeah, so people who give a talk on chimeras show a picture of
chimeras.  That’s somehow to give it legitimacy… [whispers] but
it’s sort of dumb…. Nobody would tell a patient that they’ve got a
                                                   
105 Chimerism researchers have mixed opinions, or no idea, about who, if
anybody, does know either meaning of the word.73
monster child.  We all want to find some legitimacy in history.  Of
course people do that.  I’m giving a talk on twins, I use Romulus
and Remus for heaven’s sakes, to talk about it.  Because there’s a
fascination with that. [BL]
The common element in all these reasons for using the analogy is to build
associations in the minds, imaginations, memories, etc. of the listener or
reader.  Although scientists and doctors tell me that they don’t believe that
this analogy has negative implications, I will argue in the next section that
the analogy works because people do think of genetic chimeras as
anatomical monsters.   While I don’t think this does a particularly
grievous disservice to the people so-described, it does make them objects
of fascination and subjects them to intrusion – literally and figuratively –
from inquiring medical people (who stand to gain a publication) and the
media (who stand to gain a freak story).
106   Certainly knowing about their
cellular “quirk” does them no medical good, as they aren’t, and needn’t
be, “treated” for it.
PART II: Anatomical Monsters
In this portion of the paper, I will draw upon historical literatures about
anatomical monsters to demonstrate that chimeras are a kind of modern-
day morphological monster.  Historians are generally in agreement about
the broad characteristics of monster discourse in the European Middle
Ages and the Enlightenment.  Beginning around 1500, Lorraine Daston
and Katharine Park argue, treatment of monsters and attitudes about them
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began to change remarkably.  In popular literature, monsters (which were
not limited to human oddities, but included all manner of peculiar or
perilous natural phenomena) were originally invested with divine and
portentous meaning.   “As the period progressed, they appeared more and
more as natural wonders – signs of nature’s fertility rather than God’s
wrath.”
107  Fear and superstition about monsters persisted among the Early
Modern Christian populace, but the seventeenth century saw the educated
laymen and Baconian scientists distancing themselves from the less
educated classes.
 108  Attitudes about monsters – now seen by elites as
“curiosities and sports of nature”
109 rather than ominous otherworldly
signs – mark this growing gap.
110
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109 Michael Hagner, "Enlightened Monsters" in The Sciences in
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110 I have encountered only one reference to Godʼs hand in twentieth
century chimera formation.  In their 1958 review, Race and Sanger write
about the fourth case of chimeric twins, found in Mexico:
To Dr. Velez-Orozcoʼs enquiry whether she were a twin she
answered no; but Dr. Velez-Orozco was then taken aside by her
mother who said that there had indeed been twins but the boy was
stillborn because of Godʼs anger at the drunkenness of her husband.
Sanger refers to this case in correspondence contained in the MRC files:
“I, Ruth, secretly suspect that Mrs. PMʼs mother is like the mother of
Velez Orozcoʼs propositus and is keeping quiet about God striking a blow
in anger.” (Ruth Sanger to George W. G. Bird, November 30, 1973,
F20/2/1 Part 2 of 3, SA/BGU, The Wellcome Library, London.) Like in
the seventeenth century, these comments convey disdain (or more likely
amusement) at religious superstition.  In this case, the distance it charts is
that between British secular academics and Mexican lay people.75
In the seventeenth century, monsters became ubiquitous.  They were
discussed in popular and educated circles and they appeared “as
spectacles in court culture, at marketplaces, and at fairs.  Numerous case
studies filled erudite journals… and natural oddities were desired objects
for collectors’ cabinets.”
111  Hagner describes in some detail Czar Peter I’s
court in St. Petersburg Russia, in which anatomically unusual humans,
such as dwarfs and hermaphrodites, were kept as curiosities and courtly
entertainments.  In her book The Platypus and the Mermaid and Other
Figments of the Classifying Imagination, Harriet Ritvo devotes a chapter
to animals and humans considered monstrous and their role as public
spectacles.  “The house of the monstrous,” she writes, “contained many
mansions.  And from the seventeenth century onward, those mansions
were ever more densely tenanted.”
112
At the turn of the eighteenth century, a new scientific impulse to
systematize and classify monsters prevailed, particularly among
anatomists and medical men.
113  While monsters’ status as spectacle and
curiosity did not disappear, connoisseurs of the monstrous during this
century were more likely to view anomalies as rare foils for Nature’s
remarkable orderliness than as products of “her” artfulness and trickery.
Monsters presented a challenge to Enlightenment visions of natural and
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social order and so, Hagner argues, they needed to be “domesticated” or
brought into order through methodical display and classification.
During this century, monstrous births and miscarriages garnered a new
epistemic status, particularly in teratology (literally “the study of
monsters”), the forerunner of embryology. They became instruments in
scholarly debates between, for example, advocates of preformationism (all
traits present at embryo creation) and advocates of epigenesis (form
emerges gradually over time).
114  No longer just objects of value and
prurience in themselves, monstrous conceptions and births became objects
of dissection and experimentation, for learning about nature through its
aberrations.  Etienne Saint Hilaire and his son Isidore Geoffrey Saint
Hilaire were the most famous proponents of teratology.  The latter
“domesticated” monsters:
By placing them among anomalies, by classifying them according
to the rules of the natural method, by applying a methodical
nomenclature to them that is still in use, and above all by
naturalizing the compound monster, the monster in whom one finds
united the elements, complete or incomplete, of two or more
organisms.
115
Where monstrosities had previously been preserved and displayed whole,
they now were more likely to be opened up, in parts, or in pictorial
representations.  While they did not lose their status as curiosities and
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“good finds,” anatomical monsters had by now lost the ability to inspire
fear.  By the end of the nineteenth century, monstrosities offered
“forbidden sight of the secret work-room of nature.”
116
Chimeras as anatomical monsters
Little scholarly work has been written about twentieth century anatomical
monsters, especially in comparison to previous centuries.  That which
does deal with monstrous themes tends to emphasize vague but ubiquitous
concerns about experimental biology, genetic engineering and
reproductive technology.  Jon Turney’s Frankenstein’s Footsteps, for
example, argues that Shelley’s story is “the governing myth of modern
biology.”
117  Turney’s book explores the trope of monstrosity, and in
particular Frankenstein, as it is deployed by scientists, and more often by
worried publics.  An article by Melinda Cooper directly connects
eighteenth century teratology to modern stem cell science, and argues
that: “What is exceptional about recent developments in stem cell research
is the fact that such monstrous possibilities are being exploited as a source
of regenerative tissue.
 “
118  In other words, what used to be coded as
dangerous excess is now seen as a life-giving panacea.
While these authors explore the rhetorical use of monstrosity in recent and
contemporary science, their cases do not follow in the tradition of
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anatomical teratology, which contemplated individual instances of
monstrosity and sought to learn general rules of development from them.
Chimeras, however, seem to have direct continuity with the anatomical
monsters described above.  While the actual term “monster” has fallen out
of favor in medical contexts, many features of eighteenth and nineteenth
century monster discourse endure in contemporary biomedical discourse
about human chimeras.  The 1974 article titled “Another Human
Chimaera”
119 is reminiscent of the 1864 Lancet article about a malformed
fetus entitled “Another Monster.”
120
Like the teratologists before them, the discoverers of early human
chimeras persistently expressed a kind of prurient pleasure in their
subjects.  The most striking aspect of the correspondence contained in the
MRC Blood Group Archives is the persistent fascination inspired by
chimeras, exemplified in the excited speech by Moores with which I
began this chapter.  Letter-writers frequently congratulated each other
when someone discovered a chimera.  They were described as
“fascinating,” “exciting” and “remarkable finds.”  In exchanges about
Mrs. McK, Medawar tells Race that “we are all agog.”
121  In Race’s reply,
he writes “we have enjoyed this blood,”
122 and signs off the letter with an
enthusiastic “Fe Fi Fo Fum.” (In this case, like in Frankenstein, there is
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some confusion about whether the scientist or the “patient” is the
monster.)  In another letter from around the same time, Race thanks
Dunsford, the doctor who sent the samples to the MRC, for “letting us
share in this superb blood.”
123  These sentiments express the pleasure
associated with rare and challenging work, but they also imply that Mrs.
McK was thought of as a wonder of nature.  Even long after the thrill of
the first cases wore off, Race, Sanger et al. remained enthralled with
chimeras.  In 1973, Sanger writes “I’ve just realized that it’s 20 years
since the first twin chimera was spotted and they are still an
excitement.”
124   These comments suggest that, as in the eighteenth
century, researchers took “an erudite pleasure in and fascination with
monsters, regarded as highlights in a collection.”
125
The MRC group collected cases like former monster connoisseurs
collected objects for their curiosity cabinets. They also used their rare
finds to impress visitors:
We have frozen two of the samples and kept one in the fridge to use
as a demonstration.  We are being visited by some of the Medical
Research Council soon and to have a visible example of dispermy
to show should impress them.
126
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Instead of the whole person, they collected vials of blood and punch cards
with their blood groups. Catherine Williams, a serologist in Miami, sent a
sample to the Lister Unit with a note saying “we thought you might like to
have the enclosed specimen for your curiosa file.  It is a blood group
chimera.”
127  In her reply, Sanger writes “thank you very much for letting
us look at this fine fellow.”
128  This exchange demonstrates the scientists’
habit of conflating the blood and the person, as in “whole bottle of sister
sent to Jan,”
129 and “herewith some of the W family.”
130
Sometimes these samples were hard to come by and members of the team
would literally have to coordinate field trips to “collect” blood at the
people’s homes.  Unlike desperate patients eager to have researchers look
at their bodies and tissues, chimeras – being healthy – had little reason to
want to be researched, and they were not in regular attendance at clinics
or hospitals where blood could be easily procured.
131  Maintenance of
relationships with these singular “cases,” then, required some careful
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the more recent court case, John Moore v. the Regents of the University of
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management, which seems to have included Christmas cards, and
selective information-sharing:
If these could be obtained without unduly worrying the patient (and
I would have thought this possible if the presence of a second cell
type was explained to her without telling her that one was male) it
would be very good to get to the cause of the chimerism as such
people are, as you know, extremely rare.
132
Investigators also discussed strategies for enrolling patients and their
families in the projects so continuous sources of blood would be available.
The W twins, who were particularly heroic “volunteers” for blood draws
and exchange of skin grafts, were given “the Oliver Memorial Award” by
the British Blood Transfusion Service for their selfless contributions
(including blood).
The skin grafting experiment performed on the W twins is a good
example of researchers using rarities as instruments for resolving
theoretical debates.  Indeed much of the early excitement about blood
group chimeras related to early work on immunology and transplantation.
Medawar and others were very interested in why some transplants are
rejected and others tolerated. In his essay “The Uniqueness of the
Individual,” Medawar uses chimeras as an exception which proves the
rule of genetic individuality:
The non-identical twins between which it is possible to exchange
skin homografts are among the most remarkable animals in nature
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for they are graft-hybrids or chimeras…[they react] in complete
defiance of the principles formulated in this article.
133
The tendency to use anomalies found in nature to illustrate the normal is,
many historians suggest, a characteristic of eighteenth century scientific
treatment of monsters.  Daston and Park explain: “Interest in exotic
creatures was tolerated only in so far as it illuminated the anatomy of
more common ones.”
134  In an eerily similar passage, an Anonymous
reviewer of chimeric twins writes:
Although the cases discussed are rare, it is interesting how many
basic deductions can be made from such a small amount of material
– in sharp contrast to the results sometimes obtained from large-
scale population surveys.  The rare abnormality can lead to our
understanding a normal mechanism.
135
When, in 1983, the MRC group was still collecting and publishing cases,
but less able to justify theoretical interest in them, Tippett concludes her
review by saying that although more than 70 chimeric cases are known,
“investigation of these rare people, who are natural experiments, is still
entertaining and worthwhile.”
136
People with both male and female sexual organs are an enduring kind of
morphological rarity which clearly ties together medical discourses of the
past with those of the current century.  Alice Dreger, in her thorough
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history of hermaphroditism, writes that “stories of hermaphrodites are
sprinkled throughout virtually every era of recorded history.”
137 The
history of Western attitudes about hermaphrodites is in keeping with that
of monstrosity more generally, as described above.  From a mediaeval
fear and mistreatment of hermaphrodites as supernatural portents of evil,
to an early modern fascination which recast them as “marvels,” to a
modern scientific “domestication” of them as pathological specimens,
hermaphrodites seem to be exemplars of anatomical monsters.
Chimeras overlap with hermaphrodites and intersex conditions, both as
biological phenomena, and because they both inspire anxieties about
sexual classification.  Blood group chimeras contain blood cells from their
fraternal twins; in some cases, the twin is of the opposite sex.  In cows,
the first known instance of this phenomenon, female cows would be
sterile.  Dr. Dunsford’s report that his patient had “a sufficient quota of
curves and bumps to attract and wed a spouse”
138 translated, in the
published account of the case, to the statement that she “is feminine in
appearance and has had one child: she is clearly not a freemartin.”
139
Worries about potential infertility in men were handled in an even more
delicate manner, probably in order to avoid emasculating implications.
With regard to a 1957 case in which 25% of a young man’s blood cells
were genetically traceable to his sister, Race writes the following in a
letter to a co-author about the draft publication:
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I did not, in the Discussion, mention the possibility that, in Man, it
may be the male who gets it in the neck (to put it with all delicacy).
There seems to be no evidence yet for this and it would surely
cause worry to Mr. W or to his parents.
140
Race’s speculation that “it may be the male who gets it in the neck”
means that while Mrs. McK had proven that female blood chimeras could
definitely be fertile, there had been no similar demonstration from a
human male.  Consequently, Race implies, human males may be infertile
like female twin cows.  (This turns out not to be the case.)  Concealment
from patients has been characteristic of the medical sciences that deal
with intersex, and paternalistic attempts to protect patients from self-
knowledge featured in scientists’ handling of chimeras as well.  Race and
Sanger were not, however, so delicate in their reference to Mrs. McK’s
long deceased brother: “This rather puts to shame the human male embryo
whose feeble hormones appear to have absolutely no effect on his
sister.”
141  The reference to “feeble hormones” is obviously a denigration
of the “manhood” of the human male embryo.
142
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The other kind of human chimerism – dispermy or tetragametic – is one
of several potential “causes” of intersex development.  Some (though not
all) XX/XY chimeras have some degree of dual-sex tissue development.
This was, in many cases, why these people came under medical scrutiny
in the first place. Their “condition” was diagnosed with the demonstration
of karyotypes of both collections of chromosomes from different cells.  In
one noteworthy case, a woman was found to have almost entirely XY
cells in her blood.  Her doctor wrote a letter to Race and Sanger, which he
titled: “the Strange Case of the Pregnant Male.”
143  In it, he writes, “PD
looks female both to me and the obstetrician.  It seems she has enough
XX to look female and obviously to make eggs – if you see what I mean.
Otherwise it seems one can make out a good case for her being a male.”
144
Whether or not clinicians’ anxieties about sex in chimerism intertwine
with the gendering of the Chimaera is difficult to say.  One could
speculate that the ferocious and violent tendencies of the Chimaera, a
female creature, suggests some sort of gender ambiguity or multiplicity,
which is also present in discussions about mixed-sex human chimeras,
although I have no direct evidence that this was a purposeful analogy.
Certainly the more germane norm that the Chimaera is violating is the rule
that an animal should only be one species.  Indeed, this norm has been the
recent subject of debate in bioethical, legal and theological circles.  While
plant and animal combinations that transgress species divides have long
been created without much uproar, the possibility that part-human
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organisms could be engineered has incited public controversy.  Francoise
Baylis and Jason Robert opened a heated philosophical debate about
animal-human chimeras in the American Journal of Bioethics with their
article “Crossing Species Boundaries.”
145  In it, they write:
As against what was once commonly presumed, there would appear
to be no such thing as fixed species identities. This fact of biology,
however, in no way undermines the reality that fixed species exist
independently as moral constructs. That is, notwithstanding the
claim that biologically species are fluid, people believe that species
identities and boundaries are indeed fixed and in fact make
everyday moral decisions on the basis of this belief.
146
Interspecies chimeras, particularly those that involve human components,
are considered monstrous because they violate a social or moral norm.  I
will conclude by speculating about what social norms human clinical or
“found” chimeras violate.
Conclusion
To return to a point I made in the introduction of this chapter, monsters do
not exist a priori, but are manifestations of culturally specific rules and
anxieties.  In some cases, “monstering” has been used to police
classifications in the service of overt political aims.  During colonial
campaigns, for example, the portrayal and public display of indigenous
peoples as morphological freaks of nature were used to denigrate the
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Robertʼs provocative paper.
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“savages,” and thus justify colonization.
147  Hence, biological norms are
simultaneously social norms.  When something out of the ordinary
appears in nature, it is not violating nature’s law, but the laws that human
beings (often scientists) have attributed to nature.  Monsters are valuable,
Canguilhem writes, because they reinscribe the ordinary, the ordered:
By demonstrating how precarious is the stability to which life has
accustomed us - yes, only accustomed, but we made a law out of its
custom - the monster gives an all the more eminent value to
specific repetition, to morphological regularity, to successful
structure; it makes us realize that these are not necessary.
148
Making a similar point, Harriet Ritvo underscores the propensity of
biological hybrids and crosses to “emphasize the existence of boundaries
between groups and simultaneously obliterate them.”
149
Human chimeras have been persistently fascinating to medical researchers
in the latter half of the 20
th Century because they violate the rule that
organisms derive from a single fertilized egg and contain the self-same
genome in every cell.   Beyond simply implying that genetic chimeras are
rare or unusual, biomedical representations of them as anatomically
monstrous imply that humans, or biological organisms should only
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contain one genome.  This rule has gained a heightened salience in the age
of forensic DNA testing.  The imperative to have a singular genetic
identity is now an instrumental part of governance in most nations.  That
chimeras threaten this rule has not escaped public notice, though experts
dismiss this worry on grounds of the rarity of the phenomenon.
Dreger writes that sexual ambiguity is so captivating and so unsettling
because “the discovery of a ‘hermaphroditic’ body raises doubts not just
about the particular body in question, but about all bodies.”
150  That
“Nature” can transgress fundamentally held social categories (like sex)
troubles the perceived naturalness of those categories.  Chimeras, too,
raise doubts about all bodies.  Particularly because of the invisibility of
outward signs, we could all be chimeras.  This differentiates chimeras
from their eighteenth century counterparts such as Siamese twins, dwarfs
and two-headed babies.  Monstering, in the past, has largely relied on
visible anomalies, gross features which distance the object from the
viewer, and often inspire repugnance. Domestication of monsters often
meant that scientists and medical men would provide a rational
explanation for why a human was the way he or she was, which perhaps
alleviated some of the stigma.
Chimeras, however, harbor invisible difference.  “Passing” as normal is
not a social issue; without the laboratory, they have no difference.  In
order to become chimeras, people or their tissues have to enter the clinic
and then the laboratory, which they often do by accident (as blood donors,
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for example).  The first surprise is that such doubly-endowed people exist,
and the second surprise is that they are not visibly monstrous, despite such
a fundamental “pre-zygotic mishap.”
151  In a small number of cases,
chimeras have photo-worthy patchy skin or unusual genitalia, but in most
instances the case reports are devoid of photographs of the person
described.
 152  However, pictures of chromosomes, and of fluorescently-
tagged Y chromosomes, make the anatomical oddity visible to the
audience, and to the person themselves.
This, then, is a twentieth-century innovation in anatomical monstrosity.
Monstering, a social process of delineating norms and violations of them,
still relies on visualizing anomalies. Where two heads and parasitic twins
once inspired public awe and scientific scrutiny, there has been a change
in the order of magnitude of morphological abnormalities.  Our body parts
have gotten much smaller.  Chimeras are, to borrow Canguilhem’s term,
micromonsters.
153  In chapters 2 and 3 I will explore a recent area of
research that suggests that chimerism may in fact be a biological norm.
Certainly with the therapeutic employment of transfusions, transplants
and stem cell therapies, the occurrence of genetic multiplicity is
increasing.  Hence, chimeras may be a transient kind of micromonster,
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Canguilhem applies the term to “hereditary biochemical errors” which are
monstrous because they are “errors of nature.”  Because of their
continuity with centuries of anatomical monstrosity, I suggest that
chimeras are even better examples of micromonsters.90
marking a contemporary, though not eternal, preoccupation with
individual genetic integrity.  This contingency would come as no surprise
to a genealogist.91
CHAPTER 2:
THE WRONG TOOL FOR THE JOB: FETAL CELLS AND THE Y
CHROMOSOME
Bodies cannot be said to have a signifiable existence prior to the
mark of their gender; the question then emerges: To what extent
does the body come into being in and through the marks of gender?
---Judith Butler, Gender Trouble
1
Introduction
Attention to the materiality of scientific practice is a persistent concern of
science and technology studies (S&TS).  Rather than leaving the science
settled and attending to the social interests that swirl around it, S&TS is
adept at looking for sociotechnical hybrids within the minutiae of the
work done by scientists.  In this chapter, I will describe the techniques by
which identities are affixed to cells, which allows scientists to
differentiate them from one another. Human genetic chimeras are made
when biomedical researchers find cells in people that, by some genetic or
immunological measure, do not belong there.  While immunological
markers and blood groups have played a part in the discernment of
chimerism, by and large the most important tool for researchers has been
chromosomal sex.  Many of the cases of chimerism described in chapter 1
were discerned by the visualization of cell populations that contained both
XX and XY cells, when only one of these cell types was expected.  For
example, cells “out of place” are located, in women, by their tell-tale Y-
chromosomes, marks that “should not” be found in women.
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Because chimeras are found so rarely, it was methodologically impossible
for me to capture the mundane laboratory practices by which they are
constituted.  Fortunately, spontaneous genetic chimerism is not the only
situation in which  biomedical investigators go searching for cells out of
place.  In this chapter, I will trace the clinical history of a technique which
actually aims to find Y-chromosomes in women.  In this case, finding a Y
is a routine, even desired, outcome that does not call the woman’s identity
or femininity into question. Unlike the subjects we encountered in the
previous chapter, these women are pregnant.  Because pregnant women
contain beings with their own (albeit contested) identity and their own
genetic profile, notions of pregnancy were not radically altered when
researchers discovered that some cells escape through the so-called
placental barrier, and can be found in pregnant women’s blood.  In a
sense, according to modern Western ideas about pregnancy, pregnant
women’s bodies are already multiple, they have already compromised
whatever cellular purity is expected of non-pregnant people.  When
investigators started finding Ys in pregnant women, their thoughts turned
to utility rather than pathology: How could these cells be put to good use
to find out more about the growing fetus inside the woman?
In his superb history of the experimental culture of fruit flies and their
scientists, Robert Kohler claims that the Drosophilists made the fruit fly
into a “living instrument.”
2  The flies, he writes, became both biological
and technological at the same time.  In this chapter, I aim to tell a similar
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kind of story about one bit of material culture, around which small teams
of clinical and laboratory scientists grouped, dispersed and regrouped.
My living instrument is not a whole organism, or even a whole cell, but a
single human chromosome: the Y.  It is living in the sense that it is
organic material, rather than metal or plastic.  It is derived from a living
body, a woman’s body.  Kohler shows us that successive generations of
fruit flies became physically adapted to the interests of the humans
working with them, and vice versa.  In my story, generations of
investigators organized research programs and laboratories around their
trick of finding Y-chromosomes in pregnant women and (sometimes)
showing that they coincide with male babies.  However the materiality of
the Y chromosome – what counts as a Y – has changed over time. In the
sense of continual transformation, the Y, like Kohler’s fruit fly, is a living
instrument.
Incidentally, fetal cell researchers never aspired to find the Y
chromosome specifically for performing prenatal sex identification.  It
was a means rather than an end.  Their endgame was a “noninvasive”
prenatal genetic test, using fetal cells isolated from a mother’s blood.  The
goal, fetal cell researchers have always maintained, was to isolate a few
fetal cells from a sea of maternal cells, and to examine their genetic
material under the microscope, in much the same way that cytogeneticists
currently examine fetal cells extracted from amniotic fluid.  As with
amniocentesis, they would be looking for extra chromosomes (e.g., Down
Syndrome) and for deletions and rearrangements of chromosomal material
(e.g., Prader-Willi Syndrome).  The advantage of using maternal blood is
that it would circumvent amniocentesis, an invasive procedure that always94
presents some risk of inducing a miscarriage.  Because of this hazard,
amniocentesis is generally only offered to women who have some kind of
increased risk for an abnormal pregnancy, such as “advanced age” (over
35).  The investigators who aim to bring a fetal cell technology to
hospitals and markets have a vision that every woman would have access
to prenatal genetic testing.
3  Such an innovation would reduce the
economic costs of invasive procedures as well.
This goal was first articulated in 1969, around the time when
amniocentesis began to be used clinically.  While amniocentesis has
become routinized, fetal cell isolation has foundered.  Generations of
researchers have tried to reliably find the Y chromosome in the blood of
pregnant women carrying male babies.  Their successes have always been
hampered by false positives.  For example, the outcome of a recent ten-
year, multi-million dollar study was a 41% specificity for correctly
matching Y cells to male babies.
4  The assumption guiding this effort was
that the Y chromosome is a fool-proof marker of a fetal cell, because
mothers (being women) don’t have Y chromosomes.  True, this marker
can only be used in half of all pregnancies, but scientists argue that 50% is
better than any other fetal marker.  The investigators call the Y a “tool,” a
“surrogate,” a way to “calibrate” the technique.  As one medical geneticist
                                                   
3 Most women in the United States (insurance permitting) do have access
to prenatal screens such as AFP or ultrasound, but these generate risk
assessments rather than actual diagnoses from looking directly at the
chromosomes.
4  D. W. Bianchi and others, "Fetal Gender and Aneuploidy Detection
using Fetal Cells in Maternal Blood: Analysis of NIFTY I Data. National
Institute of Child Health and Development Fetal Cell Isolation Study,"
Prenatal Diagnosis 22, no. 7 (July 2002), 609-615.95
told me, “the Y chromosome was a means of validating the system.  It
was no more than that”[MR].  And so the Y chromosome is an
instrument, even according to the actors in my study.
Because the experimental cultures in this research field have been
organized around the instrumentality of the Y chromosome, a stringent
binary logic of sex (as XX=female and XY=male) is embedded in the
experimental system.  There is, however, a disjuncture between this crude
and mutually exclusive rule that makes the Y seem like a good tool, and
the ambiguities that open up when this rule is applied to actual bodies.
The simple calculus – that female bodies contain only XX cells and male
bodies contain only XY cells, unless a woman is pregnant with a son – is
undermined by biological and technical glitches or exceptions.  The
number of these seems to keep growing in light of new theories (about the
prevalence of chimerism, and about fetal loss in early pregnancy, for
example); in light of new therapies (like transplants and transfusions); and
in light of new techniques for looking at bodily material with greater
resolution.
In what follows, I will use theoretical tools from science and technology
studies, and from feminist theory, to argue that the Y chromosome, as a
proxy for sexed bodies, has been mistaken as a stable instrument around
which assemblages of technical and social variables have been adjusted
during the life of this would-be technique.  This misplaced confidence in
the intransigence of the Y, and of “maleness,” has contributed to the
inability of researchers to mobilize the technique across the divide from
experimental laboratory to hospital clinic.96
In a corroborating postscript to this story, we will see that a small private
lab, called Acu-gen, has recently been able to cash in on the investment
made by the generations of fetal cell researchers.  Acu-gen, unconnected
to the publicly-funded, above-board and self-consciously ethical fetal cell
researchers, offers the “Baby Gender Mentor” kit direct-to-consumers
over the internet.  They claim 99.9% accuracy at identifying fetal gender
from a pin-prick of women’s blood as early as five weeks into the
pregnancy.  Not surprisingly, given the troubled history of the Y, more
and more women are asking for their money back when their ultrasounds
and births contradict the kit results.  In the course of the controversy,
scientists and consumers have criticized the company and the technique,
but not the infallibility of the XX/XY divide, the devotion to which is
what makes the kit marketable in the first place.
Externality
In his article “Towards an Analysis of Scientific Observation,” Trevor
Pinch sets out to explore why some observational reports in science are
accepted, while some are not.
5  He develops the notion of the varying
“externality” of those reports, which I will make use of to explore the
acceptance or rejection of particular observations of “fetal cells.”  Rather
than fetal cells, Pinch’s physicists were looking for solar neutrinos,
byproducts of nuclear fusion in the core of the sun.  Solar neutrinos
cannot, however, be directly observed, and these physicists rely on a
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series of translations that are “highly mediated by experimental
manipulations, practices and processes of interpretation.”
6 Specifically,
the following three reports come at different stages in the experiment, and
can be made equivalent, depending on the context of the report:
a)  Splodges on a graph were observed.
b) Ar
37 atoms were observed.
c)  Solar neutrinos were observed.
7
Pinch calls these steps in observational translation “degrees of
externality.”  Splodges are closest, or “proximal” to the observer and solar
neutrinos are farthest, or “distal” to the observer. Proximal reports are
more modest, while distal reports are more profound, though risky, and
entail assumptions about the observational situation.
8  “By this process of
externalization,” he writes, “observation becomes a question of studying a
chain of surrogate phenomena via a series of manipulations and
interpretations, and this highlights the fundamental ambiguity over just
what has been observed.”
9
Similar to the solar neutrino scientists, the researchers in my case cannot
directly observe fetal cells.  Even through a microscope (a mediator),
these cells are indistinguishable from surrounding maternal cells and must
be processed in order to be visibly distinguishable.  Since the beginning of
                                                   
6 Ibid., 7.
7 Ibid., 9.
8 Pinch uses externality in a similar way as Latour and Woolgar use the
concept of “modalities” in Laboratory Life, 75-88.  The fewer modalities,
or qualifiers, a statement has, the more fact-like it becomes.
9 Ibid., 8, emphasis in original.98
the efforts to isolate fetal cells, the first, or most proximal, step of
observation has fluctuated in response to the available technologies and
commercial reagents.  This step has always entailed some manner of
staining or fluorescence, but the stain and the target (the whole Y
chromosome, or just a segment of it) have varied.  I will describe these
variations in more detail below.  The next degree of externality – what the
stain is meant to indicate – is always the same: the Y chromosome.
Finally, the most distal observational report is a fetal cell from the current
pregnancy, which must therefore be male.  So, in keeping with the
analogy to Pinch’s solar neutrinos, we see the following possibilities:
a)  A green dot was observed.
b)  A Y chromosome was observed.
c)  A fetal cell was observed.
Using externality as a framework to discuss his case studies, Pinch goes
on to make several important analytical points.  First, in disputes about
what was observed in a particular experiment, competing parties attack
their opponents’ claims by pushing back the degree of externality.  For
example, one party may claim to have seen solar neutrinos, while an
opponent in the debate may successfully make the case that splodges on a
graph were indeed seen, but the evidence cannot sustain the report of
either Ar
37 atoms or solar neutrinos.  Then, Pinch writes, “the chain of
inference will have been broken.”
10  A second contention Pinch makes is
that experimenters are faced with a dilemma about the level of externality
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they should adopt in framing their claims in publications or elsewhere.
The more distal the claim, the more open it is to criticism.
We will see that fetal cell researchers did not usually have a dilemma
about what observation to report; there was no gap between a) and c), in
their view, because the assumptions embedded in the chain of inferences
were deemed utterly self-evident, and were, for the most part, endorsed by
their community.  These assumptions were that 1) the staining technique
at hand could reliably adhere to and reveal Y-chromosomes; and 2) the Y-
chromosome could only be from a fetal cell.  Beneath this assumption is
the rule of binary chromosomal sex.  Because the steps in the chain of
inference were seemingly obvious, every publication made the most distal
report: that fetal cells were observed (at least in cases where the birth
outcome matched the observation).
The degree of externality was not usually pushed back by opponents or
competitors,
11 but it often was by investigators themselves, in post-hoc
attempts to explain away false-positives and false-negatives.  This “repair
work”
12 is a common feature of published accounts of fetal cell research.
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Explaining “false” (i.e. unexpected) results by scaling back on the
externality of the observational report works to preserve the fidelity of the
technique and the assumptions behind it.  The primary assumption
repaired throughout this case study is that XY cells only come from male
bodies.  This will become clearer as I describe the reports by consecutive
generations of fetal cell researchers, below.  I organize them
chronologically and by the particular staining method that constitutes the
first degree of observation: karyotype, quinacrine, FISH, and PCR.
Fishing for the Y
1) Karyotype: a small dark object
In 1969, Walknowska, Conte and Grumbach published an article in The
Lancet that initiated a line of research aiming specifically to retrieve fetal
cells for prenatal diagnosis.
13  Their method for analyzing cells was to
prepare karyotypes from dividing cells in culture, and to examine them
under a microscope for the presence or absence of a Y chromosome.  A
karyotype is a visual convention in which chromosomes are arrayed in
matching pairs.  To produce a karyotype, cells must be cultured so that
chromosomes will divide, and then cell division is stopped at metaphase,
when chromosomes are condensed and at their most visible.  The
chromosome images are then literally cut out, one by one, from a
photograph of the microscope slide on which they were randomly arrayed.
Staining of chromosomes in the late 1960’s was such that they appeared
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uniformly dark, unlike the banded or striped chromosomes one would see
now.  Consequently, the only way to match pairs and to differentiate them
from each other was by size, and by the location of the centromere, a
constriction in the middle or on one end of the chromosome.
Walknowska et al. studied blood samples from thirty pregnant women,
and in twenty-one of them “metaphase figures with 5 small acrocentric
chromosomes interpreted as 46/XY were found.”
14  One would normally
expect to find four small acrocentric chromosomes (two of chromosome
21 and two of chromosome 22) in women.  Nineteen of these twenty-one
women subsequently delivered male infants, which suggests, the authors
contend, that the fifth small chromosome was a Y, and the cells were fetal
in origin.  They suggest that the “false positives” (i.e., female babies were
born) were the result of an “artefact or chimaerism for fetal 46/XY cells
persisting from an earlier pregnancy.”
15  The category “artefact” can
include many things, such as stained material that is not chromosomal,
dirt on the slide, etc.  From this first report we also see that the authors
considered the possibility that cells from prior pregnancies persist.
Hence, where a fifth small darkly stained body was seen, and a male baby
was born, the authors reported that they had seen a fetal cell.  Where what
they thought was a fetal cell was seen, and a girl baby was born, they
moved back the degree of externality to say that either a Y chromosome
was seen, and it was from a prior pregnancy, or only a darkly stained body
was seen, and it was an artifact.
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Four months later, cytogeneticists Patricia Jacobs and Peter Smith
published a short letter, also in The Lancet, that offers other possible
explanations for Walknowska’s findings.  They authors contested whether
or not fetal cells were truly observed by introducing ambiguity about what
should count as a Y chromosome:
Firstly, the fifth small acrocentric chromosome might not be a Y
but might be a group-G autosome, the “46/XY” resulting from a
loss of a medium-sized chromosome and the gain of a small
acrocentric autosome, presumably due to double non-disjunction.
Secondly, the fifth small acrocentric chromosome might have
arisen as the result of a deletion of much of the chromosome
material from a medium-sized chromosome, giving it the
appearance of a small acrocentric chromosome.
16
While it is not necessary to understand the technicalities of this excerpt,
the basic premise is that what looks like a Y might not be a Y, but a small
chromosome (21 or 22) that was picked up from another cell.
Alternatively, they suggest, it might be a longer chromosome that has lost
a chunk.
Moreover, Jacobs and Smith revisited their own extensive cytological
evidence and found 17 cells from “normal, non-pregnant women” that
could have been interpreted as having a Y chromosome had they used the
same criterion as had Walknowska et al.  While Jacobs and Smith were
explicit in saying that their results “do not refute the explanation given by
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Walknowska and her colleagues,”
17 and should instead be read as a
cautionary tale, subsequent investigators cited this article as a refutation,
and somewhat of a controversial setback.  Like the combatants in Pinch’s
solar neutrino debates, Jacobs and Smith questioned whether Walknowska
et al. were warranted in their claim to have seen fetal cells, or even Y
chromosomes, and accepted only that they had seen a small, darkly
staining object.  Jacobs and Smith’s article is idiosyncratic in a field that
largely lacks contestation and debate about observational reports.  In other
words, different groups of researchers in this field are far more likely to
comment on each other’s laboratory technique than on what they say they
saw.
2) Y-body: a bright yellow spot
In the early 1970’s, Jim Schroder and his colleagues published a number
of positive results identifying Y-bearing cells in the blood of pregnant
women who later delivered male infants.  What counted as a Y
chromosome, in his work, was called a “Y-body.”  Schroder and his
colleagues stained cell preparations with quinacrine hydrochloride, a
chemical which causes Y chromatin (constituent material of Y
chromosomes) to glow brightly under a special fluorescence microscope.
Chromatin glows because it is rich in A-T base pairs, which are
particularly amenable to fluorescent dyes.  Y-bodies are found in
interphase nuclei, the point in the cell cycle when the chromosomes are all
clumped up in a ball, rather than individually distinguishable.  An
interphase nucleus, stained with quinacrine, would look like an intact
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circle, faintly glowing yellow.  The Y body is a bright yellow spot near
the margin of the circle.  A contemporaneous paper establishing the
method describes that Y chromatin “showed much stronger fluorescence
than other fluorescent material often present in the same nucleus.”
18
This method, as one might imagine, invites interpretive flexibility. The
potential ambiguity required stringent rules for counting: “To avoid
erroneous identification at interphase, only obvious or probable double
structures with strong fluorescence were scored as Y-bodies.”
19  Even so,
Schroder, and others who used this method, always encountered false-
positives (Y-bodies where girls were born) and false negatives (no Y-
bodies, boys born).  Investigators would follow up incorrect results by
staining the parents’ cells.  Often they would discover that the
chromosomes of the parents had idiosyncrasies that were inconsistent
with their sex.  For example, in one woman, “the fluorescence of the
centromere region in chromosome 3 was stronger that usual,”
20 and hence
was probably mistaken for a Y-body and resulted in a false-positive.  One
false negative was apparently explained by the male child’s father’s Y
chromosome, which would have passed on to the son: it “was relatively
small.”
21 In another study, Schroder controlled for this variability:
“Mothers were excluded if their own autosomes had regions of brilliant
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fluorescence that simulated Y-bodies” and “All 18 boys had a Y
chromosome of large or medium size.”
22
This labor-intensive retrospective repair work would follow false-
positives and false-negatives, but was not done where the Y-body
assessment was deemed correct.  While this may seem sensible, it does
not, for example, account for a situation in which a mother has a glowing
chromosome 3, and the son has inherited a small Y.  A cell with a “Y-
body” in this case would be incorrectly labeled a fetal cell.
Most who used the quinacrine-staining method concluded that it had
limitations, particularly that “the definition of a Y-body varies
considerably from one laboratory to another.”
23 Because of the possibility
of aborting a healthy female fetus, Schroder declares the false positive
rate too high to use for prenatal sex identification
24 and concludes that
“the method can hardly be recommended for routine use.”
25  Siebers et al.
come to a similar conclusion, citing as possible causes of false results
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“autosomal fluorescence,” “variability in the size of the Y-chromosome”
and “impatience of the investigator.”
26
While Siebers and Schroder judged the clinical utility of the technique
pessimistically, the evidence that male cells were indeed present in
maternal blood, at least in some pregnancies, was enough to invite further
attempts to extract and examine them.  In the late 1970’s, Leonard
Herzenberg’s laboratory at Stanford University was enrolled in the pursuit
of a “universal non-invasive screening technique for prenatal diagnosis of
genetic abnormalities.”
27  Herzenberg’s major innovation was to enrich
the number of fetal cells, which so far seemed to be present in the tiny
proportion of about one cell per 1000-5000 maternal cells.  (This estimate
was later judged to be too generous, and it is now believed that fetal cells
number about one in a million maternal cells.)  His lab introduced a
technology called the fluorescence-activated cell sorter (FACS) that
aimed to increase the likelihood of finding fetal cells.
For detection of the Y, Herzenberg’s team used the same quinacrine
staining method used by Schroder and Siebers.  They found between one
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and six Y-positive cells (from around 500-1000 screened for each woman)
in each case in which a male infant was born.  In short, they did find
“fetal” cells in every case where they expected to and in only one where
they did not.  The “false positive,” they conclude, could be from a
previous pregnancy, or from “an extreme deviation from the usual
frequency of Y chromatin-bearing cells in maternal blood.”
28  The
authors, in a recitation of Schroder’s and Seiber’s previous conclusions,
suggest that fetal cells really are present, but that the “proportion is still
low for diagnostic purposes.”
29  They cite “very serious maternal
contamination in the sorted population”
30 as an obstacle, but end the
article with a promise of increased efficiency to facilitate “universal
screening.”  Throughout the 1980’s, several labs sought better methods
for making use of the putative fetal cells,
31 but it was not until molecular
methods for targeting the Y chromosome became available that the field
began to generate interest among numerous research groups, the NIH and
corporations.
                                                   
28 G. M. Iverson and others, "Detection and Isolation of Fetal Cells from
Maternal Blood using the Flourescence-Activated Cell Sorter (FACS),"
Prenatal Diagnosis 1, no. 1 (1981), 72.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31  A. E. Covone and others, "Analysis of Peripheral Maternal Blood
Samples for the Presence of Placenta-Derived Cells using Y-Specific
Probes and McAb H315," Prenatal Diagnosis 8, no. 8 (Oct, 1988), 591-
607; A. E. Covone and others, "Trophoblast Cells in Peripheral Blood
from Pregnant Women," Lancet 2, no. 8407 (Oct 13, 1984), 841-843; A.
Selypes and R. Lorencz, "A Noninvasive Method for Determination of the
Sex and Karyotype of the Fetus from the Maternal Blood," Human
Genetics 79, no. 4 (Aug, 1988), 357-359.108
3) PCR: an autoradiograph band
Reviews from within the field cite the adoption of molecular techniques,
such as Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Fluorescence in situ
Hybridization (FISH), as the basis for a turning point that would establish
consensus about the existence of fetal cells in maternal blood.  Both of
these techniques entailed radical changes in the treatment of cells and the
inscription that was to count as a Y chromosome.  They did not, however,
eradicate ambiguities, false-positives and false-negatives.  In 1989,
Dennis Lo and colleagues at Oxford used PCR to amplify a 149 base-pair
segment of the Y chromosome.
32  Commercially-made primers, Y1.1 and
Y1.2, were added to the DNA extracted from maternal blood.  The
primers attach to particular stretches of the Y and instigate replication
(called “amplification”) and re-replication (in “nested PCR”) of that
segment during repeated rounds of heating and cooling.  When the
resultant segments of DNA are run through an agarose gel, the many
copies of the amplified segment (if it was there in the sample) will appear
as a distinct band.  Lo et al. report having correctly identified the sex of
nineteen fetuses by presence or absence of a Y band on a PCR gel.
In 1990, Diana Bianchi’s laboratory in Boston was the first to combine
FACS with PCR to amplify a segment of the Y chromosome.
33  While
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Amplification from Maternal Peripheral Blood," The Lancet (December 9,
1989), 1363-1365.
33  D. W. Bianchi and others, "Isolation of Fetal DNA from Nucleated
Erythrocytes in Maternal Blood," Proceedings of the National Academy of
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3283.109
previous attempts to isolate fetal cells had targeted lymphocytes (a type of
white blood cell), Bianchi’s lab sorted maternal blood for nucleated red
blood cells (NRBCs).  Bianchi et al. drew blood from nineteen women,
who would subsequently undergo amniocentesis because of their
“advanced maternal age or anxiety,” and sorted it for NRBCs using the
FACS.  They then used PCR to amplify a particular 222 base-pair
segment from the short arm of the Y chromosome.  Finally, they ran
amplified samples on an agarose gel under ultraviolet light, and they
found Y-bands in 6 of 8 male pregnancies and 1 of 11 female pregnancies.
The authors suggest that in the infant girl who had registered as a false
positive, “there may have been a low level of sex chromosome
mosaicism, XX/XY chimerism, or the presence of the Y411 sequence on
another chromosome.”
34  Once again, we see an investigator raise the
possibility that some people have chromosomal arrangements that do not
conform to the XX/XY dichotomy.  Bianchi herself had previously co-
authored a paper on a clinical case of “sex chromosome mosaicism,”
where a patient had both XX and XXY cells.
35  The possibility of non-
binary chromosome arrangements comes up only as a post-hoc
explanation to repair the results.  While I will return to this theme later in
the chapter, I want to highlight an inconsistency in the use of chimerism
as an explanatory resource.  Researchers in this field will immediately
dismiss any suggestion that non-standard chromosome profiles are a
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threat to the Y chromosome calibration method.  Sex chromosome
abnormalities, they tell me, are far too rare to worry about.  The only time
anomalies come up in investigators’ discourse (other than when I press
them) is when they can be used to rationalize troublesome results.
However, if chimerism was even close to as common as investigators
propose after the fact (in this case 1/19), it would certainly threaten the
validity of the instrument.
A more likely explanation for false positives with PCR, researchers
report, is contamination.  Lo and his colleagues were careful to outline the
precise window of amplification cycles for which a Y band will show up:
less than 15 cycles will not show the Y, and more than 20 will show the Y
band in women carrying female fetuses, presumably because of
“background contamination.”  The major drawback to PCR is its
susceptibility to contamination, because even one cell, amplified many
times, can throw off the result. As part of a rigorous protocol to reduce
contamination, the researchers “extracted no DNA samples from men
whilst these experiments were in progress, and all blood samples were
taken and subsequently handled by women.”
36  In the case of PCR, we see
that the instrument – the Y chromosome – ordered the social organization
of labor around it.  This practice continues where PCR is used to detect Y-
specific DNA.  As one researcher told me: “everything is wiped off before
we use it.  So we have pipettes that males are not allowed to handle, just
to ensure that … because you’re gripping them, you’ve got skin cells”
[PT].
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4) FISH: a green dot
In the previous cases, I have gathered observational reports, and attempts
to repair them, from published literature.  In this section, which considers
the method called “Fluorescence in situ hybridization,” or FISH, my
evidence is from interviews with all of the major participants in a large
clinical trial meant to test the technique.  The NIH-funded trial, whose
acronym was “NIFTY,”
37 began in the early 1990s and it lasted
approximately a decade.  The outcome of the multi-million dollar study
was a disappointing publication in a “low impact” journal announcing a
41% success rate at matching Y cells to male babies, with an 11% false
positive rate (matching Y cells to female babies).
The impetus for the project was a few positive reports with small sample
sizes that correctly identified, for the first time, fetal cells with
chromosomal abnormalities in addition to their Y chromosomes. James
Price, Sherman Elias, Joe Leigh Simpson and others, then at the
University of Tennessee, had used FISH (which I will describe below) to
correctly confirm trisomy 21 in one fetus, and trisomy 18 in another.
38
Bianchi’s group also identified trisomy 21 fetal cells from maternal blood,
in a case in which trisomy had already been diagnosed by conventional
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38 S. Elias and others, "First Trimester Prenatal Diagnosis of Trisomy 21
in Fetal Cells from Maternal Blood," Lancet 340, no. 8826 (Oct 24, 1992),
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methods.
39  At around the same time, a German lab headed by Wolfgang
Holzgreve also began publishing on fetal cell separation. Holzgreve cites
the advent of fluorescent probes as the impetus for his group’s interest in
the field. In 1993, Holzgreve’s lab used an enrichment system called
magnetic activated cell sorting (MACS) and FISH to detect trisomies 21
and 18 in patients.
40
At the beginning of the trial, hopes were high.    One member of the
collaboration told me, “It was very exciting.  We thought ‘Wow, this is
really great.  We’re all going to have our name in lights and it’s going to
be wonderful’”[PT].  After a 1993 conference bringing together all the
major research groups, “participants left with a clear consensus that fetal
cells were indeed not only present but also, with modifications, could be
exploited for prenatal genetic diagnosis.”
41
Funding from the NIH was secured after Joe Leigh Simpson and Sherman
Elias approached Felix de la Cruz, then chief of the Mental Retardation
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Karyotype in Maternal Peripheral Blood," Human Genetics 90, no. 4
(Dec, 1992), 368-370.
40 W. Holzgreve, H. S. Garritsen and D. Ganshirt-Ahlert, "Fetal Cells in
the Maternal Circulation," The Journal of Reproductive Medicine 37, no.
5 (May, 1992), 410-418.
41  Joe Leigh Simpson, Sherman Elias and New York Academy of
Sciences, Fetal Cells in Maternal Blood: Prospects for Noninvasive
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and Developmental Disabilities Branch (MRDD) of the NIH.
42  Simpson,
along with a few other collaborators in NIFTY, had previously worked
with de la Cruz on a large clinical trial to assess the safety and efficacy of
Chorionic Villus Sampling (CVS), an invasive prenatal genetic screening
test.
43  The contacts were in place, then, for Simpson and Elias to persuade
de la Cruz to fund a similar genetic testing project, though this one had
the aim of circumventing risky invasive tests.
NIFTY involved four different labs in order to accumulate a large number
of samples, but also because a trial involving several sites would
intrinsically test the robustness of the technique.  In order to be clinically
feasible, the technique would have to be operable in many hands and in
many places.  The centers involved in NIFTY were tied to particular
clinicians, rather than to locales, and in fact several of the centers moved
with clinicians during the course of the study.  The original teams were
those who had published positive results: Joe Leigh Simpson and
Sherman Elias at Baylor University in Houston; Diana Bianchi at Tufts
University in Boston; Wolfgang Holzgreve and Dorothee Ganshirt at
Munster University.  Laird Jackson at Thomas Jefferson University (TJU)
in Philadelphia joined the collaboration after the NIH put out a call for
participants.  Although the investigators at TJU had done no work with
fetal cells in maternal blood, they had been involved in the CVS study and
                                                   
42 The MRDD is a branch of the National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development (NICHD), an Institute within the National Institute
of Health (NIH), a U.S. government body.
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had contacts with a local company that could separate cells by using
magnetically linked antibodies. These four centers both recruited patients
and conducted laboratory work on the samples, while a fifth partner,
Obstetrician Mark Evans at Wayne State University in Detroit,
contributed samples to the study, but did not perform any of the
laboratory work.
A final, though integral, participant, was the data management company,
DMSTAT, a Boston-area company founded by Kimberly Dukes.
DMSTAT is a private company that the NIH hired as an impartial
participant to whom the laboratories would report their results.  In
addition to collecting the data, analyzing it statistically, and reporting on
the aggregate results, the company was involved in producing and
amending the protocol for the study.  They also coordinated and chaired
meetings and conference calls, and they did laboratory visits to ensure that
participants were following the protocol.
An interim publication by the parties in the collaboration noted that the
numbers of fetal cells that cross the placenta seem to be higher when the
pregnancy is abnormal. “Since the goal of fetal cell analysis is detection
of aneuploidy and not gender, we recommend that ongoing and future
studies of fetal cells in maternal blood use sensitivity of detection of
aneuploidy in aneuploid cases as the endpoint for analysis.”
44
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Nonetheless, the group prioritized “detection of fetal male gender”
45 as a
means of evaluating, for the first time on a large scale, whether the
technique would work.
The centers would collect blood samples from women who already had
chosen to undergo an invasive procedure, they would attempt to isolate
fetal cells from the maternal blood and then would compare the result
with findings from the test.
46  Early in the project, the NIFTY group
published a letter in the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology,
which proposed that “in the initial phase of the study cell separation
techniques, monoclonal antibodies, and genetic analytic methods will be
compared among centers.  A later phase of the study will use a single
protocol to analyze collaboratively at least 3000 pregnant women.”
47
While the explicitly stated purpose of the collaboration was to develop a
common protocol, one never emerged.   One investigator reported that
“you would hope that there would be a common protocol that would have
been developed from that.  And that’s really, even at the end, we learned a
lot but we didn’t really have a single product that was developed” [MR].
Major differences in the groups’ approaches included whether to use
MACS or FACS during the enrichment step, and how many different
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47  F. de la Cruz and others, "Prenatal Diagnosis by use of Fetal Cells
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chromosomes to look for in the detection stage.  Enrichment, the first
major step in the technique, aims to raise the ratio of fetal cells to
maternal cells.  Ideally, one would be able to separate out the fetal cells
and end up with a pure sample, but the pragmatic aim in this study was to
get a high enough concentration of fetal cells that a human at a
microscope could find at least one on a microscope slide in a reasonable
amount of time. Each lab group chose to use one of two very different
enrichment methods.  Boston and Baylor each used the fluorescent
activated cell sorter, or FACS, while Basel and Philly used the magnetic
cell sorter or MACS.  The choice of FACS or MACS, at the beginning,
had to do with prior experience.  Eventually, though, it would become a
point around which social alliances were formed, and “things just ran in
two parallel courses”:  “Right away there was (pause) a discussion at least
between the MACS people and the FACS people.  And as it went on it
kind of became a little bit polarized” [DI].
The second step, which participants call “analysis”, follows MACS or
FACS.  This involves “smearing” the enriched sample onto a microscope
slide, and using FISH to look for chromosomal differences between
maternal cells and fetal cells. FISH has several steps: First, DNA from the
sample is fixed on the microscope slide and non-genetic components of
the cell (proteins, membranes) are cleared away with enzymes that digest
them.  Second, the DNA is “denatured” with heat or unzipped so that it
becomes single stranded.  Next, “probes” (small pieces of single-stranded
DNA commercially made to stick to a particular DNA sequence) are
mixed with the DNA on the slide. The probe, outfitted with a fluorescent
marker molecule, will bind to the target DNA.  In a dark room with a117
fluorescence microscope, the probe will be visible as a bright spot on a
contrasting-color background.  When two kinds of probes are used – for
example, one for sequences on the X chromosome and one for the Y
chromosome – they can be engineered to emit different colors.
One target for analysis in all 4 laboratories was the sex (XX or XY) of the
child. Sex, in this case, was determined by attaching a fluorescent “probe”
to both the X and Y chromosomes in a blood sample.  In those where the
Y chromosome could be seen (as a green spot on a red circle), the
particular cell was presumed to be fetal in origin and the pregnancy was
predicted to be male.  Two of the centers also looked for extra or missing
copies of chromosome 21, and one of these laboratories “went after” a
total of 5 chromosomes: X,Y,13,18,21.
48 As with enrichment, the labs
began with a marked difference, not in their detection method, but in what
exactly they were trying to detect.
While FISH is a largely “black boxed” technique,
49 in practice it entails
layers of difficulty: in making the cells permeable to particular probes, in
making sure the probes stick only to the sequence of interest and not
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others, in seeing and counting “signals” despite ambiguities on the slide
introduced by overlapping cells, etc. Investigators also say the results vary
because different people handle the equipment with different degrees of
skill.  FISH is like the “plasmid prep,” a common laboratory technique
that appears to be stable and formalized.  However, when Kathleen Jordan
and Michael Lynch watched molecular biologists actually doing plasmid
preps, they “often encounter a number of persistent problems associated
with establishing the coherence and efficacy of the practice, determining
whether one practitioner’s method for doing it is the same as another’s,
accounting for discrepant results, and explaining how the technique
works.”
50
With FISH, a great amount of “tacit knowledge” is required to elicit
results from such finicky material.
51  One lab, for example, took pride in
being able to get five-color FISH to work.  The PI explained that the lab
director in this lab was “really a pro” and “so she’s managed to get the
cells to be more informative than some other centers” [MR].  Because
non-invasive prenatal genetic testing is desired not for sex-selection but
for diagnosing aneuploidy (extra or missing chromosomes), ultimately it
would have been more useful to get five-color FISH to work, but the extra
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“beating up” the cells take for such a feat may have compromised this
lab’s detection rates, which were low when compared with other labs in
which only sex chromosomes were targeted.  FISH also entails some
observational ambiguities possibly corrected by skilled microscopic work.
One report, for example, notes that “the microscopic resolution of
contiguous signals and focal planes of a signal that is unclear in one plane
may become clear on refocusing the microscope.”
52
At some point during the trial, when results were clearly turning out to be
disappointing, the data management company urged the different
laboratories to concentrate on detecting the Y chromosome, and to give up
on the other chromosomes, which would have more or less than 2 copies
(and therefore differ from the mother) only in very rare circumstances.  A
participant told me:
If you looked at a … woman who basically, this is her first delivery
and you can get 50% of those samples and you’re finding a Y, then
you know you’ve got the fetal cell.  And then once you’ve got the
technology down and you can get Ys 100% of the time, then go
after your aneuploids.  It’s sort of a proof of concept. [LY]
Several other participants explained to me the obviousness of relying on
the Y chromosome as proof of a fetal cell.  One interviewee reports that
“it’s quick and easy,”[BB] and another describes it as “this kind of rapid,
dirty way of detecting, you know, male DNA.  It misses female cells”
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[JM].  Some explained that it is exclusive to males: “The Y chromosome,
not only is it obviously different, you know, it’s only present in men”
[AG]. Another researcher told me “obviously mommy shouldn’t have Y
chromosomes.  If you see a definitive Y chromosomal signal within a cell
it should be fetal” [DI].
What went wrong?
Despite the apparent ease of finding Y chromosomes, the report that came
out of the trial was, by most accounts, a frustrating disappointment.
However there was no single, simple explanation for the apparent
breakdown. In their classic study about scientists’ discourse, Nigel Gilbert
and Michael Mulkay begin by noting that this multivocality in scientists’
reports of “what went on” is common.  Moreover, discordant accounts of
the same experiment or, in this case, the same collaboration can confound
sociologists’ attempts to recreate a singular story about “what when on.”
Instead Gilbert and Mulkay examine the variation of scientists’ accounts
as a topic in itself, and they identify two recurrent repertoires: the
empiricist repertoire and the contingent repertoire.  In the empiricist
repertoire, most common in formal accounts such as published articles,
“speakers depict their actions and beliefs as a neutral medium through
which empirical phenomena make themselves evident.”
53 Unlike the
empiricist repertoire, which allows nature to speak for itself, the
contingent repertoire introduces any number of variable factors outside
the arena of natural phenomenon, such as “speculative insights, prior
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intellectual commitments, personal characteristics, indescribable skills,
social ties and group membership.”
54  These extra-scientific factors, the
speakers imply, interfered with nature’s voice.
Gilbert and Mulkay argue, with ample evidence, that scientists choose
which repertoire to employ in contextually specific ways, and following
an asymmetrical structure.  Specifically, they tend to use the empiricist
repertoire when connecting successful experimental evidence to the
correct view or theory, which is most often their own.  “Each speaker
presents his theoretical position as an unmediated expression of the
natural world, in so far as that world has revealed itself in the findings of
controlled experiments.”
55  Scientists use the other style of discourse, the
contingent repertoire, most often when they are accounting for their own
error, or the “incorrect” beliefs of colleagues and competitors.
Gilbert and Mulkay’s analysis is useful for understanding the accounts
produced by NIFTY participants to explain the disappointing results of
the collaborative study.  In my interviews with fetal cell investigators,
they almost exclusively used the contingent repertoire.  This would be
predicted by Gilbert and Mulkay’s model, as the results of the trial were
not impressive.  The only exception to this was, of course, the 41% of the
times when a Y chromosome was detected and a male baby was born.
Because the model predicted that the technique should detect Y
chromosomes in 100% of the cases where boys were born, this was
judged to be a collaborative failure.  However, it is implied, in those 530
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cases out of 1292 when the expectation predicted by theory and the
experimental result agreed, nature spoke for itself.  In the other 762 cases,
something social or technical got in the way.
In what follows, we will see examples of from interviews with the NIFTY
participants in which they use the contingent repertoire to explain factors
contributing to the poor results.  Gilbert and Mulkay describe this strategy
as “accounting for error”: their interviewees used the discursive strategy
in order to explain – or explain away – error.  The apparent errors, they
said, were a function of social factors.  This reasoning functioned to
protect the scientists’ own credibility and theory choices, while calling
into question their competitor’s reputation or authority.  The NIFTY
collaborators were in a slightly different situation that the competitors that
Gilbert and Mulkay interviewed.  Like Gilbert & Mulkay’s respondents,
the NIFTY teams were in separate labs, and essentially competing to be
the first to crack the fetal cell isolation problem.  However, unlike Gilbert
and Mulkay’s scientists, the collaborative set-up of the trial (a condition
of their funding) meant that their fates in this project were tied together,
and that they established informal, and mostly friendly, relationships.
Hence their accounts of error were not as oppositional as those that
Gilbert and Mulkay describe.  For example, the following interviewee
mentions competition and mistrust, contingent factors, but he does not fall
into an “us and them” pattern.
Everyone had their own ideas and approaches.  Not until the very
end did it become more collaborative.  I think it was more of a
competitive collaboration early on in that everyone had their own
ideas, trusted their own data, but didn’t necessarily, I don’t want to123
use the word “trust”, but didn’t see the reliability in others’ data as
much as in their own data. … they don’t want to give away their
goldmine if it’s really going to work. [AG]
NIFTY participants tended to hedge a bit in describing reasons for error,
treating collaborators with courtesy, accepting some portion of the
responsibility for not communicating better, and in the end concluding
that the project was just too complex for the methods at hand.
When asked to reflect on the success or failure of NIFTY, most
interviewees expressed some disappointment.  Most vacillated between
accounts suggesting that the technique failed, and alternatively that the
collaboration failed, and the two failures cannot easily be pulled apart.
Almost every one of my interviewees spoke, at some point, about the
disappointing results in terms of the difficulty inherent in the natural
objects, or research materials.  The rarity of fetal cells, and the inadequacy
of the techniques featured in these accounts:
We know that the fetal cells are there but they are very rare.  So
you’ve got to have a technology that can pick up one to five cells
per milliliter of maternal blood.  And flow-sorting and magnetic
activated cell sorting, the commercially available technologies are
not sensitive enough. [BB]
And these cells were very very very rare.  So exactly as you would
visualize the needle in a haystack.  This is what we had to deal
with. [PT]
Fetal cells, it seems, are like the voice of nature: trickling through an
obstacle course of social and technical impediments.124
One recurrent theme that came up in interviews is that the gap between
expectation and result, which doomed the study, was a result of its mis-
description as a clinical trial.  The rubric under which the work was
generously funded – a “clinical trial” – was judged in retrospect to have
been a poor description of what really went on: “So the study got termed a
clinical trial which was probably not the best thing to do because
everyone expected finalized clinical data and we were all really still doing
a lot of R&D” [PT].  Another participant lamented that “It should never
have been described as a clinical trial.  It wasn’t a clinical trial, it should
have been described as an R&D, we always say ‘study’.  I think people
went into it very blue-eyed, thinking we were going crack this” [GM].
The incorrect classification as a clinical trial, these participants feel,
created inflated expectations.  Hence, the disjuncture between expectation
and a poor numerical result had material consequences for the field as a
whole: “Those results could have been maybe a lot better and it is a bit
frustrating from the perspective of the field that that paper is used as the
conclusion, it’s the end of the line.  It’s a shame” [TH].
This theme – that the trial was a failure because such a high profile group
of scientists produced such a dismal aggregate success rate in the end –
was recurrent in the interviews.  For example, these two assessments both
came from laboratory directors:
What was embarrassing was that, you know, the government had
spent over 17 million, I don’t know the exact number, of dollars on
this multicenter trial, and what did we have to show for it, were a125
few papers that gave this multi-center review and really it was hard
to say that we had made a lot of progress. [PT]
We were all hoping for a NEJM paper at the end of the study, and it
finally got published in Prenatal Diagnosis.  Which a lot of people
who weren’t involved in the study said this was probably the most
expensive paper that has ever been published, it was several million
dollars. [GM]
In making the best of a bad situation, some investigators told me that the
trial was a mitigated success because the lack of rigid protocol, and the
generous funding allowed them to follow up on side projects generated
during the course of the trial.  One respondent described this
methodological capriciousness as a kind of opportunism: “Everybody is
moving on to the next best thing, and the next newest idea… It’s all
driven by funding ultimately, and by what you can get out of it” [TH].
Several thought that this flexibility built into the NIH funding scheme
allowed them to follow up on more promising leads than the
disappointing fetal cells:
So there’s all of these sideline things that were developed because
people had the ability to do them.  It allowed us to, you know, the
entire plasma DNA work was funded from NIFTY.  We would not
have gotten into that if we didn’t have that money.  In fact, they
told us, don’t stay fixed to one protocol, if it doesn’t work, don’t
stick with it. [GM]
Really the goal as the study progressed was to generate data and
different ideas to get additional funding.  So our approaches to
microchimerism and DNA and RNA work and NIH grants that
we’ve had have come directly from that funding. [AG]126
According to some respondents, the “next best thing” approach may have
prevented individual laboratories from sticking with a routine for long
enough to attain satisfying results. While some labs were quick to focus
on new areas altogether, most were tinkering with the methods for
isolating fetal cells throughout the trial.  One clinician told me “we went
through all sorts of bead techniques and separations, you know big beads,
little beads - different density gradients before and after.  Issues relating to
transport of the samples, do you analyze them immediately – do you
wait?” [MR]
One investigator, in particular, was dismayed that the other laboratories in
the study would neither stick to their own method for very long, nor
switch at some point to the method (MACS) which seemed to be getting
better results.
I said “We’ve tinkered with a couple things – not that it seems to
change – they’re all bad.  Maybe we just should try doing one thing
and seeing if consistency slightly improves it.”  So we did that.
And it did.  We improved gradually just because the people doing it
just were more consistent about what they were doing. [DI]
Of the participants, it was this investigator who was able, eventually, to
obtain the most encouraging results.  In the last 250 to 300 results of the
trial, his lab was able to get 70-72% Y signals for male pregnancies.  The
methodological promiscuity of his collaborators, he figures, was due less
to commercial interests than simply to the novelty of the task: “everybody
wanted to do whatever it was that looked like it might be interesting so in
case it worked, they wouldn’t be left out” [DI].127
While some investigators complained that other labs didn’t stick to one
method long enough to develop the tacit skills to make it work, another
common assessment was that other labs were actually too attached to their
own methods. As one interviewee told me: “This was a famous
expression:  ‘Well in our hands, we can get it to do this’” [LY].  One
researcher in the field who was not part of the collaboration commented:
“each group obviously wanted to stick with their method because they
thought their method was going to be the best method.  And as a result the
whole thing is very difficult to draw any conclusions from and it’s
actually quite amazing that they managed to produce a report at all” [TH].
A member of the data management company, whose job it was to enforce
a common protocol, described her efforts to corral the individual labs:
We did site visits.  We needed to make sure that everyone was
doing everything in a uniform manner.  And even then they
weren’t.  It’s not their fault.  And it’s not the NIH’s fault.  It’s that
people, society, and NIH for political reasons, people wanted it to
be better than it was.  And it wasn’t where it was.  So what ended
up happening is then you’ve got everybody kind of doing their own
thing and not following protocol because they wanted to figure out
a way that they could find the fetal cells. [LY]
This rationale, which includes both society and politics, obviously
introduces contingent extra-scientific factors to explain why the trial was
a disappointment.  This speaker showed obvious frustration throughout
the interview at the investigators’ stubbornness.  Yet she also vindicates
them personally and points to people and politics as interfering with good128
science.  While speaking with these scientists, I was struck by the array of
contingent explanations for the results that did not live up to expectations.
No one, however, suggested that the model is wrong: maybe fetal cells are
not there in many pregnancies, or maybe Y chromosomes do not, and
should not, always match up to male pregnancies.
Why not Y?  Breaks in the chain of inferences
Notably absent in these accounts is any mention of the potential fallibility
of the Y chromosome as a tool for detecting fetal cells.  In NIFTY, I think
that this is partially because the magnitude of “error,” if it can be called
that, is so large.  In other words, the roughly 60% of male pregnancies in
which there was no Y signal, and the 11% of female pregnancies in which
there was, can obviously not be accounted for just by variations from an
XX/XY sex binary.  We did occasionally see non-standard sex
constitution as a possible reparative explanation for the “false” results
when, in the early days of the technique, the sample sizes were much
smaller.  Nevertheless, I suggest that exceptions and outliers to this rule
must account for some of the gap between expected and achieved results
in the NIFTY trial.
In order to explore this possibility, I will return to Pinch’s model of
externality introduced earlier in the chapter.  There, I described three
potential observational reports, and alleged that fetal cell scientists usually
jump to the most distal report in cases where the expected result is
achieved, and slip back up the chain to retrospectively repair their “false”
results.  Because the possibility that fetal cells persist from prior129
pregnancies was confirmed during the course of NIFTY, an observed fetal
cell could either be from a past or a present pregnancy:
a)  A green dot was observed.
     
b) A Y chromosome was observed.

c)  A fetal cell was observed.
                                                        
d) A fetal cell from the current   OR  A fetal cell from a past
pregnancy was observed. pregnancy was observed.
 
e)  The embryo/fetus/child is male. The fetus is male or female.
My purpose here is to enumerate those exceptions that violate an absolute
adherence to the “binary rule of chromosomal sex.”
56  This rule, on which
the calibration equipment of almost fifty years of fetal cell research has
relied, is thus: female bodies contain only XX cells and male bodies
contain only XY cells, unless a woman is pregnant with a son.  To caution
the skeptic, this is admittedly an area of rarities, and my argument is
therefore one based on the aggregate possibility that the chain of
inferences doesn’t hold, rather than relying on any one instance of
biological or technological anomaly.  Furthermore, the technology itself
relies on rarities: one green dot, or one single cell, constitutes a positive
result.
The last statement, “the fetus is male,” is an inference, rather than an
observational report.  The accuracy of this inference is, of course, the way
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that the investigators test the functioning of their technique.  The
observational report against which this inference is compared, in the case
of NIFTY, is either a karyotype produced from amniocentesis or CVS, or
the sexual anatomy of the child at birth.  A break in this step – d) to e) –
occurs when a fetal cell from the current pregnancy is truly observed, but
the child is not “male.”  This could be the result of chimerism or
mosaicism, in which the fetus has both XX and XY cell lines.  If the fetal
blood cells are XY, but the amniocytes (cells in the amniotic fluid,
derived from the fetus) are XX, the amniocentesis would conflict with the
fetal cell results.   Additionally, if “girl” is the apparent birth outcome, but
the fetal cells are actually XY, the child may have androgen insensitivity
syndrome (AIS), where a chromosomal male is a phenotypic female
because she is unable to respond to certain hormones, and thus is feminine
in her secondary sex characteristics.
The major situation in which d) might not be true, but c) is would be
where a fetal cell from a prior pregnancy is detected.  This cell could be
from a known male pregnancy, or from a termination or miscarriage.  It
could even be from a pregnancy that the woman was not aware she had
because the demise of the embryo occurred so early.  Male fetal cells
could also be found in a woman who had only given birth to girl children.
These cells could come from an XY vanished twin: “A vanished twin is
thought to be a relatively common phenomena [sic] resulting from a
spontaneous resorption of one sac or embryo in a twin pregnancy.”
57  As
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the trial went on, investigators in NIFTY became aware of the potential
for false positives from lingering fetal cells, and they attempted to control
for it by targeting nucleated red blood cells (NRBCs) instead of white
blood cells (lymphocytes).  The former are believed to be present during
pregnancy, but rapidly cleared after, while the latter can multiply and
persist for decades.
The possible detection of a fetal cell from a prior pregnancy breaks the
category “fetal cell” into two kinds: fetal cells past and fetal cells present.
The object of the prenatal test is to render the former invisible, and to
make the latter visible.  Interesting ambiguities open up with respect to
the categories “fetal cell,” “mother,” and “chimera.”  Any woman who
has had a previous pregnancy, known or not, could be a chimera either
because she was born a chimera or because she has been “chimerized” by
prior pregnancies.  Fetal cells past can be conceived of as part of the
mother, as “her” cells, or they could be considered foreign.  Female fetal
cells are, of course, not considered at all.  Their invisibility renders them
part of the mother.  The assumptions embedded in the experimental set-up
include an imagined mother whose cell composition prior to the
pregnancy was purely XX.  When the experiment produces false positives
or false negatives, the imagined mother can be readily adapted to
accommodate prior pregnancies or chimerism.  The point here is that,
unless complicated genetic profiling is undertaken on individual cells (and
it is most often not, particularly in large trials like NIFTY), the
classification of results, and the ways in which those results are
rationalized, allow numerous resources for retrospective repair work.132
The link in the chain from b) “a Y cell was observed” to c) “a fetal cell
was observed” requires that the positive identification of a Y chromosome
is equivalent to the observation of a fetal cell.  It is this link that is most
susceptible to breaking as a result of non-conformity to the binary rule of
chromosomal sex.  The Y chromosome could come from the mother, but
be unrelated to her pregnancy history. Small numbers of XY cells could
have been introduced externally – via an organ transplant, a bone marrow
transplant, or a blood transfusion, although this can usually be ruled out
by a thorough medical history.  If her cells were all XY because of AIS,
for example, it is likely that she would be infertile, and therefore not
likely to be in a prenatal testing clinic.  However, it is possible that a
small proportion of her cells would be XY.  The mother may contain non-
fetal Y-chromosomes if she is an XX/XY chimera or mosaic.  Chimeric
women with cell populations of both types can be fertile if their
reproductive tissues are mostly or entirely XX.  Also, she could be a
blood chimera, having absorbed cells from her fraternal twin brother
during gestation.
In a surprising recent study (post-NIFTY), Lee Nelson and her colleagues
tested women who had never been pregnant to discern whether or not any
Y-chromosomes could be found. No one had looked at this before,
because of the powerful dogma that women “are” XX throughout, and
that bodies are well contained and sealed off from each other.  They found
that “slightly more than one fifth of all women with no history of a male
births had male microchimerism in their peripheral blood.”
58  As sources,
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they suggest a nonrecognized (male) miscarriage, or a vanished twin, but
they raised some other possibilities for this apparently normal
phenomenon:
A third possibility is from an older male sibling transferred by the
maternal circulation to the fetus of a later pregnancy.  Another
possibility that has not been investigated is whether male DNA can
be detected in a woman’s circulation from sexual intercourse
without pregnancy.
59
These sources would yield very few XY cells, of course, but in the fetal
cell studies, a single cell sighting was coded as a positive result.
As mentioned previously, a Y chromosome could come from a
contaminating source during the laboratory work.  As we saw,
experimenters attempted to control for this by excluding males from the
laboratory space.  This precaution, however, relies on the assumption that
we can tell what chromosomes a technician contains just by looking at
her.  A woman may, however, have only XY cells if, for example, she is
transgendered, or if she has an intersex condition like AIS.  In these cases,
she may not wish to disclose this information because of the potential for
stigma.  Alternatively, she may have some proportion of XY cells for the
reasons mentioned above in relation to the mother: she could be a chimera
or a sex chromosome mosaic; she may have had an organ transplant, a
blood transfusion; she may be pregnant, or she may have previously had
sons, or an abortion or a miscarriage.
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Moving up the chain, the last link is that between a Y chromosome and a
green dot.  While these could be caused by non-specific binding to the Y,
or by visual artifacts, these have little to do with the sex chromosome
binary.  However, one of my interviewees described a situation in which a
green dot would not be equivalent to a whole Y chromosome: “Some
women will actually carry a Y, will have parts of their X chromosome
which Y bits have translocated onto, so you’ve got to be kind of careful
that you use the right signal, that you go for the right sequence”
 [TH].  In
other words, the probe may have correctly identified part of a Y
chromosome, but it might come from a female – the mother, the fetus or
the technician.
Notably, none of these threats to the chain of inferences connecting green
dots to fetal cells would be disputed, in principle, by the investigators in
NIFTY.  When I asked one PI about sex chromosome abnormalities, he
replied: “Yes, you could have a fetus that had a chromosome abnormality
but the majority of the blood samples you would get would be from
normal pregnancies” [DI].  Their lack of concern about rarities,
exceptions and outliers is a pragmatic matter; the Y is “good enough” for
getting results published, and it is a good enough detector of whether or
not the system can work. This may well be true, depending on the purpose
of the test.  In fetal cell research, the Y has been good enough for proof of
concept in small-scale experimental settings, but not good enough for the
certainty required of a clinical test in a hospital.  The resilient expectation
that the Y chromosome is the right tool for the job – in the face of
evidence to the contrary – hints at a deep cultural commitment to the
intransigence of a binary order of sex.135
Sex and gender
Joan Scott traces the surprisingly recent history of "gender" as a word and
as a concept.
60  Its use, in feminist circles at least is intended to emphasize
the cultural, relational and fluid aspects of social distinctions based on
sex.  Sex, on the other hand, usually refers to the biological differences -
chromosomal, hormonal and anatomical - that allegedly separate men and
women in some way not reducible to culture.  However numerous
feminist biologists and critical theorists, such as Nelly Oudshoorn, Anne
Fausto-Sterling, and Ruth Bleier have historicized and contextualized a
number of presumably biological categories, showing them to be
culturally mediated.
61  As Judith Butler writes, “what is ‘sex’ anyway?  Is
it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or hormonal, and how is a feminist
critic to assess the scientific discourses which purport to establish such
‘facts’ for us?”  One strategy feminists have used for undermining sex
(and the apparently natural gendered characteristics that flow from it), is
to point out biological variability:
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Biologists and medical scientists recognize, of course, that absolute
dimorphism is a Platonic ideal not actually achieved in the natural
world.  Nonetheless, the normative nature of medical science uses
as an assumption, the proposition that for each sex there is a single,
correct developmental pathway.  Medical scientists, therefore,
define as abnormal any deviation from bimodally distributed
genitalia or chromosomal composition.
62
Both chimerism and fetal cells in women contribute to this project
because they call into question the dogma that people are genetically
homogeneous, an assumption that has prevailed even among feminist
critics.  Indeed, because it would take an inventory of every cell in a body
to demonstrate chromosomal purity – an impossible task – we don’t know
that anyone is genetically homogenous.
The assumption that seeing a single Y chromosome in a pregnant woman
means that she is carrying a male baby reproduces and reifies the binary
economy of chromosomal sex.  Ironically, though, it can be re-read as a
fundamental challenge to the stability of this tenet.  Quite simply, if
women’s bodies contain Y-chromosomes – because they are or have been
pregnant with Y bearing fetuses, or because they have a more diverse
chromosomal arrangement than the binary model allows – then the
presence of a Y chromosome can no longer mark a body as male.  The
chromosomal dichotomy breaks down.
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The inscription of a Y chromosome as a band on an autoradiograph, in the
presence of only “female” bodies - the mother, the fetus, the technician -
is called a “false positive”.  Rather than suggesting that it might indicate a
true Y chromosome, it is taken to be confirming evidence of the sporadic
contamination – by traces of a so-called “male” body - during PCR
preparation. The externality of the report is moved back one notch by
saying that a Y chromosome was indeed observed, but it was from a male
other than the fetus.  Contamination is a catch-all for the unexpected in
this procedure and it functions to assume, create, and reify binary
categories of chromosomal sex.  Hypothetically taken to its extreme,
discipline of laboratory technicians in the name of anti-contamination
readily devolves into absurdity, and comes to seem more of a ritual than a
precaution.
63  Women technicians could be prevented from bodily contact
with men, for fear that they would carry unwanted cells on their skin or
clothing.  From this very technology, we have learned that pregnant
women can carry Y chromosomes, even in skin rashes likely to flake.  As
a precaution, pregnant technicians could be barred from this practice, or at
least have to undergo prenatal sex determination themselves to make sure
that they are carrying females.
My contention is that regulation of lab technicians by their biological
attributes is a peculiar practice.  It happens here, I suggest, for two simple
reasons, both of convenience.  First, just as searching for the Y
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chromosome seemed an obvious place for investigators to start,
mandating that technicians be female seemed an obvious precaution.
Dividing the world into binary categories of male and female is something
we are all accustomed to; it doesn't (seem to) take a complicated vetting
process.  Of course this assumption excludes or renders invisible anyone
who has a non-standard chromosome/gender relationship because of a
chromosome abnormality, or mixed XX/XY chromosomes.
The second reason for this apparent precaution is that most cytogenetic
laboratory technicians are female anyway.  As one of my interviewees
described, “We’re just a group of women here who tend to keep working
in this lab” [PT].  Rayna Rapp suggests that most personnel in
cytogenetics labs are women because laboratory work is a service sector
which has regularized hours and low pay – hallmarks of ‘women’s
work.’
64  In fetal cell isolation, the appearance of female technicians as an
innocent technological precaution based on sex  - or on not sloughing off
Y chromosomes every time they turn around - encodes a gendered
segregation of labor present in the lab anyway.
The Baby Gender Mentor
Finally, I offer the story of the Baby Gender Mentor as a confirmatory
postscript to my arguments in this chapter.  In the summer of 2005, a
small private lab called Acu-Gen Biolab, Inc., based in Lowell
Massachusetts, introduced onto the market a kit called “The Baby Gender
Mentor” (figure 4).  The kit is offered direct-to-consumers over the
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internet.  Designed for “the type of woman who can’t wait to open
Christmas presents,”
65 it purports to identify the “gender” (technically, the
sex) of a baby as early as five weeks gestation, with a 99.9% success rate,
and a 200% money-back guarantee.  The test requires a woman to prick
her finger, dab a few spots of blood on a special paper, and mail it to the
Acu-gen lab.  This test must be done in the absence of males in order to
prevent contamination (figure 5).  Within 24 hours, she can log on to their
website, enter her special code, and discover the gender of her baby.
Figure 4: the Baby Gender Mentor kit (photo: A. Martin)
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Figure 5: No boys allowed (photo: A. Martin)
I suggest that the BGM is an illegitimate child of the fetal cell research
trajectory because it apparently uses cell-free fetal DNA – the presence or
absence of bits of Y-chromosomes – to detect sex.
  I say “illegitimate
child,” because while the NIFTY scientists are uninvolved with the kit,
the “science behind facts” page of the website contains a long list of
publications, many of which are by NIFTY participants, and arose from
NIH funded research.
66  I say “apparently” because the company is very
secretive about its method, and it has not published any evidence of the
protocol or accuracy of the technique. The fetal cell investigators, from
whom I learned about the kit, are angry both because the test probably
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violates their patents, and because they believe it cannot possibly be
99.9% accurate at 5 weeks.  Ethicists are worried about the kit because of
its potential use for unsanctioned gender-selective abortion (an issue,
incidentally, that fetal cell researchers up to now have been laudably
sensitive and prohibitive about).
The Baby Gender Mentor, cheerily plugged on The Today Show, in
newspapers and in women’s magazines, was an instant hit with thousands
of women, who forked out the steep fee “just for fun.”  Its heyday was
short-lived, though.  In its approximately nine months (!) on the market,
the kit has become mired in bad publicity and controversy, including,
most recently, a class action law suit.  Consumers are disgruntled for
many reasons, not the least of which is that many women are delivering
babies who are the wrong sex.  When these women have confronted the
company with their false results, they have been told a familiar story.
These are posts from a website that is tallying women’s complaints:
EternalSunshine: Acu-Gen tested 4 times (inconclusive, boy, girl,
boy). Claims that mother is "chimeric" and has different DNA in
blood in "left and right hand". No refund.
67
MikeysMom: Acu-Gen retested original sample, still came back
boy. After her baby girl was born, the mother sent a valid birth
certificate requesting a refund, but Acu-Gen requested a blood
sample or fingerprints from her baby. Dr. Wang informed the
mother she should be very concerned because her baby is not
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genetically female and should be checked to see if she has a uterus
or ovaries.
68
The company’s president, Dr. Wang, is apparently relying on presumptive
chromosomal anomalies to repair problematic results, and circumvent the
200% money-back guarantee.  The possibility of something other than an
unequivocal boy or girl result is not mentioned anywhere in the test’s
literature.  Wang, maintaining his claim that the lab does not make
mistakes, comments that the test, in practice, has revealed “the inevitable
complexity of nature.”
69  Nature is not so complex, though, that he has
adjusted his 99.9% guarantee.  In an ABC News inquiry, the narrator
skeptically reports that “For every specific case Linda asked about, Wang
had an excuse like embryo fusion or vanishing twins.”
70  For verification,
the reporter asks expert Diana Bianchi.  She replies: “Embryo fusion does
exist. Vanishing twins do exist. But they are both very, very rare
phenomenon. So I don't think they'd be a common explanation for any
discrepancy in the results.”
71
Time will tell whether the Baby Gender Mentor will be judged as a “good
enough” tool for parents to decide what color to paint the nursery.  In the
discourse about the controversy, however, I have not seen a single person
question the desire that fuels the marketability of this clearly opportunistic
technology.  The desire “to know” is based on a commitment to binary
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gendered ideals (or else why would it matter?).  The premise of the
lawsuit is that the test has caused women, whom their own lawyer calls “a
vulnerable group, or at least an emotional group,”
72 undue heartbreak.
They seek compensation for “the wrenching flip-flop from expectations of
one gender to the other, made especially painful for some by the sudden
dawning of fears that perhaps the gender confusion meant something was
wrong with the baby.”
73
These comments seem resoundingly to confirm Butler’s claim that “the
mark of gender appears to ‘qualify’ bodies as human bodies; the moment
in which an infant becomes humanized is when the question ‘is it a boy or
girl?’ is answered.  Those bodily figures who do not fit into either gender
fall outside the human… .”
74  This moment of gendering is happening
earlier and earlier.  As a consolation, I enjoy some subversive pleasure
from imagining the “surprise” babies whose wrong-colored nursery and
queer apparel may open up to them some new possibilities for being.
Conclusion
In the case of the Baby Gender Mentor, Dr. Wang and Acu-gen are using
the putative and unproveable occurrence of chimerism to repair their
results (and avoid giving customers their money back).  Simultaneously,
they are using the label “chimera” to repair the assumption that
“normally” XX=female and XY=male.  Any exception, by virtue of being
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labeled an exception, reifies the norm.  Because of their secrecy, we do
not know precisely what the personnel at Acu-gen observe before they
make the observational report “male” or “female.”  We do know that
when challenged, the company admits a break in the chain of inferences,
however it does so in a way that individualizes the mistake, and protects
the integrity of the technique.  The “error,” they imply, is not in the
technique, but in the individual body of either the woman or the baby.
This potential for variation in the cellular content of bodies is a useful
rhetorical resource for researchers to repair their findings or their
techniques in the short-run.  If we take a longer view of the field, this very
same variation – the fundamental instability of sex – seems to doom the
project to failure.145
CHAPTER 3:
FOREIGN CELLS IN THE MOTHER(LAND): THE LANGUAGE AND PRACTICE
OF FETAL MICROCHIMERISM RESEARCH
My point of departure is that nationality, or, as one might prefer to
put it in view of that word’s multiple significations, nation-ness, as
well as nationalism, are cultural artifacts of a particular kind.  To
understand them properly we need to consider carefully how they
have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have
changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound
emotional legitimacy.
---Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities
1
Introduction
Barbara Duden employs a historicism that is similar to Anderson’s in her
account of how the fetus came to be a “modern certainty.”
2  She describes
her task as one of showing “historically that the human fetus, as
conceptualized today, is not a creature of God or a natural fact, but an
engineered construct of modern society.”
3 Anderson’s and Duden’s
arguments are compelling because they begin with objects – nation and
fetus – whose existence is now widely taken for granted.  Neither is
visible to the naked eye; they are made visible with maps and sonograms.
Both are entities that, in contemporary America, have a seeming
concreteness that commands fierce protection and emotional and political
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investment, at least to some portion of the political spectrum.  And both,
we learn from Anderson’s and Duden’s skillful accounts, are relatively
new.  In the 18
th Century, a man had a God and a King, but he did not
have a nation. A woman had a stagnation, a fruit that may or may not
emerge as a child; she did not have a fetus.  My project is not historical on
the same scale as Anderson’s and Duden’s, but it has grown from the
same kind of sensibility about the emergence of objects.  And it concerns
a strange and recent convergence of their objects of study.  In this chapter
I ask: how did the fetus come to be a nation?
In the past decade, several researchers in a handful of laboratories have
been characterizing a phenomenon that they call “bidirectional cell
trafficking” between fetal and maternal bodies.  This research trajectory
grew directly out of attempts to use fetal cells in pregnant women’s blood
as an instrument for prenatal screening (see chapter 2).  The empirical
material for this chapter begins in 1996 with the first definitive evidence
that fetal cells can be found in women’s bodies long after the pregnancy is
over.  The technical term for this phenomenon is “microchimerism”; like
chimerism, except the second population of cells is very small in
proportion to the major population.
In both the spoken and written technical discourse of the community of
(mostly American) microchimerism researchers, metaphors that liken
cells to human migrants are ubiquitous.  Fetal cells “traffic” into the
maternal body, “migrate” to particular organs and “repopulate” them.
Sociologist John Torpey writes “rather than ignoring the role of states,
studies of immigration policies take them as given and thus fail to see the147
ways in which regulation of movement contributes to constituting the very
‘state-ness’ of states.”
4  Similarly, I suggest that trafficking and other
geopolitical metaphors in fetal cell research both assume and contribute to
the state-ness of bodies.  While geopolitical metaphors are not the only set
of tropes employed by researchers in this field, I was struck during the
course of my research by their prominence.
This story bears out the proposition – suggested by Emily Martin,
5 Evelyn
Fox Keller
6 and others – that the ways in which scientists speak and write
about the objects they study is embedded in metaphors available from
sociocultural frames that are specific to times and places.  Keller writes:
Some of the force of descriptive statements … derives from the role
of metaphor in constituting similarity and difference, in defining
the “family resemblances” that form the bases on which we
categorize natural phenomena and in motivating the performance of
particular experiments or the construction of particular technical
devices.
7
Nowhere, but in the late 20
th or early 21
st Century Anglo-America would
cells be trafficking, migrating and repopulating organs, because these are
contemporary preoccupations.  The question then becomes: Would cells
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be doing the same things if they were described in different ways?  Fetal
cell microchimerism is a particularly good phenomenon for showing that
the ways in which scientists talk about objects matters for the research
trajectory and for the ontology of those objects.  This chapter begins with
a detailed history of the past decade of research in fetal microchimerism,
with special attention to the discourse of the field.  Later in the chapter, I
discuss how language itself traffics in and out of the laboratory to
configure and reconfigure identities and ontologies of cells, fetuses and
women.
Fetal cell voyages, 1996-2006
Cellular invasions
The presence of fetal cells in women’s blood during pregnancy was first
noticed over a century ago.  Since the late 1960’s, a number of persistent
groups have tried to recover fetal cells from maternal blood, so that they
can be used for prenatal genetic testing (see chapter 2).  The “holy grail,”
as some of them call it, would be a technique for analyzing fetal
chromosomes by using only a blood sample from the mother.  This would
be a less risky, less expensive (and therefore lucrative), earlier and more
widely available test than amniocentesis or Chorionic Villus Sampling
(CVS), the current options for definitive prenatal diagnosis.  Since the
beginning of this quest, “fetal cells” have been interchangeably defined by
their proxy: cells bearing a Y chromosome, found in a woman who is or
was pregnant.  In chapter 2, I covered the story of fetal cells, prenatal
testing, and misplaced faith in the Y chromosome.149
In this chapter, I pick up the story in 1993, at a conference entitled “Fetal
Cells in Maternal Blood: Prospects for Noninvasive Prenatal Diagnosis.”
The conference was in Arlington Virginia, and funded primarily by the
NIH, though support also came from the March of Dimes and several
genetics corporations.  The proceedings from the conference suggest that
the driving impetus for the conference was to bring a fetal cell technique
to clinical utility and to the market.
8  At the conference, several disparate
groups, mostly from the US, but also from Switzerland and the UK,
congealed into a field of research.   Other invited participants, who were
tangentially allied to the core set and have not persisted as key players,
included anatomists, immunologists, ethicists and some representatives
from the private sector.
I suggest that during the conference two important shifts occurred in the
landscape of fetal cell research.  The first is that the community of fetal
cell researchers was introduced to a new set of metaphors. Prior to this,
fetal cells existed entirely as instrumental objects (or would-be
instruments for prenatal diagnosis).  Things were done to them (they were
sorted, separated, isolated, probed, purified), but they didn’t do things.
When a verb was used in conjunction with their apparent presence in a
pregnant woman’s blood, it was generally a fairly passive verb: they
passed across the placental barrier, or they were transferred to maternal
blood.
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At the conference, Kurt Benirschke, an anatomist from outside the core
group of fetal cell scientists, described how fetal cells establish contact
with the maternal tissues.  These cells “invade” and “attach” to the
placental floor, and are involved in “cell traffic … between fetus and
mother.”
9  Other contributors, Beer et al., introduced the notion that the
fetus is immunologically comparable to a transplanted organ.  Their
article begins with the statement that “in any graft-host relationship” there
are different ways in which “the host may become aware of foreign solid
tissue.”
10  They go one to describe that the placenta, “a frontier of
immense proportions,”
11 orchestrates many functions including
“deportation of living cells into the mother.”
12  Like Benirschke, Beer et
al. describe fetal cells invading maternal tissues, and refer to fetal cell
trafficking, across the placental “barrier”.
Thus these nationalistic metaphors – now accepted as the technical
language of the field – had a historical beginning in the fetal cell
community.  It seems plausible that, in a manner akin to Ian Hacking’s
notion of “semantic contagion,”
13 the language of cell traffic, invasion and
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the foreign-ness of fetal cells entered the lexicon of the core group of fetal
cell researchers at or around the time of the 1993 conference.  The vision
that they uphold – that organisms are pure collections of immunologically
cognizant cells, capable of distinguishing self from other – long pre-dated
this discursive contagion.
14  Consequently, I am not suggesting that the
package of metaphors I am tracing is causal of research theories and
practices per se.  Rather, as Max Black argues in his explication of
metaphors as interactive: “The metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses,
and organizes features of the principal subject by implying statements
about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject.”
15  The principal
subject in this case would be the cell out of its proper place, and the
subsidiary subject would be a traveler between countries.  The metaphor
makes sense to its users because the same relations of self and other seem
to apply to both subjects.  This makes sense, in turn, because they have
been accustomed to thinking, speaking and writing about the two
scenarios in the same language.
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Cellular residency
A second turning point in the field, also foreshadowed at the 1993
conference, rendered fetal cells less like incidental byproducts of
pregnancy and more like immigrants.  Diana Bianchi, a central player in
fetal cell research for more than twenty years, presented evidence from a
study of eight women who were not pregnant, but who had delivered male
infants between 6 and 27 years earlier.
16  The non-pregnant women had
been included in the study as controls against which to compare women
who were carrying male fetuses. Much to their surprise, the Bianchi lab
found that most of these non-pregnant women were positive for male
DNA.  They report: “The fact that women might become permanent low-
grade chimeras after pregnancy is a surprising observation that needs
validation and extension by other investigators.”
17  Bianchi described her
reaction to these unexpected results:
You know, really, it was a disappointment to us to find out that
fetal cells circulated from prior pregnancies, because we were
focused on isolating fetal cells from the current pregnancy, and we
were using … the stem cell antigen, thinking that fetal cells would
preferentially have this antigen and it would be a good marker to
pull out fetal cells for non-invasive genetic diagnosis.  So at first
when we found out that it pulled out cells from a prior pregnancy,
we were very upset.
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While Bianchi and her lab presented these findings in 1993, the paper was
rejected three times in her attempt to get it published.  The resistance, she
says, was because the findings “challenged a lot of paradigms”:
I think it just was, people just, it wasn’t that they had concerns
about the technical aspects, it was just the idea.  Why weren’t these
cells rejected?  It didn’t make sense to them, you know, it was
counter-intuitive that a foreign cell would live in somebody for that
long.
Another member of the Bianchi lab described the resistance in similar
terms:  “And why would a cell not be eventually destroyed.  Eventually a
foreign cell should be, or bacterial cell, should eventually be killed off
after 27 years” [AG].  Note that both of these descriptions use the word
“foreign” and imply that, in keeping with the premises of immunology,
one would expect a hostile reception for cells outside of their proper
self.
18
The full article was finally published in 1996 in the Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences USA.
19  It has since become Bianchi’s most
cited publication, and somewhat of a touchstone in the field. This article is
the first to use the term “microchimerism” to characterize the presence, in
humans, of fetal cells in maternal bodies. Bianchi cites Liegeois, a mouse
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researcher from Paris, who coined the phrase in 1977.
20   Aside from
Liegeois, transplantation researchers were the only others to use the term
“microchimerism,” beginning in 1992.  This connection between fetal cell
research and organ transplantation is more than incidental.  One
researcher told me:  “Because the fetus essentially is a foreign antibody,
or antigen, whatever you want to call it.  It’s a foreign thing that’s …
you’ve got to consider it an organ transplant.  You know, it’s there, it can
do all these, it’s like a little entity on it’s own” [JM].  Thomas Starzl, a
renowned transplant surgeon from Pittsburgh, referred to chimerism and
microchimerism to describe cells from the donor that circulate in the
recipient’s body after organ transplants. Starzl championed (and continues
to promote) the idea that microchimerism prevents the organ recipient
from rejecting the organ and therefore should be strategically encouraged
in patients.
21
Notably, the discussion in Bianchi’s 1996 paper is the first to make an
explicit link between the maternal/fetal relationship and that between an
organ recipient and the donated organ. In Bianchi’s analogy:
It is tempting to hypothesize that active cellular traffic across the
placenta early in gestation is important and perhaps necessary in
inducing tolerance to the human fetus. … Starzl and his coworkers
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have demonstrated chimerism resulting from widespread seeding of
donor cells that emanate from whole organs being transplanted. …
They have postulated that bidirectional cell migration and
repopulation is the first step in the acquisition of donor-specific
tolerance, and, ultimately, successful graft acceptance.  The human
pregnancy may also benefit from similar one-way or even two-way
traffic.
22
This passage is, as far as I can tell, the first adoption of the language of
migration in any publication by researchers in the fetal cell community.
Dennis Lo followed up Bianchi’s article with a paper titled “two-way cell
traffic between mother and fetus,” also in 1996.
23  From this point on,
“trafficking” becomes the standard technical descriptor for movement of
cells between mother and fetus, especially when those cells are found to
persist after pregnancy, miscarriage or termination.  It is used in formal
technical and popular publications, and it is how researchers describe the
phenomenon in interviews: “so few trafficked over that all the procedures
to try and find them reduced them even more” [TH].  And so, by the end
of the conference, or at least by the time that Bianchi’s results had been
accepted as valid, fetal cell researchers had a new, more active, language
to describe fetal cell movement, and they had a new, promising, research
problem:  What were these cells “doing” in women?
Cellular insurgency
Around this time, Lee Nelson, a rheumatologist in Seattle, and Carol
Artlett, an immunologist in Philadelphia, independently became interested
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in fetal cell microchimerism. Nelson published a theoretical piece in
Arthritis and Rheumatism proposing that, since women have a
significantly higher incidence of autoimmune diseases than do men, and
since they tend to occur after women’s childbearing years, maybe
persistent fetal cells are causing diseases in women.
24  She described to
me the genesis of this idea:
I work in a transplant center where colleagues are often talking about
graft-vs.-host disease…One colleague shared my interest in fetal-
maternal cell exchange during pregnancy as he thought it might
influence transplantation success. I asked him if it was known how
long it takes fetal cells to disappear from the mother's circulation
after pregnancy.  One day he called me up and said he had talked
with another colleague who studied fetal cells in the mother's blood,
that they had tested one of their technicians and found fetal cells
were still there are year after delivery.  When he told me this it was
like the lights went on.  I thought - scleroderma looks like graft-vs-
host disease, it occurs more in women and usually after childbearing
years (by 5-15 years), the fetal cells persist, maybe the foreign fetal
cells play a role in scleroderma.  Later I talked with the researcher
who had studied the technician and he told me that Diana Bianchi
had a similar finding and sent me an abstract she'd presented - at that
time she hadn't yet published a paper.
Like Nelson, Artlett told me that her research direction was stimulated
both by Bianchi’s findings, and by an analogy to transplantation
immunology:
See scleroderma is very much like a graft vs. host disease.  It has
similarities; it doesn’t mean that it is graft-vs.-host disease.  But our
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assumption was that it looked so similar to it, lets go and look for a
foreign cell population and see if fetal cells, those fetal cells are
actually in the lesions.
How would one look for fetal cells in women’s tissues? The techniques
for finding Y-containing cells – already accepted as proxies for fetal cells
– were readily adopted from prenatal testing labs, including Bianchi’s.
25
Both the Nelson lab and the Artlett lab immediately went to work to find
Y-containing cells in women with scleroderma, a fatal autoimmune
disease, who also had given birth to sons.  And they found them, in the
blood, kidney, lungs and skin of women with the disease.
26
Following a spate of publications associating fetal microchimerism with
scleroderma, the main research groups, as well as new ones, began
looking for, and in most cases finding, fetal cells in a range of other
autoimmune disorders.  These included skin rashes common during
pregnancy,
27 autoimmune liver disease,
28 autoimmune thyroid disease
29
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and lupus
30.  By 2000, evidence of the presence of male cells in women
with diseases was mounting and the “bad fetal cell” hypothesis was
gaining momentum.  The primary labs were publishing reviews and
opinion pieces in prestigious journals,
31 and disease support groups were
funding microchimerism research and inviting speakers to their meetings.
This was a remarkably prolific publishing period for the three key labs
(Artlett, Bianchi, Nelson) and it has all the hallmarks of what sociologist
of science Joan Fujimura calls a “doable” research problem: a
standardized and relatively easy technique that graduate students and
postdocs can use, a relatively short experimental time frame, and the
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ability to generate both publications and further funding.
32  One lab
director told me the goal of the lab in the heart of the microchimerism
research was to “publish the hell out of this thing and lets just get the
papers out there”
 [AG].  The height of fetal microchimerism research was
the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s.
Concurrently, it had become apparent that fetal cells were not going to be
the prenatal screening panacea that many investigators had hoped (see
chapter 2).  Microchimerism, therefore, was a timely research avenue for
those laboratories and researchers who had honed their skills by searching
for Y chromosomes in women.  One such researcher told me:  “It became
obvious, I suppose, that prenatal diagnosis wasn’t going to be a winner,
and we were really, there was a lot of time sitting around discussing what
these cells might actually do.  What other useful things could we draw
from the research?”[TH]
Cellular relief work
While the “bad fetal cell” theory was on its way to becoming a fact, some
peculiar things began to happen, mostly in the Bianchi lab.  Diana Bianchi
described to me two unexpected “AHA! moments” which came from
control subjects in autoimmune microchimerism research.  In the first
experiment investigators were looking for fetal cells in patients with
autoimmune thyroid disease, and comparing them to healthy thyroid
tissue from women who had also had sons:
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There’s one woman … part of her thyroid is entirely male and part
of her thyroid is entirely female.  And she’s healthy, she just has
this benign thyroid adenoma that’s been removed, never been
transfused, I mean those are definitely her son’s cells in there.  But
that turned into a thyroid.  I mean the male cells have follicles and
it looks like a normal thyroid.
In the second experiment, Bianchi’s lab was looking for fetal cells in an
autoimmune liver disease.  Every study needed a control population, but it
is rare that a healthy woman would have a liver biopsy.  And so in this
study, they used as controls the biopsies from some women who had
infectious hepatitis C, which is not an autoimmune disease.  In one
woman who had been diagnosed with hepatitis C, cells from a male fetus
populated almost an entire lobe of her liver.  The lab used genetic markers
from the woman and her former boyfriend to prove that the cells
originated from a pregnancy she had terminated years ago.
33
Importantly, in both of these cases the male cells seemed to have
differentiated from some kind of stem cell into tissue cells – thyroid and
liver – that were indistinguishable morphologically from their “host”
counterparts. In their report of the hepatitis case, Bianchi and colleagues
proposed an altogether new hypothesis:
This finding, if replicated, has significant implications. It suggests
that endogenous fetal stem cells may be an alternate source of
tissue repair in the [post-pregnant] woman. Taken together, these 2
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cases imply that fetal cells can migrate to diseased maternal tissue
and differentiate into functional tissue.
34
After these findings, the Bianchi lab retrenched from the position that
fetal cells were likely disease agents, and started looking for them
everywhere.  The scope of doable research problems expanded.  They
changed their IRB application and consent forms to reflect the change
from autoimmune disorders to anything that affects women, including
ovarian and cervical cancers.
In their most recent work, the Bianchi lab is championing this “stem cell
repair” model: “So our theory is that the cells go in as blood cells or stem
cells and then they encounter the diseased tissue and in that setting they
differentiate into the host organ, whatever that is.” This hypothesis – with
its tantalizing implications that fetal cells could be used therapeutically
instead of embryonic stem cells – has garnered some media publicity,
particularly in the United States.
35  Lee Nelson also modified her position,
in light of the new evidence, to allow that fetal cells may either be
“insurgents” or they may be “protectors.”
36  At present, the research
community is ambivalent about what fetal cells are doing in women.  And
with this question – “What the heck are they doing there?”
37– I will end
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the empirical story and turn to some analysis of the language and guiding
metaphors in the field.
Ontologies
Ian Hacking’s Historical Ontology is a collection of essays “concerned
with objects or their effects which do not exist in any recognizable form
until they are objects of scientific study.”
38  If ontology is the study of
being, then historical ontology is the study of things coming into being, in
a gradual and time-dependent process.  This approach to the study of
things – like nation and fetus – owes a clear debt to Michel Foucault, and
to his genealogical method. In this section, I contemplate what the
package of geopolitical metaphors, discussed above, has meant for the
ontology of fetal cells in women.  My concern is not metaphysical but
practical; in other words, I make no distinction between what the fetal
cells are “really” like, or “really” doing, and how scientists describe or
depict them.  As Annemarie Mol writes, “ontology is not given in the
order of things … instead, ontologies are brought into being, sustained, or
allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day, sociomaterial
practices.”
39
By focusing on discourse about trafficking and state borders, I run the risk
of overdetermining one particular set of metaphors to the exclusion of
others that researchers also use.  Such a single-minded approach
oversimplifies the ways in which overlapping packages of metaphors are
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mutually constitutive, though not always consistent.  Speakers and writers
have some agency in selectively deploying one set of images over
another, depending on their rhetorical purpose; metaphors operate more
like tools than cages.
40  In this community of fetal cell researchers,
alternatives to immigrant-talk include graft versus host metaphors and
more militaristic images common to immunology and cell biology.  Thus,
metaphors co-exist in a web of meanings which are interconnected.  For
example, whether cells are imagined as immigrants or soldiers, they have
in common that they are people invested in nationhood.
Cells are people, too
Hacking makes a well-known distinction between social and natural
kinds, and he argues that the former – like gloves and multiple personality
– are liable to change in response to our description of them, while the
latter – like planets and horses – are not.
41  Although this distinction
would be contested by many in science in technology studies, it becomes
especially murky when the so-called natural objects are personified.  A
number of sociologists and anthropologists of science have identified the
tendency for scientific researchers to personify cells. Jackie Stacey writes
that:
Cells are endowed with more than just a physiological identity in
scientific discourse.  These supposedly biological units are, in fact,
being increasingly “endowed with personhood”… the
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conceptualization of the cell as the microcosm of the self has
permeated all kinds of medical practice in recent years.
42
In her work on the history of cell culturing, Hannah Landecker notes: “the
synecdoche between cell and person functioned to make the cell
populations of Petri dishes analogous to populations of people.  The
scientists moved readily between the language of cells in culture to that of
people in culture.”
43  Emily Martin also drew our attention to
characterizations of the egg cell and sperm cells in predictably gendered
motifs, and more recently she has traced the discourse of immunology in
which cells have jobs ranging from housekeeping to garbage collecting to
police work.
44 Sarah Franklin and Margaret Lock note that “cell lines
acquire powerful social identities with high stakes in terms of individual,
familial, professional, and community futures.”
45  From what I have
observed and read, it is the rule rather than the exception for cells to be
personified in fetal cell research as well.  In addition to the obvious
likening of cells to travelers, traffickers and immigrants, one pediatrician
told me: “Cells are pretty smart … They know where to find their home
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and how to interact” [BL].  While I was observing routine practice in a
clinical lab, a technician told me that cells get “depressed” when they are
alone.
That cells are personified in contemporary biology and medicine seems
beyond doubt.  However, few analysts have grappled with the question of
why this is so.  I have three speculations, which I’ll call the biological,
phenomenological and historical explanations, and I suspect that they all
contribute.  The biological explanation is that gametes and early
embryonic cells are the literal precursors of full-blown persons.  We each
came from one fertilized egg cell, as everyone familiar with the birds and
the bees knows.  Stem cell politics in the U.S. makes the slippage from a
cell to “a life” seem frighteningly self-evident.  However, this feature of
embryonic stem cells doesn’t so easily explain why a blood cell or kidney
cell acts remarkably like a human.
The second hypothesis I offer is that cells are phenomenologically like
people.  This, of course, could also be a product rather than a cause of
their personification, and it is more likely a case of co-construction.
Nonetheless, cells and humans share some characteristics.  They are both,
in most cases, understood as “living,”
46 and as atomistic, discrete or
individual.  They have discernable boundaries and are usually perceived
as separate from each other.  An affinity that cells and people share is that
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they can be, and often are counted. People are counted by censuses and
votes, for example, and cells are counted in disease treatment and
monitoring – CD4 counts in HIV/AIDS and white blood cell counts in
leukemia for example. This operation both measures the discreteness of
objects, and makes them discrete.
47  Another characteristic that likens
cells to people is that they are motile.  This feature seems particularly
prescient in my story where movement across boundaries is key to the
analogy. Another way of making this point about phenomenological
similitude is to ask the family resemblance question: What “kinds” of
things are most often personified? I suggest that discrete, mobile things
are more likely to be anthropomorphized than are stationary, amorphous
or fluid things.
My third suggestion, which most explains how cells became not just
people, but citizens, is historical. A thorough history of the metaphor and
meaning of “the body politic” exceeds the scope of this chapter and my
own expertise.  However, it is clear that an analogical relationship
between the body and the state has been compelling, at least to
philosophers, political theorists, and authors since the ancient Greeks.  Its
proponents included Plato, St. Augustine, King Henry VIII, Shakespeare
and Hobbes, to name just a few. Several commentators have recently
called “the body politic” a “dead” and/or misused metaphor.
48  To be
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48  David G. Hale, "Analogy of the Body Politic" in The Dictionary of the
History of Ideas, Vol. 1 (Charlottesville: The Electronic Text Center, The167
clear, I don’t think that when my informants use the phrases “cell
trafficking,” “migration” and “immigration,” they are self-consciously
proposing that the state is or should be like a human body in the same way
that many of their predecessors were.  However several American
biologists in the 1930’s were doing exactly this.  The Scientific Monthly
published several essays expounding the virtues of the human body as a
model for governmental organization.  These include “Body Anatomic
and Body Politic,” by cytologist E.V. Cowdry
49; “Organic Theory of the
State,” by Stanford bacteriologist W.H. Manwaring
50; and “The Body
Physiologic and the Body Politic,” by Harvard physiologist Walter B.
Cannon.
51 Some particularly germane excerpts include:
I, therefore, venture the opinion that the most reliable guide to an
impartial and successful overhauling of our democratic institutions
would be the political ideals deduced from the economic
perfections of the human body.
52
Let us compare some types of cells with the millions of individuals
which constitute a fairly self-contained nation …The nerve cells are
the oldest and wisest.  They constitute the ruling class and have
special means of gathering information; domestic, from within the
community, and foreign, from the outside world … Order is
enforced by the leucocytes or policemen.
53
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My objective is not to explore the intricacies of these authors’ political-
anatomical arguments, although these are truly fascinating, but to suggest
that they (among others, no doubt) made the idea of the cell as citizen
available to twentieth century biologists.
Intentionality
In this area of research, though, cells are not just citizens.  They are
citizens of the world.  They have exceeded the boundaries of one body
and entered another, perhaps illicitly. The conflation between cells and
persons implies some peculiar consequences.  One is that cells, like
people, are intentional actors. As Stacey puts it, “cells are given individual
identities: like us, they desire, they fear, they have intentions, they
triumph, and they are satisfied.”
54  In written and spoken language of fetal
cell scientists, fetal cells only became intentional when they were found to
outlive the birth of the child or termination of the fetus.
And their intentions, it seemed, were malevolent.  Daniel Nordman wrote
“the vagabond is, by definition, a suspect.”
55  Like the always-suspicious
vagabond, fetal cells were immediately suspect.  Worse than travelers,
they were traffickers.  For at least five years, the prevailing hypothesis
was that fetal cells were attacking women’s bodies.  That investigators
followed this particular research trajectory, I suggest, is entwined with the
package of nationalistic metaphors in which the fetal-maternal
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relationship was and is framed.  This implication is supported by the
reports of various investigators I interviewed.  One, for example, said:
The microchimerism, we knew, that first paper was ‘97, but then, as
you probably know, the whole field went off on a tangent down the
autoimmune disease line, and it wasn’t really until probably 2001
that Lancet, the Srivatsa paper, that people began to sort of say well
hold on a minute now, are we just finding it because we’re looking
for it, or does it actually mean anything?
  [TH]
Also with the benefit of hindsight, another explained:
The rheumatology community was sending us down the
autoimmune pathway and everyone went that way cause that’s
where everyone’s going – lets go that way.  Then all of a sudden we
said hold on a second, wait a second.  Lets just take a step back and
look at this. [AG]
This trip down the garden path, so to speak, is much like the story Evelyn
Fox Keller tells about “the pacemaker concept” in developmental
biology.
56  Keller was involved in a line of research in which her theory
that favored complex and interactive explanations was marginalized while
theories that favor causal explanations were foregrounded.  “In our
zealous desire for familiar models of explanation,” Keller writes, “we risk
not noticing the discrepancies between our own predispositions and the
range of possibilities inherent in natural phenomena.  In short, we risk
imposing on nature the very stories we like to hear.”
57
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Using Max Black’s language, researchers assumed that when they cross a
border, both cells (principal subject) and people (the subsidiary subject)
move from a safe territory of recognition and protection to a foreign and
hostile territory.  As Gloria Anzaldua writes, “borders are set up to define
the places that are safe and unsafe, to distinguish us from them.”
58
A comparison to rhetoric about immigration is potentially telling about
the kinds of latent associations that may be embedded in the immigration
metaphors.  Lauren Berlant writes:
This panic of mistrust in the viability of a non-European-dominated
“America” almost goes without saying in any contemporary
mainstream discussion of the immigrant effect: it is expressed in
the chain of almost equivalent signs “immigrant,” “alien,”
“minority,” “illegal”; it is expressed in the ordinary phrase “wave
of immigrants,” which never quite explicitly details the specter of
erosion and drowning it contains, a specter that has long haunted
American concerns about the solidity of national economic and
cultural property.
59
The xenophobia described by Berlant could be an implicit feature of the
concept of cell trafficking.  What exactly is trafficking or being trafficked
in maternal/fetal cell exchange?   The notion of “cell trafficking” is not
particular to the fetal cell community.  As I described above, it entered the
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lexicon of the core set of human fetal cell researchers around 1996 via
transplant immunology, and pregnancy cell biology more broadly.  As a
very rough gauge of its history in cell sciences, I did a Medline search for
“cell” and “trafficking” together.  Its first use was in 1983 (roughly
around the beginning of Nancy Reagan’s “war on drugs”), and it has had a
steady incline since then.  In many cases of its broader usage in biology,
some kind of marker or tracer has been affixed to the cells, such as a
fluorescent marker, and this may, in fact, be the commodity that is
trafficked.  As far as I can tell, the word does not have a terribly precise
meaning in microchimerism research, but it is always invoked to imply
movement across a border from one immunologically or genetically
defined “self” to another, where the smaller self is a transplanted organ or
a fetus.
In its colloquial or political sense, trafficking usually implies that
commodities – drugs, babies, organs, persons – are being carried across
borders illegally by a third party.  In microchimerism literature, the cells
seem to be trafficking themselves; there isn’t an implicated third party. In
some uses, the “products” being trafficked by cells are conceivably the
fetus’s DNA, or more precisely the half of it that derives from the father,
and is therefore “foreign” and immunologically suspect. I do not think
that the ways in which my informants use the verb “trafficking” is a
deliberate, precise and fully reflexive reference to trafficking in the illicit
political sense. I do think they deliberately imply movement of cells from
a safe territory of to a foreign territory.  They inherited this view of
cognizant and hostile cells from immunology.  However the fundamental
premise of immunology, that cells “know” the difference between self and172
other is undermined by the very findings coming out of this research, and
in other areas of immunology. Cells do not know always where they
belong, or at least do not always reject others:
[T]his dominant model has recently been challenged, for the self is
polymorphous and ill-defined. Contemporary transplantation
biology and autoimmunity have demonstrated phenomena that fail
to allow strict adherence to such a dichotomy of self/non-self, and
as new models are emerging, “the self” has been left exposed as a
metaphor, whose grounding — philosophically and scientifically —
is unsteady and thus increasingly elusive as the putative nexus of
immunology's doctrines.
60
As indicated in this passage by Alfred Tauber, the inadequacy of a strict
self/nonself divide is also being questioned in subspecialties other than
fetal microchimerism.
The productive immigrant
Hans Jorg Rheinberger describes that: “The sciences are characterized by
a permanent process of reorientation and reshuffling of the boundary
between what is thought to be known and what is beyond imagination.”
61
And so adaptations and reorientations of metaphors of immigration
continue to be productive in the field of fetal cell research.  While fetal
cells were originally presumed to be ill-willed, they now, one interviewee
described, have a somewhat broader range of potential intentions:
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There’s three potential consequences of a fetal cell being present in
maternal tissue.  It’s bad, causing an immune response.  It does
nothing, it’s just sitting there, an innocent bystander.  Or three, it’s
doing something good.  So those are the three.  It’s almost like
poetry.  It has nothing to do really with the biology.  It’s just saying
it’s good, bad or indifferent. [AG]
In the process of the research I’ve described, fetal cells have gone from
being suspicious vagrants to productive immigrants, naturalized – in the
political sense of the term – to their new home. One newspaper reports on
the good cell theory: “If a woman's tissues or organs are injured, fetal
cells from her baby migrate there, divide and turn into the needed cell
type, be it thyroid or liver, intestine or gallbladder, cervix or spleen.”
62
These cells are less like insurgents, and more like ‘Doctors Without
Borders’, or at least good citizens.  This too, is a trope of immigration
policy, but a more liberal assimilationist one.  The vagabond has become
a productive worker.
Lately, the traffic in cells between women and their children seems to be
bi-directional, so mothers’ cells can be found in their children.  In a
spontaneous use of the immigration discourse that permeates this field, an
immunologist recently described the following scenario to me about the
sub-population of my mother’s cells presumed to be living in my body,
and she invited me to be part of an experiment:
If a Turk was born in Turkey but he moved over here and lived here
thirty years, he’s not going to be the same as if he stayed in his
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parent country.  And then you could also look at this issue of, by
analogy, was the nation formed at the time that the cell emigrated.
So, your mother’s cells coming in to you are coming in at a time
when the nation is not yet formed.  The nation is just at a time of
becoming, you know, a federation … So I can’t wait to do that
experiment. [RD]
It’s a bit confusing, but Turkey, in this scenario, is my mother, and the
Turk is her cell that “emigrated” to my body during gestation.  The
planned experiment would isolate my mother’s cells from my body now
and compare them to my mother’s cells from her body, to see if there
were differences.  Importantly, this researcher was not using the metaphor
to explain the hypothesis to me, it was, she said, the immigrant metaphor
that gave her the idea for the experiment.  This application of the
metaphor takes into account such complex social and temporal factors as
enculturation and assimilation.  When, in a previous quote, Bianchi said:
“I mean those are definitely her son’s cells in there.  But that turned into a
thyroid… The male cells have follicles and it looks like a normal thyroid”
she was, I think, being jarred by the material to change the frame of
reference: what, because of its fluorescent Y chromosome looked
remarkably like “other” or “foreigner” had come, under different staining
and lighting, to look a lot like “self” or “citizen.”
In more recent work these same researchers are finding microchimerism
wherever they turn their microscopic gazes: twins, women who have
never been pregnant, men, children.
63  The epistemic interest in fetal cells,
and therefore the funding, was sustained by the notion that bodies are,
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with few exceptions, pure collections of genetically identical, self-same
cells.  In nationalistic terms, the overwhelming sameness of the
population is what enabled one to spot the outsider, and a fetal cell was
conceived of as just that: matter out of place,
64 hostile, pathological, and
therefore potentially interesting.  However, if small numbers of cells from
our encounters with other human beings can be found in all bodies, they
lose their epistemic interest.  One investigator told me that funding for
this research is now hard to get “because most people say: So what?  You
know, its like they’re there, so what” [JM].
So what, indeed.  I’ve just described in detail the changing metaphors of a
research trajectory that didn’t really get very far.  Was it because the
metaphors were misleading?  I would argue no, that this is just a
particularly intriguing example of science as usual – some representations
work with the material, others less so.  However, it is also a good example
for looking at the ways in which scientific characterizations of bodily
phenomena fold back on people’s conceptions of themselves.  As Emily
Martin writes, “The imagery and metaphors that are the organizing
features of scientific accounts are as real in their effects on the way
doctors and patients act in the world as the effects of an antibiotic or a
scalpel.”
65  In the following section, I consider the ways in which the
characterizations of fetal cells by fetal cell researchers traffic out of the
laboratory and come to mean something to particular people and publics.
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Conclusion: Traffic beyond the lab
In this, the final section of the chapter, I explore what peripatetic cells
imply about the “territories” they move from (fetus) and to (mother).  As
in previous sections, I am attempting to stay close to the discourse used by
the actors in my study rather than to blithely spin out these metaphors and
their cultural resonances.
Fetal Sovereignty
Geopolitical metaphors, as they are mapped onto pregnant and post-
pregnant bodies, may be, or may become, a resource for constructing
claims of fetal sovereignty.  Without a border, there can be no distinct
fetal entity.  Torpey, whom I quoted at the beginning of the chapter,
claims that “states’ monopolization of the right to authorize and regulate
movement has been intrinsic to the very construction of states.”
66  Torpey
adapts and augments Weber’s argument that modern states monopolized
the legitimate use of violence.  In Torpey’s view, “modern states have
also expropriated the legitimate means of movement within and across
their borders.”
67  In fact, control of entry and exit is one of the defining
features of a state, and physical borders are necessary to the ontology of
nations.  Similarly, the border or barrier that is seen to separate woman
and their fetuses, and that regulates the movement of cells, renders the
fetus and mother separate states.  Like nations’ borders, the placental
“barrier” is simultaneously seen to be secure and, in light of new
evidence, permeable.
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Several feminist commentators on reproductive sciences have pointed out
a recent and intensifying tendency to depict the fetus as autonomous and
in control of pregnancy: “the emphasis is not only on fetal separateness
and fetal independence, but on its ability to control the mother, rather than
be controlled by her.”
68  Fetal cell scientists share this tendency when they
suggest that what fetal cells are “doing” in women is ensuring that the
fetus is not rejected but “tolerated.”  Many people in the field believe that
fetal cells are sent across the placental barrier as emissaries, signaling to
the mother that she should not reject the fetus [e.g.,BB,MR].
While it is tempting to suggest that the fetal independence implied by the
language in this field plays into or comes from pro-life politics, it seems
that the phenomenon does not map onto abortion politics in any obvious
way. I have found that several pro-life and Christian websites post links to
research and newspaper articles about microchimerism, often without
comment.  On one such site, a post following an article about
microchimerism is explicit: “This also puts the lie to the feminist claim
that a fetus is just a lump of flesh, for the unborn baby not only is its own
being, but mother and baby each affect each other (share stem cells) in a
way that carries on for decades.”
69
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On the flip side, however, one microchimerism researcher told me that
she is regularly contacted by a national pro-choice group who expressed
that their clients are very interested in fetal cell research: “in resolving
their feelings about abortion, it is very important … that they have
retained cells from this pregnancy, that in a way is a gift to them” [BB].
In both pro-life and pro-choice discourse, the “traces” that a fetus leaves
in a woman are considered relevant to fetal status.  However the social
meanings of fetal cell microchimerism are not yet stabilized or
successfully mobilized by one particular political interest group, and I
don’t think the language comes from specific political interests, except
insofar as they may be deeply embedded in the culture.
Motherland
What does it mean to women that fetal cells take up residence in their
blood and organs?
70  In 1991, Donna Haraway suggested that  “women
have had so much trouble counting as individuals in modern Western
discourses” because “their personal, bounded individuality is
compromised by their bodies’ troubling talent for making other bodies.”
71
In 1998, Emily Martin wrote that “compared with the internal purity of
the self, women fall far short.  When they are pregnant, they are truly
hybrid, uneasily ‘tolerating’ the foreign fetus.”
72  Both of these comments
seem to foreshadow the characterizations of microchimerism as a
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condition of multiplicity, however with microchimerism, women’s
compromised individuality lasts much longer than pregnancy:  “’A
pregnancy lasts forever,’ Bianchi suggests, ‘because every woman who
has been pregnant carries these little souvenirs of the pregnancy for the
rest of her life.’”
73  Women’s “troubling talent” now extends well beyond
the nine months of pregnancy.  Post-pregnant women become inhabited
by their children’s cells (and apparently by their children, as I will discuss
in chapter 4).  Arguably, this differentiates women from men, whose
individuality is contained and uncompromised.
74
Thus far I have been speaking of cells as personified in very general
terms, which is how scientists speak about them at the level of
publication, in newspaper accounts, and for the most part in interviews.
However, the tissues – blood, skin biopsies, thyroid – have come from
actual women, in whom the Y-bearing cell is personified in a specific
sense: it originated from a pregnancy which she experienced, and in many
cases a son who is living.  In fact, this cell has no meaningful signification
for the researchers unless it is tied to a story from a speaking subject.
This necessity for accurate information about pregnancy history, and in
some cases access to tissues from other people in a woman’s life,
introduces a degree of methodological uncertainty for the scientists, and a
degree of intimacy for the women.  One researcher describes this
confessional moment:
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One of the criticisms in the microchimerism studies, especially the
ones on autoimmune disease is that they didn’t spend enough time
checking histories, or it was only chart based.  Whereas what I did
was spend about an hour talking with these women.  And therefore
we certainly got a much more detailed history.  One woman told me
about a miscarriage maybe 50 years ago during the war.  I got the
feeling that was something that wasn’t talked about very much, and
it certainly didn’t appear anywhere in her chart, it wasn’t in her
records that she’d ever been pregnant, yet she had. [TH]
Moreover, once cells have been identified as belonging not to a particular
self – the woman – but are visiting, borrowed or harbored from someone
else, this knowledge re-enters the woman’s story or those told about her.
To some, apparently, the knowledge that they carry cells from their
children is heartening.  About the woman mentioned above, the researcher
reported: “It seemed to be quite a comforting thing for her, its kind of
silly.  Definitely the fact that there could still be something there didn’t
seem frightening to her” [TH].  For those who learned about the
phenomenon in the context of research about potential causes of their
disease, the knowledge was less likely to be reassuring: “I had one patient
say to me, I want to know which of my sons gave me scleroderma.”[JM]
In both cases, patients adopted the slippage from cell to person that
permeates the language of researchers, but it implied a complication or
reorientation of actual relationships between people in the world.
The apparent colonization of women by cells that are “not theirs”
sometimes colors, in peculiar and alarming ways, how others see her.181
Investigators would occasionally tell me that women had complicated
pregnancy histories, which meant more work for them to sort out whose
cells “belong” to whom.  Researchers also worried that their patients
weren’t always telling them the whole story.  Couched in these complaints
was an unmistakable moral judgment about the woman’s sexual past, and
the traces it left on her body.  The difficulty with controlling women’s
reproduction, one investigator told me, is the reason that they are
switching to mice: “We can’t tell women to become pregnant or have
miscarriages or whatever else” [AG].
Finally, in an alarming appropriation of this research, I found that an
article about microchimerism had been posted on a white supremacist
website called “Stormfront”.  The phenomenon of cell exchange was
taken up as proof that white women who had mixed-race children were
“defiled,” and the cells left behind posed a contaminating threat to
subsequent pregnancies.  Moreover, the presence of these cells – like the
“one drop of blood” rule – was presumed to change the woman’s racial
status: “As that non-white bloodline courses through the (Formerly) white
female's body, her own physiology becomes irreversibly altered to
perpetuate the blood structure produced in the womb.”
75  The tagline for
this commentator was “For God, Race and Country.” While this example
is admittedly extreme, it illustrates that the slippages between body and
nation, between bloodline and cells, traffic beyond the borders of the
laboratory.
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CHAPTER 4: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF CELLS
Our ideas and attitudes seep into the functioning of the body itself,
making up the realm of its possibilities or impossibilities.
---Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies
1
Chimerism has a biological and a psychological analog, both of which
have been studied by historians and anthropologists of science and
medicine.  The first, organ transplantation, creates an almost identical
biological scenario, and, like chimerism, it raises complicated questions
about identity and boundary-crossing.  It is from Margaret Lock’s chapter
“The Social Lives of Organs,” in her exemplary ethnography of organ
transplantation, that I borrow the title for this chapter.  The psychological
analog, multiple personality disorder, provides a foil for thinking about
the legal and social imperative to be singular, unitary, one.
I begin this chapter with Paul Rabinow’s deliberation on the peculiarly
Western linkage of the body and the person, a preoccupation he identifies
in both mediaeval Christian Europe and in the late 20
th Century California
Supreme Court.
2  Following Rabinow, I suggest that many of the identity
questions raised by chimerism are not particularly new, though the cell
has taken on a fairly recent and important role as a meaningful and quasi-
sacred part of the body.  Next, I turn to organ transplantation as an already
well-studied biological phenomenon in which identity is seen to inhabit
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human tissue, and the relocation of tissues invites both lay people and
medical specialists to ponder fragmentation and multiplication of
personhood.  Transplantation provides a germane introduction to issues of
identity raised in my ethnographic study of chimerism and
microchimerism.  In some cases, insights and speculations about identity
were offered to me in the course of my research, and in others, I
specifically asked researchers to reflect on questions of selfhood and
identity.  In media accounts of chimeras, quandaries of multiplicity,
fragmentation and confused kinship are almost always foregrounded;
indeed they seem to be the main reasons for journalistic and popular
interest in the topic.  Rather than simply taking these tidbits of
conversation and news as revelatory of what commentators think about
chimeras, I will use them as analytic levers into larger questions about
individuality, relationship and intercorporeality.  For this final task, Ian
Hacking’s concept of “making up people,” and on the history of multiple
personality disorder provides a frame for my analysis.
3
The body and the person
In his essay “Severing the Ties: Fragmentation and Dignity in Late
Modernity,” Rabinow relates a late 20
th century court case about
ownership of cells to a grander context of Western preoccupations with
the relations between body, soul and person.
4  He opens with the assertion
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that “the intimate linkage between the two key symbolic arenas, ‘the
body’ and ‘the person,’ would have to figure prominently on any list of
distinctively Western traits.”
5  Attention to the “oldness” of this linkage
helps to “isolate elements of the unarticulated uneasiness that many feel
over late modern culture.”
6  He invokes medieval Christendom (via the
work of Caroline Walker Bynum
7) to illustrate that both theologians and
the masses were deeply concerned about the materiality of the body and
its spiritual status.  The doctrine of resurrection, that “God will assemble
the decayed and fragmented corpses of human beings at the end of time
and grant them eternal life,”
8 was taken literally; corporeal minutiae such
as hair and fingernail clippings, were the subject of scholarly debate.
Thomas Aquinas attempted to divest the body of some of its spiritual
significance by insisting that only the soul would be resurrected.  As
evinced by relic cults, reverence for the fragments of the body persisted in
the Middle Ages.  “A belief in the fundamental identity between the body
and the person was embedded in these popular beliefs and practices and
was not to be shaken by theological finesse.”
9
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Rabinow demonstrates that the same tension (whether the body is the
locus of humanity or mere matter), was a central concern in the 1990
court case, John Moore v. the Regents of the University of California.
10
At issue, very broadly, was whether John Moore had a legal claim to the
profits garnered by researchers who had, unbeknownst to him,
commercialized cell products derived from a cell line that was developed
from cells taken from Moore’s body.  Excerpts from both concurring and
dissenting opinions in the case are relevant to Rabinow’s argument.
Justice Arabian wrote:
Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one’s
own body tissue for profit.  He entreats us to regard the human
vessel – the single most venerated and protected subject in any
civilized society – as equal with the basest commercial commodity.
He urges us to commingle the sacred with the profane.  He asks
much.
11
Justice Mosk, in his dissenting opinion, states: “Our society acknowledges
a profound ethical imperative to respect the human body as the physical
and temporal expression of the unique human persona.”
12  These judges,
differing in their political leanings and ultimate decision in the case,
agreed that the body and the person are one.  Moreover, Moore’s cells,
excised and physically remote from his phenomenological body, are one
and the same as his body. 
13  As Rabinow writes, “part is whole.”
14  Like
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medieval relic cults, these judges exhibit “the enduring cultural
understanding that the ‘person’ is inextricably tied to the sheer materiality
of the body.”
15
Transplanted identities
Rabinow mentions organ transplants as an example of contemporary
popular beliefs in the embodiment of identity, but he does not develop the
theme.  Other ethnographic studies, notably those by Margaret Lock
16 and
Lesley Sharp,
17 have grappled with the repercussions of identity for organ
recipients who literally incorporate other into self.  Organ and bone
marrow recipients are technically chimeras or at least microchimeric,
according to the definition of the term, which specifies that the chimeric
organism contains cells from more than one genetically distinct embryo.
However, chimera terminology is rarely used in transplant communities to
refer to patients.  It does occasionally appear as an emblem. For example,
the Chimaera of Arezzo
18 is the icon of the American Society of
Transplant Surgeons, and their newsletter is titled Chimera.  In the first
issue of Chimera, the ASTS President explained the significance of the
logo:
And what is a more fantastic idea than clinical transplantation,
particularly in its multiple manifestations of our present
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16  Margaret M. Lock, Twice Dead.
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Medical Anthropology  9, no. 3 (Sept, 1995), 357-389.
18 An Etruscan Statue from 5
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armamentarium? Thus, the Chimera as the logo of the American
Society of Transplant Surgeons not only embodies the substance
(multiple diverse body parts) but also the spirit of our specialty.
19
Beyond its use as an icon, chimerism has a more specific meaning in
transplant communities.  A small number of transplant physicians use the
term chimerism, or “macrochimerism” to emphasize their novel
therapeutic strategy for improving organ acceptance in recipients.
20  They
aim to induce organ tolerance by transplanting, along with the required
organ, bone marrow from the same donor.  Ideally, this would create an
eternal population of donor’s cells in the recipient’s blood, enabling them
to tolerate the organ (i.e., not reject it), preferably without the use of life-
long immunosuppressants. Therapeutic macrochimerism creates a
situation akin to the twin blood chimeras who were found to tolerate skin
grafts from each other (see chapter 1).
Nonetheless, “chimera” is not a common term in transplantation, and it is
not an identity description that organ or bone marrow recipients can
expect to encounter.  However, the quandaries of identity that are raised
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by transplantation are analogous to those in genetic chimerism, except
insofar as the first is “man-made” and the second is “an experiment of
nature” (a distinction that may or may not be relevant to identity). Lock
and Sharp have used interviews and other ethnographic methods to
explore identity in transplant patients, and their findings foreshadow the
implications of chimerism for identity.  In particular, they describe the
frequent disjuncture between people’s experiences of identity
transformation post-transplant and the medical advice they receive, which
downplays or derides any suggestion that the human tissues embody and
convey personal, animistic qualities.
Sharp writes that “[t]ransplant professionals, organ donors, and recipients
alike appear on the surface to embrace the idea of organ-as-thing, yet
underneath all struggle with the larger cultural constructions that
personalize body parts.”
21  The specific contours of this struggle are
culturally specific, as Lock demonstrates so thoroughly in Twice Dead, a
comparative study of organ transplantation in North America and Japan.
22
Even within cultures, though, the emotional, psychological and spiritual
responses among individuals are highly variable.  Both Sharp and Lock
emphasize the contradictions and paradoxes inherent in this experience.
On the one hand, donors and their loved ones are encouraged by nurses,
physicians, and eager transplant personnel to “give the gift of life,” to
enable the deceased to “live on” in another.  On the other, they are
discouraged or prohibited from incorporating recipients into their social
lives, and from imagining visceral connections.  Usually the recipients
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and donors are told very little about each other, and the only facilitated
contact is a letter of gratitude delivered through the transplant co-
ordinators.  Hence the organ – when solicited – is to be seen an entity of
inordinate personal value; once given up, it is to be seen as an inanimate
object: “the rhetoric that transplant specialists use among recipients insists
… organs should be reified: they are mere muscles, pumps, filters or bits
of flesh.”
23
While it is not inevitable, it is certainly common for recipients to identify
with their donors, and to feel that they have received some of the donor’s
traits along with the organ.  This is the subject of many “psychosocial”
studies, as well as anthropological enquiries.  For example, Sharp tells
about a black man who was worried that a white woman’s kidney would
reject him.
24 Lock excerpts this story from an interview:
I still think of it as a different person inside me – yes I do, still.  It’s
not all of me, and it’s not all this other person either… You know, I
never liked cheese and stuff like that, and some people think I’m
joking, but all of a sudden I couldn’t stop eating Kraft slices.
25
Furthermore, Lock discusses a psychiatrist who works with organ
recipients, who tells her that he asks patients what they call their new
organ:  “And they’re always surprised when I ask that, because they
didn’t think anyone else had given their organ a name!  They’ve given it a
persona, a story, and they have a whole relationship with it.”
26  He also
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told her about a teenager who received a kidney from an Italian donor,
and he was trying to make a good home for it, by eating Italian foods.  In
another study, recipients reported having become “kinder” and “more
tolerant” post-transplant, perhaps because the donor had had different
opinions than the recipient, or when a man receives a woman’s heart.
27  In
short, since organ transplants have been practiced, qualitative researchers
have reported that many recipients perceive some sort of conveyance of
traits.
Sharp describes that transplant recipients are discouraged from these
kinds of ideas:
[Psychiatric and psychological specialists] voice a common
concern: it is pathological and thus unnatural when recipients
identify with their donors.  They alert other professionals to the
psychological dangers of such identification, formulating guidelines
on how to help recipients extinguish their delusions and build a
healthier sense of self.
28
As a subtle example of this, the psychiatrist whom Lock interviewed told
her: “men who get kidneys from women often feel feminized – although I
haven’t noticed a problem the other way around.”
29  His coding of this as
a “problem” corroborates Sharp’s finding.  In the 1970’s, psychiatric
professionals’ concerns tended to have a psychoanalytic flavor: “Although
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most transplantation patients make a satisfactory adjustment, some have
serious difficulties integrating the new organ into their body image, and
pathologic introjections, denial and other ego disruptive sequelae may
follow.”
30
In a more recent psychological study of organ transplantation and identity,
Swedish researcher Margareta Sanner distinguishes between “rational and
‘modern’ reasoning” and “primary process thinking.”
31  The latter, typical
of young children’s thinking, includes “archaic symbolism and illogical,
instinct-ridden, wishful and magical thinking.”
32  Sanner’s methodology
entails lengthy and repeated interviews with organ recipients.  She
explores patients’ explanations of the causes of their perceived changes in
personality post-transplant, and identifies three categories of such
explanations.  The first is “transmission, which is a kind of magical
thinking” in which “a contamination through an unspecified ‘essence’
from the donor to the recipient occurs via the transplant.”
33  Unlike this
primary process rationale, the other two kinds of explanations are coded
by Sanner as “rational.”  The first of these is, to quote a patient, that “a
gene would slip over” from the donor.  The second “rational” explanation
is “analogy thinking”: “It is, for instance, an empirical fact that a mixed
substance usually shows traits from all components comprising that
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substance. Thus, one might expect that such laws also apply to
transplantation where ‘people are mixed.’”
34
Professional discourses about patients’ beliefs in the transmission of
personality traits from donors to recipients inevitably cast the problem in
terms of an expert/lay person dichotomy.  The rational (secular) doctor
knows that the body and its parts are devoid of animistic qualities.  The
superstitious and unscientific patient believes she has been infected with a
desire to eat cheese.  However both Sharp and Lock point out that the
divide is not so clear-cut.  Doctors themselves occasionally betray signs
of, as Rabinow would say, their own “enduring cultural understanding
that the ‘person’ is inextricably tied to the sheer materiality of the body
[and] its parts.”
35  Lock tells a story of a surgeon who was uncomfortable
with the proposition that organs might be procured from death row.  His
chagrin was not because of ethical problems, but because, he says “I
wouldn’t want to have a murderer’s heart put into my body.”
36  Sharp
describes that clinicians who are all business in the presence of patients
speak more figuratively in each others’ company: “Monstrous images of
Frankenstein and the chimera haunt the literature that appears in
professional and technical journals, even while these same authors scold
their patients for referring to themselves in this fashion.”
37
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Microchimerism and identity
In chimerism research, clinicians and molecular biologists talk about cells
as representatives of the people – even as the people – to whom they
“belong.”  This synecdoche is in keeping with the enduring cultural
linkage between body and person detailed by Rabinow and expressed by
transplant recipients.  It is also further evidence that the conflation is not
limited to non-scientists.  When microchimerism researchers talk about
identity, they often describe the cellular phenomenon as a literal
embodiment of the mother-child relationship.  Their comments are rife
with cultural assumptions about motherhood.  One informant was
particularly loquacious about the mother-child bond, and related cell
exchange to his own relationship with his recently deceased mother.  A
fairly lengthy excerpt from the interview demonstrates that for him, this is
more than a fleeting reflection.
I’d say probably 99% of the people I talk to find some kind of… I
don’t know if it’s poetic justice or something… But it’s the whole
thing of mother and their children.  You know how society is,
different societies, but you know, and working women and stuff
like that, and trying to balance career and family and stuff like that,
but when it comes down to it, your mom is your MOM.  And that’s
the one person – you could be a murderer and your mom will still
come and visit you in jail.  And the thing about – there’s a saying of
something like – the mother holds their children’s hand for only a
short time, but holds their hearts forever.  And there’s a certain
almost like a physical manifestation of that idea.
 
I have my mother’s cells in me and my mother, although she
recently passed away, but she had my cells in her and it was almost
that kind of nonverbal relationship…. So even if I’m on the other
side of the world, I’m doing my post-doc here or whatever, there’s
still part of me in her and vice versa … I don’t want to get into the194
difference between mothers and fathers, but there is differences. 
And you know, your father is, my father was a disciplinarian, he
was like OK, I don’t want you to get thrown in jail, I don’t want
you to get anyone pregnant, don’t do drugs, all these things … but
your mom, is like your MOM, you know.  And there’s that part of it
that’s like – well it almost allows you to write it down on paper. 
Well what is it like to be a mother and a child.  Well it’s the
exchange of cells… I haven’t encountered anyone who has been
kind of creeped out about it.  Who said – well I’m not me.  Are you
telling me I’m not me, I’m part her. 
 
If anything, it’s almost more like poetry than science, but it’s like…
there’s all these sayings about mother and children relationships
that it’s almost like this phenomenon is perfectly suited to that.  It’s
like your mom’s always watching you.  No she’s not watching you,
she’s right here.  You think, your mother tries to instill caring and
honesty and having a heart.  Maybe that’s because some of her cells
are in my heart.  And it’s just kind of a fun thing.  Completely
outside the research that we do.  It gives some kind of humanity to
it, or some, you know like a moral justification to say well this is
good. [AG]
 
While this respondent begins with a gesture towards the ways that society
is changing to reflect shifts in parental responsibility from women to men
– “working women and stuff like that” – he clearly sees cell exchange as a
return to a deeper biological connection between mother and child.  There
is something essential and universal about motherhood, he implies, and
microchimerism is not necessarily the cause of this, but it is a “poetic”
and corporeal instance of it.
This respondent ends his lengthy reflection on motherhood with an
explicit demarcation between “the research” and “fun.”  The literal and
heretofore unknown mother-child connection gives him a way to talk195
about his work to the media and to his family and friends, and it makes
him feel good about his research. As countless careful studies in science
and technology have shown, there is no such boundary between the inside
and the outside of the laboratory.
38  Extra scientific factors – the “fun” –
inevitably, even necessarily co-constitutes the research.  This way of
thinking about cells not as representatives of people, but actually as
people cannot be separate from “the research.”
Several researchers are clear that their scientific theorizing is informed by
the biological (and cultural) relationship of mother and child.  The
following excerpt is from an interview with a pediatrician who does not
do laboratory research in the field but who does watch it closely, and she
writes and speaks about the implications of the phenomenon.
 
And you know there really is this kind of philosophical
phenomenon.  Which is just really cool.  See I have this sort of
loose brain so I think about these things.  The two cells that have
memory are our brain cells and our immune system, I mean
immune cells have memory.  So we've also got the memory of our
mom in those immune cells that hang around …  I did not choose
the title of that editorial loosely ("So you think your mother is
always looking over your shoulder? She may be IN your
shoulder!")  It seemed to me that the role of our parents, we've
always thought of it as environmental, and yeah, we have their
genes.  But now we're talking about it as being internal as well. 
Mom being internal.  Dad not ... which is really interesting.
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So then, when you come to, what's your sense of self and why
would you have, what would having more mom's cells do?  Well
for the first seven years of your life, you need to be empathetic with
mom, she needs to be empathetic with you.  She needs to
understand what's your behavior because you're spending time with
her and she's directing you.  So that's on a behavioral, basic
behavioral level.  But she's also teaching you about society.  You
get socialized by mom in every culture.  So the fact that you might
have some of mom's cells that have memory is very appealing to
me.
 [BL]
Her reference to her “loose brain” is a subtle cue that she knows she is
wading into territory that, while not exactly non-scientific, is at least
pushing the envelope.  However, she is obviously speaking quite literally,
and not just symbolically, about the cells containing a biological essence,
or “memory” of a person.  The cells are biologically doing something that
is related to the interests of the person from whom they came.
Another clinical geneticist had a similar take on the evolutionary role of
microchimerism:
I'd like to believe that [fetal cells] are there because the fetus has a
vested interest in keeping its mother healthy.  So if they are a
generation younger, and they are more plastic, and they have better
regenerative properties, you know, the fetus, the neonate at that
point wants its mother to be healthy.  So in a pre-antibiotic era, for
example, it would make sense to me that the fetus is going to
do whatever it can to keep its mother alive because if the mother
dies, the baby is going to die too.  You didn't have bottle-feeding in
those days. [BB]197
This clinician was clearly in favor of the hypothesis that fetal cells repair
rather than do harm.  It is difficult to know which came first, what she’d
“like to believe,” or her observations.  In any case, the fetal cells are
acting with the child’s interests in “mind.”
The researchers did make a distinction between what they saw as
appropriate conclusions for patients and lay people to draw from the
embodied cellular relationship (usually ones that were positive), and those
that were inappropriate (usually negative).  These are examples of
responses that my interviewees seemed to enjoy and encourage:
The most heart-rending response I've ever had is that this young
woman came up afterwards and she said, you know, I can't tell you
know much this means to me.  My mom died earlier this year.  And
to know she's with me is just so incredible. [BL]
A lot of people find humor in having their mother’s cells, which I
do too.  One woman came up when we started working early on on
this and said “Please, draw my blood, tell me that his cells are
there, he’s going off to college, I can’t stand it.”  So a lot of people
find it comforting and like the sense of connectedness in it.  I think
there are probably other people out there who don’t like the idea.  I
do remember one person saying it gave them the creeps. [RD]
And, on the flip side, investigators who were following up on the
autoimmune disease hypothesis, thought it was inappropriate, and a little
bit ridiculous, for women to jump to the conclusion that their son’s (and
not just their son’s cells) caused their disease:198
Actually, I had one patient say to me, “I want to know which of my
sons gave me scleroderma.”  Do you think we told her the results?
I don’t think so … To me, it’s just like, to give that sort of
information to somebody who would make a comment like that is
really unethical. [JM]
Another researcher gave an example of someone who made this deduction
about causation in the reverse scenario (maternal cells in a child):
And another kind of sensitive area is the potential for people to say,
you know, this is my fault then.  So particularly if you have a
woman who has a child that has some kind of disease.  And then on
top of it, draws the inappropriate conclusion, “Oh my cells caused
this disease.” [RD]
The researchers seem to be making subtle and somewhat contradictory
distinctions about the extent to which cells are people, are representatives
of people, or are “mere matter.”  They were more likely to embrace the
cell/person synecdoche when it placed their research in a positive, or at
least benign, light.
Kinship was a final theme recurring in fetal cell researchers’ comments on
identity.
39  Several expressed the opinion that maternal/fetal
microchimerism would be less unsettling for someone than containing
cells from a stranger:  “Now if it were to be like you shook hands with
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someone and you acquired cells that way from a complete stranger or
something or you kiss someone and you got cells and you’re like ‘Oh my
god I’ve still got that person’s cells’… that’s a little disgusting” [AG].
Even here though, it was unclear whether they thought that biologically
related cell sources were easier to fathom because of genetic similitude, or
because of social familiarity.  When comparing people’s reactions to
transplants to their reactions to microchimerism, one researcher said:
I guess the difference in pregnancy is that you're not talking about
something foreign, you're talking about somebody who you know. 
An awful lot of transplants don't take place among family ... [but
from a] strange donor we don't know about ... [Maybe there is] less
of a freaking out possibility about it [with family].  Maybe it's more
easy to accept what you know than what you don't know.
For one doctor, the relevant distinction was not whether you were related
to someone, but whether you liked them:
I actually think you know, it depends on whether you like your
mom or not.   But I think that even … philosophically the idea that
we have more transgenerational connection than we thought, it’s
kind of a nice thought, actually.  You know that we could be
learning things that we carry on on an immune level, or whatever
level.  I think it’s a very nice thought.  Now I guess that’s cause I’m
OK with my mom.  I mean if I hated my mom, and I hated the idea
that she’s helping me out when I cut my finger.  But I don’t think
most people are going to feel that way.  I think most people are
going to be very philosophically comforted by the idea that there
are transgenerational messages. [BL]
In these examples, it is easy to see how culturally and historically specific
ideas – about motherhood for example – become written into bodies in the200
language of science.  To return to the chapter’s epigraph by Elizabeth
Grosz: “Our ideas and attitudes seep into the functioning of the body
itself, making up the realm of its possibilities or impossibilities.”
40  These
scientists clearly conceive of cells as maintaining something of the person
– you could call it spirit, identity, interests, or self.
Fifteen minutes of fame
Only recently, because of a few well-publicized cases and TV episodes,
chimeras have entered the popular arena, and they have generated much
speculation about the materiality of identity. For most people initial
exposure to the existence of chimeras is curious and intriguing.  Perhaps
“cool,” perhaps “creepy,” it provokes an ephemeral awareness, probably
not deeply transformative.  Inevitably, media coverage and response to
chimerism highlights multiplicity, monstrosity, or both.
A recently reported case of same-sex chimerism has garnered media
attention including numerous newspaper articles and an NPR interview.
This case, along with another one, were profiled on a Discovery Health
Channel special entitled “I am my own twin.”  Karen, a woman in her
early fifties living near Boston, needed a kidney transplant and so she was
tissue-typed in order to match her to a potential donor.
41  She has three
sons, all of whom were tested to see if their tissue matched hers.  It turns
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out that not only were Karen’s sons not a good tissue match, but two of
them could not possibly be her sons.  The nurse called and told her:
“You know, Karen, something very unusual has happened here.
We've tested your sons because they were possible donors.  Your
sons' blood does not match your blood.  And that's an impossibility.
So they couldn't be your children,” is what she said to me on the
phone. “These could not be your children.”
42
Upon testing biopsies of other bits of Karen’s tissue – bladder, skin, hair,
cheek – her doctors decided that she is a tetragametic chimera.  The case
was published in May 2002 in the New England Journal of Medicine, and
Karen decided to “go public” with an NPR interview in August 2003. The
interviewer explains:
Karen's blood contains the genes from one of those original twin
sisters, whereas other parts of her body--her thyroid, skin, bladder,
hair--contain the genes from the other sister, or a mixture of both.
That explains why two of her sons appeared not to be her sons.
They inherited the set of genes not present in her blood.
43
Newspapers picked up on Karen’s story.
44  Followers of the popular
televisions show CSI (Crime Scene Investigation) suggested, on more
than one website, that it would be a good story line for an episode.
Indeed, the season finale of CSI in 2004, “Bloodlines,” featured a chimera
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whose genetic multiplicity initially gets him off a rape charge because his
blood and semen do not match.
45  Grissom, the clever forensic scientist,
has a eureka moment and the camera pans to an actual article about
chimeras that appeared in Nature in 2002, the same month as Karen’s
case was published.  When confronted, the suspect confesses his crimes,
and also his self-knowledge:
Grissom:  You know that bone marrow donation you gave your
brother? I checked your medical records.  His body rejected it and
he died.  My guess is that's when you first found out about your
unique condition.
Villain:  The doctors explained it.  I'm a creature of myth.
Grissom:  A chimera.  Head of a lion, body of a goat, tail of a
dragon.  You're a genetic anomaly.  One person, two completely
different sets of DNA.
Bloggers and fans, fascinated and “creeped out” by the possibility of
genetic chimeras, enthusiastically sought and shared information, often
referencing the NPR interview, media reports, or scientific articles about
Karen.  In 2005, U.S. Olympic cyclist Tyler Hamilton was accused of
blood doping because testing found that he carried blood other than his
own. His defense?  He’s a chimera.
46
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Discourse about these recent cases of chimerism confirms that genomes
have come to bear some deeper meaning about the essence of personhood,
like psyches or souls did at particular historical moments.  For example,
each of the following media accounts clearly draws the conclusion that
two cell lines are two people.  The Nature article begins with this
statement about another recent chimera, a child who was conceived after
in vitro fertilization: “Eight years ago in Britain, a boy was born who,
genetically, was two people.”
47  An article in New Scientist describes
Karen (pseudonym “Jane”):
In the end they discovered that Jane is a chimera, a mixture of two
individuals - non-identical twin sisters - who fused in the womb and
grew into a single body.  Some parts of her are derived from one
twin, others from the other.  Jane's body was made up of two
genetically distinct types of cells.  There was only one conclusion:
Jane was a mixture of two different people.
48
What does it mean to be “genetically, two people”?  In the NPR
interview, Karen herself describes some new anxieties about her
relationship to her sons:
Karen:  Telling my sons about this was the hardest part, because I
felt that part of me hadn't passed on to them.  I thought, “Oh, I
wonder if they'll really feel that I'm not quite their real mother
somehow because the genes that I should've given to them, I didn't
give to them.”
49
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The worry that Karen articulates is perhaps not as new as it seems.  The
language of genes dresses up old concerns about heredity and “blood” in
new clothing.  However chimerism presents an entirely new way to sever
this hereditary chain.
In each of these excerpts, the language available to talk about chimerism
invokes a complication of the boundaries of properly individuated
persons.  What to make of this?  It is clear that chimerism causes people
to flirt with notions of multiplicity and fragmentation in a more than
trivial way.  Karen’s interviewer in the NPR segment, for example,
ominously posits that “the biggest impact of chimerism is not practical,
but philosophical, existential, psychological.  For Karen, who began life
as twins, learning of her unusual past required some adjustment.”
50  It is
not entirely clear yet whether this adjustment is superficial, or strikes a
deeper chord.  In the following section, I draw on Ian Hacking’s
exploration of another kind of multiplicity to explore this question.  We
will also see that for a small community, the experiences of multiple
personality and of chimerism converge.
Rewriting the Genome
In Rewriting the Soul, Ian Hacking describes multiple personality as an
historically transient mental disorder.
51 What does Hacking’s analysis
lend to our consideration of chimeras and the multiplication or
fragmentation of selves?  Chimerism shares many features with multiple
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consciousness, the first of which is that they have both been “made up.”
Multiple personality came into being, with a patient named Felida X, in
late 19
th Century France, and it has achieved immense popularity in the
United States since the 1970’s.  Multiple personality disorder is an
example of “making up people”, an idea that Hacking describes thus:
“Inventing or molding new kind, a new classification, of people or of
behavior may create new ways to be a person, new choices to make, for
good or evil.  There are new descriptions, and hence new actions under a
description.”
52 People are made up through a number of avenues, in
Hacking’s account.  Sometimes official statistics that record births, deaths
and diseases create new kinds of people, stored in ledgers and files.
Sometimes it involves “semantic contagion”, where ways of talking about
things or imposing narratives retrospectively are disseminated through
official and unofficial channels, and are adopted by people as possibilities
for being.
53  Furthermore, multiples were (and are) made up through
situated interviews, interactions and therapies with experts who already
conceive of the possibility of being multiple or split.
Hacking gives the following example of a person being made up in such
an interaction.  Pierre Janet is a late 19
th Century French psychiatrist, and
Lucie is his patient:
Janet:  Do you understand me?
Lucie (writes): No.
J: But to reply you must understand me!
L: Oh yes, absolutely.
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J: Then what are you doing?
L: Don’t know.
J: It is certain that someone is understanding me.
L: Yes.
J. Who is that?
L. Somebody besides Lucie.
J. Aha! Another person.  Would you like to give her a name?
L. No.
J. Yes, It would be far easier that way.
L. Oh well.  If you want: Adrienne.
J. Then, Adrienne, do you understand me?
L. Yes.
54
In this example, two sorts of people are made up.  One new “person” is
Adrienne, who is conjured in the interaction between doctor and patient.
The simple practice of naming gives Adrienne an anchor for future
characteristics and behaviors.  She can now appear and reappear in Janet’s
notes and in Lucie’s mind.  The other kind of “person” made up in this
exchange, and in ongoing treatment, medical records and Janet’s
publications, is Lucie, a patient with a disorder called “dédoublement,”
(the nomenclature for what later became multiple personality disorder).
This second meaning, the historical coming and going of categories, and
consequently people who “are” that kind of person, applies also to
Hacking’s examples of consumptives, homosexuals, perverts, anorexics
and hysterics.  Does it apply to chimeras?
Recall Mrs. McK, who, in 1953, donated blood at a Northern England
clinic.
55  Her blood appeared to be a mixture of two types of blood, O and
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A. The investigators determined that Mrs. McK had been a twin, and
proposed that the twin’s blood had crossed over during gestation and
circulated in Mrs. McK even now, thirty-three years later.  His twin
hypothesis was correct; Mrs. McK’s twin brother had died at the age of
three.  At this point in the investigation and in the laboratory notes, Mrs.
McK’s blood went from being her own, though classed into “Mrs. McK I”
and “Mrs. McK II,” to being hers and her brother’s, both in pedigrees and
in the ways in which doctors talked about her/them.  The next series of
techniques were aimed at finding out which blood was her “truly begotten
blood,” and which was his.  Race writes, in a letter to Peter Medawar,
“isn’t it extraordinary to be able to group fully a person who has been
dead for 30 years!”
56
Like Adrienne in the example above, Mrs McK’s brother was newly made
up.  He existed again, in the blood (if not in the flesh), and was given a
number of biological attributes that were not assigned to him when he was
alive (e.g. blood type).  He was more or less conjured from Mrs. McK’s
body, without any access to his 3-year-old corpse.  In Hacking’s second
sense, in which “making up people changes the space of possibilities for
personhood,”
57 a new category was invented.  Mrs McK’s case was
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published in the British Medical Journal and she became the first human
“blood group chimera.”
58  Mrs. McK’s story highlights the historicity of
the category “human chimera.”  In Hacking’s terms, “… a kind of person
came into being at the same time as the kind itself was being invented.  In
some cases, that is, our classifications and our classes conspire to emerge
hand in hand, each egging the other on.”
59
Looping effects and vanishing twins
One of Hacking’s recurrent themes in several decades of writing about
“making up people” is that classifications have what he calls “looping
effects” on the people so-described.  New descriptions of people provide
new ways for people to act under that description.  As Michael Lynch
points out in his review of Hacking’s work, this may be a variation on a
long-studied sociological theme, often called “labeling”, and also
“looping,” by interactional sociologists like Erving Goffman.
60  I suggest
that chimeric conditions are susceptible to looping and labeling effects.  It
is this feature that makes chimeras the same “kind” of entities as
multiples, although Hacking himself may disagree.  Looping effects, in
his estimation, happen to “interactive kinds,” though not to “indifferent
kinds.”
61  Very basically, categories of people are the former because they
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can reflexively interact with classifications of themselves.  Most other
“things” are the latter, “indifferent” (a.k.a. “natural”) kinds, like quarks
and horses.  In Hacking’s view, multiple personality disorder and anorexia
belong to the first kind and schizophrenia and autism to the second kind.
The distinction, for him, turns on the question of whether there is an
underlying pathological agent that is “indifferent” to the description of it.
(Though his latter examples, schizophrenia and autism, and their
biological causes, have themselves been contested.)
Hacking would, I suspect, argue that cells are indifferent kinds.  A cell
either has a Y chromosome or it does not.  Such an identification requires
techniques of visualization – microscopes, fluorescent cameras,
autoradiographs, etc.  In chapter 2, I looked closely at the techniques for
finding Y chromosomes, and problematized the unequivocal identification
of Y-bearing cells.  Nonetheless, let us assume that one can
unproblematically identify more than one cell population in a single
human being.  Doesn’t that then make a chimera an indifferent kind?  An
important point to raise here is that chimerism is not as far as we know, a
disease.  Cells do not seem to be underlying pathological agents (although
they have been candidates for autoimmune disease causation, as we saw
in chapter 3).  Chimeras are undoubtedly coded as medical anomalies, as
demonstrated in chapter 1.  However many who study the phenomena
believe that both chimerism and microchimerism are much more common
than we know, and perhaps ubiquitous.  Whether cells “out of place” have
any “real” effects is an open question.210
Despite Hacking’s anticipated protestations, ethnographic evidence from
contemporary characterizations of and by chimeras suggests that looping
effects abound.  This is true, I suggest, because cells have come to be seen
as tiny selves, as sites and transporters of identity, as explored in the first
part of this chapter.  Whether or not they “really do” convey identity in
ontologically or biologically relevant ways is a point that I wish to remain
agnostic about.  However, in a way remarkably analogous to Hacking’s
multiples, members of a small but growing group of people, allied mostly
through internet communities, support groups, and through particular
psychotherapeutic approaches, conceive of themselves as multiple
because of an early loss and/or absorption of their twins.
These people describe themselves as “wombtwin survivors” or “twinless
twins.”  They are singletons who believe or know themselves to be
surviving siblings of the in utero death of their twin.  The “Vanishing
Twin Syndrome” is increasingly well known since the routinization of
ultrasound, and the existence of early twin loss is accepted by
obstetricians and gynecologists as a relatively common happening.  I have
often seen the statistic that one in eight pregnancies begin as twins.  A
medical article on the topic describes the impact on the remaining fetus as
follows:
In addition to loss of a twin, the surviving fetus has an increased
risk of cerebral palsy, particularly if vanishing twin syndrome
occurred during the second half of pregnancy.  Other forms of
morbidity reported in the surviving twin are aplasia cutis or areas of
skin necrosis. Researchers hypothesize that, in twins connected
through vascular connection by placental anastomoses, temporary211
hypotension in the surviving twin at the time of fetal demise of the
vanishing twin leads to poor perfusion and skin necrosis.
62
The medical community is, however, reluctant to affirm that the loss of a
twin in utero can have psychological and emotional sequelae.  Survivors
and sufferers have established their own support communities and are
collecting anecdotes and observations to get the disorder recognized and
to share strategies for healing.
63
My evidence of this community comes from websites, booklets that
survivors have published, and an archived email group called
vanishingtwins@yahoogroups.com.  In these forums, survivors describe,
and share, emotional repercussions of their early loss:
Due to a deep longing for some undefined, missing part of
themselves that, it seems, no mate can quite fulfill, single twins
may experience problems with relationships and/or even with their
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sexual identity.  They often suffer from feelings of guilt.  They may
be haunted by feelings that they’re “parasites.”
64 
The first step in treatment, a self-proclaimed specialist in the field writes,
“… is to create a distinct entity in your mind that is completely separate
from you.  This tiny little person may be named.  Giving a name is a very
important step because it marks the fact that your wombtwin and you
were separate little people.”
65  As with multiples, naming creates a node
around which a person can be made up.  Another similarity is that
knowledge of the disorder travels by semantic contagion.  Those who
identify as womb twins report that they began to suspect the cause of their
psychological distress after hearing of VTP in a psychology class, or after
a practitioner of a chiropractic therapy called Neuro-Emotional Technique
(NET) uncovered their twin.
66
While the groups and the phenomenon are not formed around genetic
chimerism per se, the survivors embrace the genetic phenomenon as
further proof of their predicament, and include information about
chimerism in basic overviews of the syndrome.  One survivor writes:
A team was invited in to view me, pictures were taken, and the
team determined that the pigment is not vitiligo (as I had previously
thought), but the skin of a completely different person, with its own
                                                   
64 Althea Hayton, Wombtwin Survivors: An Introduction. (St. Albans:
Wren Publications, 2005).
65 Ibid.,15.  The communityʼs discourse and its commitments to prenatal
experience resonate with “right to life” discourse, and there may be
important overlaps.
66 This is a peculiar variant of the recovered memory movement, also
discussed by Hacking in Rewriting the Soul.213
DNA and cell properties.  Basically, I am literally two people
walking around as one.
67 
My conclusion, after many months of pondering, is that I am a
chimera, and that in the womb I had a girl-twin with whom I fused
so completely that we share physical as well as emotional and
spiritual characteristics.  Since admitting the possibility I have
begun to feel her presence very strongly - in retrospect I have done
so my whole life, but could never bring myself to admit it.
68
The discovery of a second cell population legitimates their claim to the
protracted existence of their twin, both to themselves and to skeptics
around them.  Some ask how they can get tested to determine if they are
chimeras.  Promoters of the Vanishing Twin Syndrome use the very
existence of chimerism to move this psychological phenomenon from an
interactive kind to an indifferent kind, and the latter has more cultural
power. Unlike Hacking, I am not preoccupied with the ontological reality
of the underlying phenomenon, but rather I am interested in the rhetorical
moves that people make to legitimize or refute the biological reality of
disorders.
Conclusion
As Hacking traces, the sciences and scientists of memory played a
fundamental role in enabling and constraining the very possibility for
multiples to exist when and where they did.  Empirical examination of
multiples and their networks sheds light on the historical peculiarity of
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their “illness,” but it also reveals the historical peculiarity of the “normal”
condition: having one memory, one biography and one soul.  Chimeras
similarly call into question the naturalness of genomic uniformity. That
DNA can, to everyone’s surprise, reveal many within one (body, person,
individual, citizen) threatens to loosen the political glue which links one
genome to one person. “But they are so rare,” many say, or “what is one
cell in millions?”  As Nicholas Rose points out, rare individuals often
shape common knowledge in the human sciences:
Our vocabularies and techniques of the person, by and large, have
not emerged in a field of reflection on the normal individual, the
normal character, the normal personality, the normal intelligence,
but rather the very notion of normality has emerged out of a
concern with types of conduct, thought, expression deemed
troublesome or dangerous.
69
Are chimeras disruptive or dangerous?  On one level, not especially.
Despite the constant invocation of the monstrous Chimera in clinical
literature, to be a chimera is benign.  In other words, people do not seek
“diagnosis” of chimerism, because it is by and large irrelevant to their
health and self-knowledge.
70
Chimeras only become disruptive when one invests in a genome, or in a
cell, some essence of being human, of being oneself.  For example, the
following exchange featured on an online discussion forum after the CSI
episode:
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What if this happened to a Jewish person?
I don't think it would matter, because the genetic material is still a
blood relative. It would still be "Jewish DNA" so to speak. The
children she would bear would still be Jews, because she is Jewish
(and her genetic material is Jewish).  In the case of a conversion, I
would assume that any genetic material she would have would also
be considered Jewish, and any children she would bear would also
be Jewish.
71
And in another discussion of chimeras:
I know this may be a long shot but I’m wondering if that may be a
reason for some people being homosexual.  Two people one
body… could it be that both male and female embryos merged and
now both characteristics live in one human?
72
In both of these cases, people confronted with the existence of chimeras
extrapolated from cells to deeply social identities.  These statements seem
absurd at first pass, but they are not far from the “rational” discourses we
have seen scientists adopt in the course of this chapter.
With recent research in microchimerism, cellular and genetic multiplicity
is moving from the margins to the norm.  The more scientists and
administrators poke around in people’s cells, the greater is the
ascertainment of microchimerism.  Interventions such as fertility drugs
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that increase multiple births, and of course transfusions and transplants,
also increase the incidence.  One pediatrician told me:
It’s pretty striking that we’ve all got Mom’s cells and all fraternal
twins will have their cells.  It’s just how many?  Probably only one
in eight twins that’s conceived actually comes to term and so you’d
expect those to have cells in the surviving twin, and we know that
Mom carries cells from her miscarriages, so there is a lot of that
going on. [BL]
At least for this group of “loose-brained” researchers, “the self’s not a
clone of one.  It’s actually, intrinsically, the thing we call a self has these
minor populations” [RD]. The attribution of personhood to cells may
seem to be an absurd leap that effaces all the non-cellular elements of
being human.  It is certainly a peculiar and literal form of essentialism.
On the other hand, maybe it is visionary.  The persistent surprises and
liveliness of bodies should at least give us pause before we invest too
much in individualized genomes.217
CONCLUSION
Individualism, a powerful strain in Western political ideology and
politics, renders human being as contained, autonomous, independent,
liberal.  Postmodern and poststructural critical theories posit that human
subjects are multiple, fluid, relational, uncontained.  These theoretical
literatures are complex, esoteric and operate in generalities of which I am
wary.  Nonetheless, they importantly diagnose some broad features of
modernity and they constitute one literature to which this project can
contribute.  Postmodern theorists have dismantled the modern human
subject, showing it (us) to be historically constituted, often in the service
of particular political or institutional aims. Many point out that the
abstract subject implied in political philosophy is implicitly male, white,
able-bodied, enfranchised.
1  As critical feminist theorists have illustrated,
attention to the specificities of embodied subjects demands that there is no
“subject,” only subjects; no “body,” only bodies.
As compelling as the idea of a fragmented subject is to some of us, it is
hard to hold in one’s head, to imagine in real life.  Sherry Turkle
summarizes her own recalcitrance to reading theorists such as Gilles
Deleuze and Michel Foucault in the 1970’s.  These cultural theorists
taught that the self is constituted through language, and that “each of us is
                                                   
1 For feminist contributions to the study of “the person” and bodies, see
especially E. A. Grosz, Volatile Bodies; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble;
Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter; Donna Jeanne Haraway, Simians,
Cyborgs, and Women.218
a multiplicity of parts, fragments, and desiring connections.”
2  These
abstract formulations are like a secret language, opaque to the uninitiated,
and contrary to common sense. Turkle writes:
While in recent years, many psychologists, social theorists,
psychoanalysts, and philosophers have argued that the self should
be thought of as essentially decentered, the normal requirements of
everyday life exert strong pressure on people to take responsibility
for their actions and to see themselves as intentional and unitary
actors.  This disjuncture between theory (the unitary self is an
illusion) and lived experience (the unitary self is the most basic
reality) is one of the main reasons why decentered theories have
been slow to catch on – or when they do, why we tend to settle
back quickly into older, centralized ways of looking at things.
3
Turkle, however, found an entrée into poststructuralist theory twenty
years later, while studying “multiple user domains,” or MUDs, where
computer users experience multiple identities, where real life, or RL, is
just one parallel life among many.  Turkle writes: “In my computer-
mediated worlds, the self is multiple, fluid, and constituted in interaction
with machine connections; it is made and transformed by language.”
4
Chimerism is, I suggest, a potential exemplar of the kind of fragmentation
and heterogeneity celebrated by poststructuralist theory. However unlike
personalities, digital selves, social roles, or names, cells are in the body,
of the body.  Hacking writes “Some thinkers find atomistic versions of
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human nature to be obviously false.  Rather we are born into a society,
educated by it, and our ‘selves’ are sculpted out of biological raw material
by constant interaction with our fellow humans.”
5  In chimerism, our
“biological raw material” is itself sculpted by interactions with our fellow
humans (mothers and their children, for example).  A further novelty of
this case is that the challenge to intact and inviolable personhood is
coming from the work of biologists, rather than from critical social
theorists.  The cell scientists quoted throughout this dissertation seem to
envision a radical reconceptualization of personhood that breaks down the
individual in its last bastion: the material of the body.
Citing Darwin’s detailed studies of the peculiar arrangements of sex and
reproduction among barnacles, Elizabeth Wilson writes, “it seems to me
that scientific material contains schemes and wonders that are of immense
significance for feminist theories of subjectivity, embodiment, and sexed
and gendered identities.”
6  Likewise, it seems to me that chimeras can
provide food for feminist thought.  The literal embodiment of others (by
all people, not just women) gestures to an ethics of care that is
internalized.  It is not just that we are shaped by other people; we are
partly composed of them.  Wilson argues that attention to the empirical
details of biological sciences can challenge the orthodoxy in
contemporary feminist studies that “the biological sciences are politically
and conceptually inept, and that the goal of feminist analysis of science is
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to correct ideological error.”
7  While I am sympathetic to this formulation,
it risks both romanticism of nature qua biology, and the hubris that we
feminists and social scientists can tell the sheep of inspirational biology
from the goats of ideology.
Cynthia Von Buhler, the artist who created the painting in the
Introduction of this work, told me this about images she has seen of the
Chimaera: “I think they are quite beautiful. I'd like to have one as a pet.”
8
I must confess that I, too, like chimeras and those who study them.  It is
because chimeras seem prodigious and challenging to doctrines of
individuality that I chose to undertake this study.  However, as a scholar
of the social studies of science, I am in an awkward position vis-à-vis my
subject matter.  While we in some quarters of S&TS are urged retain a
symmetrical approach to scientific representation, the field exists as a
critical response to simplicity and reductionism.  Sometimes the object of
our study (about which we are indifferent) is reductionist (about which we
are less than indifferent).
Lucy Suchman articulated this dilemma succinctly in relation to her own
research on artificial intelligence.
9  The scientists she observed used
embodied, situated, complex means to go about reasoning, and then they
arrived at a definition of “reasoning” that used abstract, rational constructs
very different from those used by the scientists themselves.  This passed
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as “intelligence” in the realm of computers, but it is very different than the
embodied intelligence that ethnographers of scientific practice observe.
Suchman writes:
In particular, science studies recommend indifference toward the
relation of representation to phenomenon, in favour of a focus on
the practices by which representations of phenomena are produced
and reproduced.  In the case of cognitive science, however, the
phenomena is one on which our studies take a stand.
10
I began this project with an expectation that I would take a stand against
genetic reductionism, as do many other social researchers of genetics.  An
account of the genetics of a cell that equates it to a person eclipses
everything else that constitutes a person.  Most notably this includes the
social environment of both the person and the cell.  However, when I
bracket my suspicion of reductionist accounts, a far more interesting and
provocative story of cells and persons emerges, which is anything but
simple.
How far can I, as an analyst, push my observation that some cell scientists
and some journalists speak as though cells are people and people are
cells?  There are obvious limits to this quasi-serious, quasi-playful
discourse. For example, the very existence of chimerism throws doubt on
the fundamental premise of forensic testing, a point that public
commentators often note.
11  When confronted with chimerism, people are
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readily able to imagine blood being passed through the machineries of
DNA identification and being resolved into two different people, two
profiles, two entries in a forensic database.  But – and this is an important
caveat – we cannot say that cells have achieved full-blown political
personhood.  While I have shown that people speak and write about
chimeras as though they are “two people in one body,” no one seriously
proposes that chimeras be given more than one vote.  Rather than causing
a dramatic revision of selfhood that would have us all biologically – and
politically – interspersed or distributed, it seems likely that in political
contexts, the centuries old coherent subject will hold sway, and chimeras
will become a footnote to biological complexity.
Currently, though, the personification of cells in chimerism research
demonstrates that the move from DNA to person and back again has been
made to seem self-evident.  Curiously, though, this iteration of genetic
reductionism is creating more and more hybrid and heterogeneous people.
Karen, the chimeric woman who needed a kidney transplant, was
biologically compatible with twice as many potential donors as she would
have been if she were, “genetically speaking,” only one person.  While
these phenomena have thus far been managed by discourses of pathology,
pollution, and monstrosity, more fruitful visions of interconnectedness
may take their place.223
APPENDIX
Interview Details
(all interviews conducted by Aryn Martin)
Date Interviewee Place
6/19/04 Colleen Jackson-Cook Richmond, VA
9/15/04 Wendy Robinson Vancouver, BC
9/15/04 Judith Hall Vancouver, BC
9/18/04 Lee Nelson Seattle, WA.
10/13/04 Carol Artlett Philadelphia, PA
10/28/04 Diana Bianchi Toronto, ON
2/01/05 Kirby Johnson Boston, MA
2/17/05 Joe Leigh Simpson Houston, TX
2/18/05 Farideh Bischoff Houston, TX
3/15/05 Norbert Gleicher New York, NY
3/3/05 Sherman Elias (telephone) Chicago, IL
3/30/05 Samuel Strober San Francisco, CA
4/13/05 Laird Jackson Philadelphia, PA
4/14/05 Mark Evans New York, NY
5/11/05 Anne McLaren London, UK
5/15/05 Keelin O’Donoghue Manchester, UK
5/19/05 Claude Diesch & Carolyn Troeger Basel, Switzerland
5/19/05 Wolfgang Holzgreve Basel
5/20/05  Sinuhe Hahn Basel
6/10/05 Lola Cartier Montreal, QC
6/10/05 Alessandra Duncan Montreal, QC
6/10/05 Maryann Montreal, QC
9/6/05 Dennis Lo London, UK
3/3/06 Kim Dukes Boston, MA224
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